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ABSTRACT

Ghana like most developing countries struggles to improve access to water and
sanitation to its urban population. Presently many areas within the country do not have
access to portable water from the national grid. And in areas served by the approved
utility company, water service is mostly erratic and increasingly unreliable. Available
evidence indicates that only 61% of urban residents have access to improved drinking
water. Within the urban centers are disadvantaged communities which tend to have much
lower water supply coverage. However, since such disadvantaged communities are
regarded as part of the urban center, their unique needs are often hidden in the aggregate
statistics of the larger urban areas. Thus, policy interventions aimed at improving water
supply in the urban centers often have very limited effect on the disadvantaged
communities.
This research theorize that the unique characteristics of disadvantaged
communities such as high concentration of low income dwellers, squatter communities
and poor infrastructure developments, set them apart from the urban centers in which
they exist. This research therefore seeks to answer the question, how do you ensure
adequate water supply to disadvantaged urban communities in Ghana.
Using the case study methodology, focus group discussion and household
surveys, this research explores the unique characteristics of disadvantaged urban
communities and how such characteristics can be channeled into finding the right mix of
policy interventions to ensure adequate water supply.
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Chapter 1

1.1 Problem Statement
Improved water supply has been closely linked to economic wellbeing. (Okun,
1988; Bartram, Lewis, Lenton, and Wright, 2005; Barlow & Clarke, 2002; Shiva, 2005)
According to the WHO, adequate water supply and water resource management boosts a
country’s economic development and contributes immensely to poverty reduction.
(WHO, 2005) In this direction, inadequacies in water supply disproportionally affect the
health and wellbeing of poor men and women. (Amenga Etego, 2002; Hall et al, 2004) In
fact, adequate water supply is a key element in the reduction of poverty in all its
dimensions - growth in income, healthy citizenry, attraction of investments, etc.
In spite of the benefits of adequate water supply to economic wellbeing, Ghana
like other developing countries struggles to improve access to water and sanitation to its
urban citizens. At present, many areas within the country do not have access to portable
water from the national grid. And in areas served by the approved utility company, water
service is mostly erratic and increasingly unreliable. Available evidence indicates that
only 61% of urban residents have access to improved drinking water.
The low water supply coverage is not peculiar to Ghana alone, but forms part of a
systemic urban water supply problem in sub Sahara Africa (SSA). According to UK
based international charity WaterAid, water supply coverage in Burkina Faso and Uganda
is estimated at 61% and 60%, respectively. In Ethiopia, only 22% of the population has

access to portable water while 43% and 48% of the population in Mozambique and
Nigeria, respectively, have access to portable water.
The problems that account for urban water supply shortages in sub Saharan Africa
are enormous and very complex in nature. These problems range from institutional
bottlenecks like water utility management capacity and weak regulatory mechanisms to
infrastructure problems like poor urban planning, rapid growth of squatter communities
and insufficient financial resources. According to the United Nations, urban population in
SSA continues to grow at a fast pace. With an urban population of 13% in 1950, the
urban population in SSA has increased to a current figure of 33% annually. (Tabutin &
Schoumaker, 2002) The United Nations (UN) estimates that by 2030, one in two Africans
will be living in urban areas. In Ghana, the proportion of total population living in urban
areas increased from 26% in 1965 to 37% in 1997. It is projected that urban population in
Ghana will double in the next 20 years. (World Bank, 2002) The growth in the urban
sector outpaces the growth in infrastructure development and therefore limits the ability
of government to provide adequate utility services to all urban dwellers. Current
estimates indicate that over 28% of the urban dwellers in Ghana live below the poverty
line. The urban poor are more likely to congregate along urban fringes and defined areas
within the urban centers. These poor neighborhoods within the urban areas are populated
by squatters and migrants and also tend to have very poorly developed infrastructure. It is
within these poor areas that water supply inadequacies are felt more.
The response of governments to the urban water crisis has been through a multi
sectorial approach that strengthens legal and regulatory structures and emphasizes a clear

2

separation between water policy making, water regulation, tariff reforms and operational
functions. (Balance & Tremolet, 2005) The main goal of the water sector reform has been
geared towards introducing private sector participation (PSP) into the water supply
sector. This idea of PSP is based on a neo-liberal market ideology which advocates that
the PSP in the water sector can lead to technical know-how and efficient utility
management and bring much needed private capital investment. (Gortner et. al, 1997;
Chong & Rama, 2002; Hall, et al. 2004) However, gains from PSP in the water sector
have been mixed, and its continued use as a policy tool is very controversial. (UNHABITAT, 2003; Dore, et. al. 2004, Clarke, et. al. 2004, Anwandter & Ozuna 2002)
Within the disadvantaged urban areas, the gains of PSP have been very minimal
as PSP often leads to an increase in tariffs and slow expansion of infrastructure to
disadvantaged urban areas. (Amenga Etego, 200; Hall, et al. 2004) These disadvantaged
urban communities or peripheral municipalities which tend to have a high concentration
of low income dwellers and have very low water coverage in comparison to the rest of
the larger urban communities. The water supply differentials between the urban areas and
the disadvantaged urban areas are often times hidden within the aggregate statistics for
the larger urban area. (UN-HABITAT, 2006) In reality, there are wide gaps in the supply
and availability of water between disadvantaged urban communities and the rest of the
urban area. To this end, residents in the disadvantaged urban neighborhoods are more
likely to be unconnected to the national grid and therefore more likely to resort to the
unofficial and informal sector for their water supply. For instance, in the urban centers of
Kumasi and Takoradi in Ghana, piped water is available in most parts of the city.
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Although water service in these urban areas is erratic and suffers from periodic low
pressure, disadvantaged communities in these urban areas have a much worse water
supply problem that the urban area as a whole.
This research, therefore, looks at how to ensure adequate water supply to the
disadvantaged urban communities in Ghana. In Ghana, Ghana Water Company Limited
(GWCL) is charged with the provision of urban water supply while the Community
Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA) is charged with rural water provision. GWCL’s
mode of water supply is mainly through the construction of network pipes. This involves
building water treatment plants to treat water and laying pipes from treatment plants to
where it is needed in the urban areas. CWSA’s method of supplying water to rural areas
includes network pipe systems where appropriate, building boreholes and hand-dug
wells. In reality, since most rural areas have poor residents, CSWA mostly facilitates the
construction of boreholes and hand-dug wells which are relatively cheap to maintain.
Peripheral communities in urban areas have a high concentration of low income dwellers
and low infrastructure development. They therefore exhibit rural characteristics as
defined by the government of Ghana. Most fringe communities are not yet covered by the
network pipe system of GWCL. In some of the fringe communities, construction and
settlement patterns are such that it will be cost prohibitive to extend network pipe systems
to the area immediately. However, because they are not categorized as rural by definition,
they do not qualify for CWSA services. This characteristic leaves peripheral communities
in Ghana in between the policies of the GWC and CWSA. Peripheral communities
therefore depend on small scale water providers and other unapproved sources for their
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water supply. Using a multiple case study approach, this study analyzes the unique
problems faced by disadvantaged urban communities and how best such problems can be
addressed efficiently.

1.2 Purpose of Study
Ensuring adequate water supply to disadvantaged neighborhoods holds the
potential to increase economic wellbeing within the country. According to WHO, for
every US$ 1 invested into increasing water supply, an economic benefit ranging from
US$ 3 to US$ 34 is gained in the health, agricultural and industrial sector. (WHO, 2003)
In addition, access to water has often been regarded as a human right and has been
enshrined in some national constitutions. (Shiva, 2002; Barlow and Clarke, 2002; Hall,
2004; United Nations, 2006)
In this study, one objective is to examine the informal and unofficial sector on
which many disadvantaged urban neighborhoods have increasingly come to depend on
for their water supply. Although the informal sector is not recognized and their role goes
unnoticed, they may have the potential to improve access to water supply to
disadvantaged neighborhoods if they are given the necessary technical and financial
support.
Another objective of this study is to study the institutional and regulatory
arrangements in the water sector and how such institutions can be reformed to help
disadvantaged neighborhoods satisfy their water supply needs. A sustainable supply of
clean and reliable water can only be successful through the right institutional and
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regulatory arrangements. Thus, a collaborative effort between the various water supply
institutions and regulatory agencies together with the residents in the disadvantaged
urban neighborhoods can go a long way to improve water supply.

1.3 Research Organization
This study is organized as follows; Chapter 2 looks at some of the remote
and immediate problems confronting urban water systems in sub-Saharan Africa. It also
discusses how these problems have affected water supply to disadvantaged urban
communities throughout SSA. The chapter then considers the theoretical concepts
underlying the use of private sector participation in water supply as the lead policy tool to
address water supply shortages in urban centers. Chapter 2 ends with a discussion of how
private sector participation in water has affected water supply to disadvantaged urban
communities. Chapter 3 discusses urban water supply policy in Ghana. In this chapter,
emphasis is placed on the various institutional changes in the water sector in Ghana and
how these changes affect disadvantaged urban communities in Ghana.
In chapter 4, the methodology which formed the basis of this research is discussed
in detail. This chapter describes why the case study approach was selected as a research
design and the methodology used in selecting the three case studies and key informants
interviewed for the research. Chapters 5 through 7 describe individually the 3 case
studies for this study. After a brief history of the area, the individual chapters outline the
distinct water supply issues present at each case study area.
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Chapter 8 is a comparison of the three case studies. This chapter looks at the
similarities as well as the differences in the water supply issues in the case study areas. It
is the differences and similarities in chapter 8 that forms the basis of the conclusions and
recommendations in chapter 9.
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Chapter 2

Urban Water Supply in Sub Saharan Africa

The United Nations estimates that Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) urban population
has the world’s worst supply of urban water and sanitation. (UN-HABITAT, 2003)

1

In

most of the urban areas in SSA, there is little to no provision of water supply. And in
urban areas with water supply, there exist wide differentials in the availability and quality
of water supply. There are also big differentials in water supply coverage with the size of
the urban center. Water supply coverage also tends to be wider in large cities and declines
with the size of the city. For instance, in a study conducted in 1997 in Abidjan, Cote
d’Ivoire less than half of the city population of 3 million received water from the official
distribution system. (Champetier et. al., 2000) In Conakry, Guinea, only about 45% of the
urban population is connected to the city’s water system. A sizeable number of the 45%
that are connected to the city’s water system also experience erratic water flow due to old
and dilapidated infrastructure. (Champetier et. al., 2000)
In spite of the grim nature of the water supply systems in Africa, SSA is home to
some of the largest rivers and sources of freshwater in the world. Thus, the intractable
problem of inadequate water supply in urban areas in SSA seems to be due in part to
failures in institutional decision making and physical impediments such as improper
infrastructure development, low water resources financing and political instability rather
than actual hydrological scarcity. (AfDB, 2003)
1

There are regional differences in the supply of water in SSA. For instance, most countries in North Africa
and the Republic of South Africa have relatively very good water and sanitation coverage.
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This chapter is divided into six sections. Section one looks at the availability of
water resources in the SSA. Section two looks at the economics of water systems with
emphasis on how economic theory affects water delivery systems. The third section
discusses the state of urban water supply in SSA with emphasis on challenges facing
water delivery systems. In section four, the discussion focuses on the impact that
inadequate water supply has on SSA. Section five discusses the response of governments
to the urban water crisis in SSA. Private sector participation in urban water delivery is the
focus of discussion in section six.

2.1 Significant Characteristics of Water Resources in Sub-Sahara Africa
SSA is endowed with many big rivers, large lakes, vast wetlands, and a
considerable amount of groundwater reserves. There are seventeen major rivers in Africa
with a basin area of more than 100,000 KM2. Notable rivers are the Nile River with a
basin area of 3.4 million KM2, the Volta River with a basin area of 407,093 KM2, the
Congo-Zaire River basin with a basin area of 3.7 million KM2 and the Niger River with a
basin area of 2.3 million KM2. (FAO, 1997) There are also about one hundred and sixty
lakes which are larger than 27,000 KM2. FAO estimates that the 9 largest international
river basins in SSA alone cover 42% of the landmass. (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2005) The
equatorial area and the sub-humid East African Highlands within the Rift Valley have
most of these lakes. These massive water basins hold the potential for a variety of water
resource development options. Apart from tourism, recreation, fishing and transportation,
these river basins also possess a huge potential for energy production through
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hydroelectric power. It is estimated that river basins in Africa hold the potential to
produce 1.4 million Giga watts hour (GWh) per year. (AfDB, 2003) When developed
properly, these numerous rivers and lakes in Africa can serve as a reliable source of water
to supply the increasing needs of the urban centers and also for the various agricultural
development needs on the continent. Africa has about one third of the world’s major
international water basins. (Basins greater than 100,000 KM2) These basins hold the
potential for achieving water security in SSA. Although the occurrence of water
resources within the sub region are unevenly distributed, institutional mechanisms aimed
at promoting bulk water sale and water redistribution can improve the water security of
particularly arid regions.
Compared to other regions of the world, SSA has abundant rainfall. This abundant
rainfall pattern has the potential to charge or re-charge available aquifers and thus help
provide water security for the region. The annual downpour averages over 600 mm of
rainfall and is marked with great variability in time and place. The United Nations
estimate temporal variability of rainfall in Africa to be about 40% around the mean. The
temporal variability is much higher in temperate zones. Within SSA, the spatial
distribution of rainfall is varied from region to region. Table 1 shows the regional
distribution of rainfall in SSA. The island countries receive the highest amount of rainfall
measuring 1,700 mm per year. Central African countries and countries along the gulf of
Guinea also receive considerable amount of rainfall measuring an average of 1,430 mm
and 1,407 mm, respectively. The lowest rainfall occurring in SSA occurs around the
Sudano - Sahelian region measuring around 335 mm. (United Nations, 2005) The
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variability in rainfall can be countered by international water compacts and water sharing
agreements between the haves and have-nots.
Another significant aspect of water resources in SSA is the extremely low runoff
from rainfall. The low development in SSA means that most of the land surfaces are
unpaved and thus have less impervious surfaces. A significant portion of precipitation is
absorbed through infiltration and allows water to be stored as groundwater and the
groundwater that slowly discharges into streams and rivers through seepage. Table 1
provides a summary of the amount of surface and groundwater flows that are generated
from rainfall within the sub region.
From these water bodies in SSA, 9% of water withdrawn is used for community
and urban water supply. Industrial use takes 6% of withdrawn water. Agriculture takes
the lion’s share of 85% of all water withdrawn from water bodies in SSA. (United
Nations, 2005) At the continental and sub-regional levels, the water withdrawals are low
in relation to both rainfall and internal renewable resources. (See Table 2.1) Exceptions
occur in the northern regions of Africa where water withdrawals are 18.6% and 152.6%
of rainfall and internal renewable resources, respectively. (United Nations, 2005) It is
interesting to note that as of 2005, throughout Africa, the amount of water withdrawn for
the three major uses - agriculture, industry and community and urban use account for
only 3.8% of internal renewable water resources. Thus, at current withdrawal rates, there
is ample water available in SSA to meet the current water demands for agriculture,
industry and community and urban uses. (FAO, 1997; United Nations, 2006) According
to the UN African Water Vision 2025, if developed and managed properly, water
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resources in SSA hold the potential to supply water to 50% of people who do not have
access to water by 2015.

Table 2.1: Regional Distribution of Rainfall and Water Withdrawals in Africa

2.2 Economics of Water Systems
At the 1992 International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin,
Ireland, one of the principles adopted stated that “water has an economic value in all its
competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good”. Baumann & Boland,
1998, also wrote that “water is no different from any other economic good. It is no more
a necessity than food, clothing, or housing, all of which obey the normal laws of
economics”. In contrast, Barlow & Clarke (2002) refer to water as a “universal and
indivisible” truth that “the Earth’s freshwater belongs to the Earth and all species and
therefore must not be treated as a private commodity to be bought, sold, and traded for
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profit. They point out further that “the global freshwater supply is a shared legacy, a
public trust, and a fundamental human right, and therefore, a collective responsibility".
Vandana Shiva (2002) writing about cultural differences in the way water is viewed said
"a culture that sees water as sacred and treats its provision as a duty for the preservation
of life and another that sees water as a commodity, and its ownership and trade as
fundamental corporate rights. The culture of commodification is at war with diverse
cultures of sharing, or receiving, and giving water as a free gift".
In spite of the mixed views that water is a shared legacy and thus should not be
subjected to economic rules in its distribution, there seems to be a convergence in the
literature that though water is a necessity for human life, like other such necessities, the
principles of economics must be applied to ensure proper management. (Meinzen-Dick &
Rosegrant, 2002; Hanemann , 2006; Noll, et. al., 2000; Rogers, et. al., 2002; Briscoe, J.
1996)
Applying economic theory to urban water supply gives rise to a number of
important considerations for water policy.
2.2.a The Publicness or Privateness of Water
Economists use the terms public goods and private goods to refer to a precise
definition of certain goods and services. (Samuelson, 1954; Buchanan, 1968; Coase,
1974; Ulbrich, 2003) Economists refer to a good or service as a public good if the good
or service has the characteristics of non rivalry in consumption and nonexcludability. A
good or service is said to be nonrival in consumption if it can be consumed by any
number of consumers without affecting the quantity available for consumption by others.
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An example suggested by Ulbrich is a beautiful sunset. With a private good, like a shoe,
one person’s consumption limits the other person from consuming the same shoe. Public
goods are non excludable in the sense that it is impossible to keep people, especially non
payers from consuming the good or service. National Defense is a typical example, once
provided; taxpayers and non taxpayers enjoy it equally. On the other hand, with private
goods, if it is so desired, it is possible to exclude others from consuming the good or
service.
Within this structure, Hanemann argues that water exhibits both private good and
public good characteristics. (Hanemann, 2006) When supplied through pipes to homes or
supplied in a factory or a farm, water is a private good. Here, one consumer’s use limits
the amount of water available for other consumers. Also, non payers can be physically
excluded from it use. However when water is left in its natural state, like in a river basin
or a stream, it functions as a public good. 2 Hanemann quotes Samuelson as identifying
two significant consequences of the public good properties. The first is the issue of free
riders on the quantity of public goods to be supplied. Samuelson notes that public goods
are mostly supplied collectively through the voting process (or through public taxes).
(Samuelson, 1954) Private markets are unlikely to provide public goods because they can
not exclude non payers from enjoying the good or service supplied. (Samuelson, 1954;
Buchanan, 1968; Coase, 1974) 3 Public goods supplied through the voting process are
likely to be undersupplied because free riders have an incentive to understate their true
2

Technically, a water basin can be a private good if its owners can feasibly fence it and prevent non owners
from using it. In practice, since a water basin cannot be fenced, it becomes essentially a public good for as
long as it is not substantially depleted in terms of quantity and quality.
3
It must be noted that the free rider problem can be dealt with if the public good is supplied through
taxation and the tax collection system is effective.
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interests in the public good. (Groves & Ledyard, 1977; Anderson & Leal, 1989) Second,
since public goods can be consumed at the same time by potentially any consumer the
valuation is different from the valuation of private goods. With private goods, the value
of a unit of good or service consumed will be the value placed on it by the consumer.
Thus, in an efficient market, the value of a unit of private good or service will be the
value placed on it by the highest user or the user with the best use of the good. On the
other hand, the value placed on a unit of public good is the value of all those who use or
care for the public good. This phenomenon explains why the non market value placed on
environmental preservation can sometimes outweigh the use value associated with
diverting water for urban use. (Champ, et al. 1997; Loomis, 1997)
The public good nature of water in its natural state also has an influence on the
legal status of water. (Hanemann, 2006) In SSA, under customary law, water is treated as
a common property and therefore can not be owned by one person or one family.
(Boateng, 1999) It is owned by the whole community and citizens of the community have
a usufructuary right to use water. No individual citizens’ right to water is greater than the
other.
2.2.b The Cost of Urban Water
Delivering water to usage points in urban areas entails considerable cost. The
cost of urban water is associated with four major processes. First, it involves the cost of
capturing the water resource through diversion, reservoirs or ground wells. Once
captured, the second process involves transporting the water to areas of economic need.
The water then has to be treated, in the case of urban use, to improve the quality and
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reduce contamination. The final process involves delivering the water to consumers
through pipes.
The variability in the flow of water in its natural state also affects the cost of
water supply to urban areas. Water system delivery becomes relatively simple if water
usage is less than the inflow rate throughout the year. In a situation where usage is less
than the rate of inflow, the need to store water is almost eliminated when seasonal
variability and peak season use is accounted for. The capture process therefore involves
diverting water from its source to the transportation system. It must be noted that
temporary and seasonal variability in water flow affects the cost of water delivery.
Intermittent and seasonal variability can introduce a situation where consumption may
exceed inflow levels, though in the long run consumption is less than the rate of inflow.
For ground aquifers, this may lead to a drop in the water table thereby increasing
pumping costs. For surface water, temporary or seasonal storage facilities increase the
overall cost of water delivery.
The infrastructure system needed for urban water systems requires very long term
investments in fixed capital assets. (Aldo Baietti and Raymond, P., 2005, Hanemann,
2006) Even though variable costs associated with treatment, storage and transport can be
expensive, investments in fixed costs far outstrip costs associated with variable costs. For
instance, in the United Kingdom, fixed costs make up 80% of total water supply costs.
(Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994) Investments in the fixed costs of water systems
are recouped only in the long run after decades of operation. The rate at which
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investments in fixed cost can be recouped depends on the economic viability and the
proper management of the water system. (Dinar, 2000)
2.2.c Consumption
Water is an essential commodity for survival, thus, human beings will strive to
acquire clean water. This presupposes therefore that at some point, the demand for clean
water will be perfectly inelastic. However, in practice, the demand for water exhibits
some level of elasticity. Noll et. al. estimates that the elasticity of demand for water in
developing countries ranges from -0.25 to -0.75. This is so because, even in the poorest
areas in SSA, the demand for water is not only for survival. In addition, it is almost
always possible to find other sources of water elsewhere to complement or substitute for
clean water from the national grid. 4 Thus pricing can have a varied with considerable
effect on consumption patterns and waste.

5

In this case, if the price of water appears

inexpensive, then wasting water will be a perfectly rational thing to do. With this,
wasting water will only be imprudent if it creates a significant external diseconomy.
Mistakes in the pricing mechanism of urban water can have very significant
consequences to water use and the overall sustainability of urban water systems. When
prices are too low, there is an incentive for consumers to use more beyond what they
actually need. An increase in the quantity demand of water with price staying constant
then translates into the need to expand water delivery infrastructure beyond what is
efficiently needed. If revenues from the water systems are not adequate to fund the
4

However these sources may not be approved for consumption and its consumption can affect health and
lead to other negative externalities
5
Waste use emanating from failure to fix leaking pipes or refusing to turn of pipes properly when not in
use
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system, funding sources must come from general taxes or other sources, and this may be
a sign of underpricing or a subsidy. The consequences of underpricing can lead to water
system expansions based on faulty economic theory and inefficient distribution systems.
(Dinar, 2000) On the other hand, if water revenues cover all expenses and leave
surpluses, this may be a sign that water prices are too high. High prices that lead to
surpluses may also prop up an inefficient management system.
Low water pricing leads to a number of negative externalities. With low priced
water, there is no economic incentive on the part of the consumer to conserve water use.
Leaky pipes and other spillage may collect in puddles or slow moving water ways. These
puddles of water and standing water can serve as breeding grounds for disease carrying
insects like mosquitoes. In this circumstance, there is the further social cost of paying for
the effect of the disease carrying insects. The cost can be directly felt through increase in
health care cost or indirectly through revenue losses due to increased sick days for
employees.
Overpricing water has its own consequence as well. Over pricing water can have
the effect of cutting off much needed economic uses. Here, an efficiency improvement in
the management system can drastically reduce the cost of water.
Information asymmetry as to the value of water may also affects the price of
water. Some consumers may lack the sophistication to comprehend the connection
between water quality and health. Others may understand this connection in principle, but
because they cannot see the presence of microorganisms and perceive its long term effect
on their health, they may refuse to make the link. Thus, if the consumer demand for
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quality water is too low due to information asymmetry, consumers may respond to higher
prices for piped water by resorting to other low quality sources of water which is cheap.
This market failure can be corrected by introducing subsidies to provide some minimum
amount of water for human consumption.

The minimum amount of clean water

guaranteed to low income people and the less informed has been popularly referred to as
the lifeline water strategy. (Whittington & Boland, 2003) Since subsidies in the form of
the lifeline water strategy may increase water use, lifeline water blocks should be
strategically set to what is needed for basic needs.
One important indicator used for assessing the efficiency of water utilities is the
“unaccounted-for water” proportion. (Clarke et. al., 2004; Tremolet & Hunt, 2006; Baietti
et. al., 2006; Noll et. al., 2000) Unaccounted-for water predominantly emanates from
leaky distribution systems. Illegal water connections resulting in un-metered and unpaid
for water also contributes to the proportion of unaccounted-for water. A reduction in the
proportion of unaccounted for water will have the effect of reducing the need for
expansion, storage, transportation, treatment and distribution capacity of new water
utility systems. It must be noted however, that the cost of reduction in the proportion of
unaccounted for water will be necessary only if the value of water saved will be more
valuable than the cost incurred in reducing unaccounted for water or if consumers over
time place a higher value on water.
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2.3 State of Urban Water Supply in SSA
In spite of the existence of substantial amount of water resources on the continent
of Africa, urban water supply coverage in SSA is not good. (Jaglin, 2002; Estache &
Kouassi, 2002) Urban water supply is erratic, inadequate and in some cases non-existent.
(Barlow & Clarke, 2002; Marq de Villiers, 1999) The United Nations estimates that
water coverage in SSA stands at 57%. (United Nations, 2006) Water coverage in
individual countries however varies considerably. In Ethiopia, coverage stands at 22% of
the population. Nigeria, Mali and Uganda have water coverage of 48%, 50% and 60%
respectively. In relatively prosperous South Africa, water coverage stands at 88% of the
population. ( www.wateraid.org) de Villiers writes that as many as twenty two African
countries do not have the capacity to provide at least half of their population with
adequate water supply. (de Villiers, 1999)
Considerable progress in providing safe drinking water and sanitation services
was registered in SSA with the dedication of the 1980s the International Drinking Water
and Sanitation Decade. About 40 to 52 million more people were provided with access to
safe drinking water services in urban areas in SSA within this period. In spite of this
progress, SSA still lags behind the rest of the world in achieving the drinking water target
of 75% coverage by 2015 set forth in the United Nations Millennium Development
Goals. (WHO & UNICEF, 2004; Whittington, 2007)
The inadequate supply of urban water in SSA has far reaching consequences for
the development of the entire region. Human capital flight in SSA is in part due to the
poor infrastructure development, including adequate water supply. (Mutume, 2003)
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Gumisai Mutume argues that inadequate social services like water supply coverage are
contributory factors to the outward migration of skilled workers from Africa. (Mutume,
2003) The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that 27,000 Africans left the continent for
industrialized countries between 1960 and 1975. From 1975 to 1984, the figure rose to
40,000. The current projections put human capital flight from Africa at about 20,000
people annually. To make up for the short fall in skilled labor, African governments
spend an estimated $4 billion annually to employ about 100,000 non African expatriates.
According to the UNDP, Ethiopia which has water supply coverage of 22% of the
population lost 75 per cent of its skilled workforce between 1980 and 1991. Currently,
there are more Ethiopian medical doctors in Chicago than in Ethiopia. There are only 108
surgeons to serve the over 73 million people. 6 Apart from the effect of the loss of skilled
personnel on the local economy, the governments also have to spend huge sums of
money to hire foreign expatriates at a rate higher than local talent.
There is no compensation in terms of an inward transfer of skilled personnel to
SSA to make up for the loss. The reason for this phenomenon can be explained with the
reverse effect of Richard Florida’s theory of ‘the creative class’. According to Florida,
the creative class, which is made up of smart and talented people, is responsible for the
economic development of a city. Thus if a city wants to develop, then it must position
itself to attract the creative class. Using statistical analysis and indicators such as social

6

Shore, Bill, Share our Strength, Medical Students Beyond Borders, April 10, 2007. Available at
http://www.sharingwitness.org/health_welfare/medical_students_beyond_border/
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amenities and social freedoms, Florida explained that cities which have among other
things well structured social infrastructure were able to attract more of the creative class.
(Florida, 2002) The corollary of Florida’s argument appears to be true for SSA. Since
SSA lacks adequate infrastructural development including adequate supply of water, it is
not positioned strategically to attract professionals and some of the brightest talent around
the world. It is not surprising therefore that in 2006, foreign direct investment to SSA
accounted for only 1.8% of all global foreign direct investment inflows. (UNCTAD,
2007; Snarr & Snarr, 2008)
Agriculture and industrialization also suffers as a result of the inadequate supply
of water in SSA. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) food
insecurity and insufficiency in SSA is directly related to the water supply. SSA has
depended on rain fed agriculture for a considerable period of time. (Schraeder, 2004)
Recent changes in climatic conditions that have increased the variability and availability
of rainfall has negatively affected agricultural production in SSA. Lack of well developed
irrigation structures to augment rain-fed agriculture and also help expand agricultural
production has reduced agricultural production in SSA to subsistence level which is
plagued with multiple crop failures. (FAO-AQUASTAT, 2005) These issues associated
with urban water supply in SSA fall into two broad categories of problems;
resources/supply related problems and demand related problems.
2.3.a Resource/Supply Related Problems
The resource related problems involve sustainable water availability. These issues
deal with the distribution, occurrence, management and protection of water resources and
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the natural systems which the water resources depend on in SSA. The supply side issues
form the broader context through which water becomes available to meet the needs in
agriculture, industry and domestic water use. The existence or occurrence of water
resources in itself does not translate to adequate water supply. It is the institutional
arrangements for proper management, protection and agreements of distributional
modalities that will ensure adequate water supply for use in SSA.
2.3.a.i Multiple International Water Basins
One of the issues related to the supply side problems of water supply in SSA is
how to achieve water cooperation on a continent replete with multiple trans-boundary
water basins. Almost every country in SSA including Egypt is a riparian owner to, at
least, one international water basin. Africa has over 80 international water basins with
many basins having more than 3 riparian countries. The Nile basin which has a basin area
of 3.4 million KM 2 has 10 riparian countries. In the case of Guinea, located at the west
coast of Africa, 12 different international rivers pass through it territory. The water
interdependence problem is exacerbated by the fact that in some downstream countries,
high percentages of the flow originate from multiple countries upstream. The water
interdependence has been the subject of many international disputes, the most notable
one being the increasing tension between Egypt and Sudan over the use of the Nile River.
(Swain, 1997) Egypt, a downstream riparian on the Nile River has almost its entire flow
emanating from outside its borders. (United Nations, 2005) In Mauritania and Botswana,
the total flow originating from other upstream countries is 95% and 94%, respectively.
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The Gambia and Sudan have 86% and 77% of flow coming from other upstream
countries, respectively.
Table 2.2 summarizes riparian ownership in six major water basins in Africa.
Table 2.2 Major Trans-boundary Water Basins in Africa
Water
No. of
Countries in the
Basin
Countries Basin
Nile
10
Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire,
Eritrea
Congo
9
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo
Central African Republic, Rwanda,
Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania
Niger
9
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad,
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria
Zambezi 8
Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe
Lake
8
Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Libya, Sudan,
Chad
Central African Republic, Niger, Nigeria
Volta
6
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali, Ghana,
Adapted from presentation by David Grey, World Bank

Existence of Basin
Organization
Yes

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes
NO

In spite of the interdependent nature of river basins in SSA, there is very little
cooperation between riparian countries as to the management of the river basins. The
complexity of these trans-boundary river basins exist in a continent which has weak
national institutions, weak international laws and a volatile regional cooperation on water
issues. (McGowan & Johnson, 1984; Hyden & Bratton, 1992; Schraeder, 2002; Shraeder,
2004) Parochial national interests tend to prevail in most cases over shared basin
interests. In 1987, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) led an effort to
create the Zambezi River Action Plan (ZACPLAN), an environmentally sound
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management plan for the Zambezi River basin between the eight basin countries. At the
eleventh hour, Malawi and Botswana based on political reasons backed out of the plan
putting a nail to the coffin of the plan. After intense negotiations between the basin
countries the Zambezi Watercourse Commission was created in 2004 by the basin
countries. However, Zambia, an important basin country is yet to sign.
Even though the FAO has called for creation of a basin organization, no agency
exists yet for the Volta River Basin. Among the six countries of the basin, only Ghana
and Burkina Faso have increased their dialogue for the management of their shared water
resources. (http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/regions/africa/index.stm)
There is ample evidence that water resources management is best done at the
basin level. (Doherty et. al. 1992; Lawson, 2006; Falconer et. al. 2007) Thus, the proper
management, development and long term sustainability of water sources in SSA is
dependent on international cooperation between basin countries. It must be noted
however that cooperation does not come easily. In a single country like the United States,
many trans-boundary states have not been able to reach agreement on the use of common
water basins. (Dellapenna, 2007) The consequences of such disagreements can be very
devastating especially among sovereign nations. Unlike the United States, in SSA, there
is no central authority with enough power to force feuding parties to agree on the use of
common water basins. In fact, international relations are highly competitive and states put
a lot of importance on their interests. In the absence of cooperation in SSA, the potential
for conflicts between riparian countries has increased in recent times and there is the
possibility of escalation of such conflicts. (Swain, 1997) Agreements over the use of the
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river basins however hold the key to cooperation between riparian countries to achieve
sustainable management practices and realize maximum benefits from the river basins.
The South African Development Community’s (SADC) Protocol on Shared
Watercourse Systems offers a model for cooperation in the management of shared water
resources. The Nile River Basin initiative is also a step in the right direction to achieve
cooperation between countries within the Nile River Basin. However, this basin initiative
is only a starting point and does not in any way represent a comprehensive agreement as
to the use of resources within the basin. For instance the failure of the riparian countries
of the Nile River to agree to the specific volumetric water allocation which must be
available to Egypt downstream has been a subject of conflict between Egypt and Sudan.
The countries sharing the Niger River Basin and the Lake Chad Basin have also entered
into joint cooperation to work towards a harmonized environmental policy and the
sustainable withdrawals from the respective basins. These examples of cooperation
between countries, though limited, is encouraging and holds the key to a full scale
agreement as to the use of all basin resources in the future.
2.3.a.ii Disparity and variability in Rainfall
The variability in rainfall is a natural phenomenon that is driven in part by the
complex natural planetary forces which is hardly well understood. In recent times, the
variability and incidence of rainfall also has been affected by what the scientific
community refers to as world climate change. Apart from the direct use of rainfall for
agriculture in SSA, rainfall also feeds rivers and recharges groundwater aquifers. The
high incidence of disparity and variability of rainfall therefore affects the flow of rivers
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and availability of groundwater. The consequences are far reaching for downstream
countries as it provides unreliable flow of water. The unreliability of flow adversely
affects water planning services for domestic water supply and agricultural production.
As depicted in Table 2.1, there is high regional variability in rainfall in SSA.
Great disparities also exist between different regions within individual countries. For
instance, South Africa receives only 12% of the SSA’s total rainfall. However, the Congo
River basin located in the central humid zone which has 10% of the population of Africa
receives 35% of runoff in Africa. In addition, in the Gulf of Guinea region located at the
west coast of Africa, rainfall is in excess of 1,400 mm. The Kalahari Desert located to the
south has annual rainfall of less than 50mm. (United Nations, 2005)
According to the United Nations, Africa has an annual rainfall rate comparable to
Europe and North America. However, the higher evaporation of water in Africa leads to a
substantially lower net rainfall gain on the continent. The high evaporation and the
increasing variability in rainfall affect the availability of water resources for agriculture
and domestic use in SSA. Through the Integrated Water Resource Management
framework, certain structural steps can be taken to improve the management of runoffs.
An important step in this direction is the integrated management of land use patterns,
forests and wetlands. (Shaver et. al. 2007) Vegetative cover reduces the amount of runoff
and increases percolation of water to charge groundwater aquifers. Forested areas also
reduce the amount of evaporation from water bodies. In addition, in domestic and
industrial settings, through partnerships with planners and the construction industry,
buildings in urban areas can be constructed to harvest water during the raining season.
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Such water can augment processing for industries and also outdoor water use for
domestic consumers.
2.3.a.iii Inadequate Institutional and Regulatory Regimes
An important factor affecting the supply of water in SSA is the existence of an
effective institutional arrangement and regulatory regime at the local and international
level to preside over water supply. At the international level, the inadequate institutional
and regulatory regimes to ensure water management between basin states affect the use
of water within river basins. (Pallett, 1997; Starr, 1991) Where institutions exist,
inadequate financial support and the lack of real political power to embark on its work
have curtailed the effectiveness of such institutions. For instance, the activities of the Nile
River Basin Initiative have been limited due to the lack of financial support for the
regulatory institution. Although all riparian countries have agreed to jointly fund the
activities of the Nile River Basin Initiative, annual contributions have always been
delayed and in some cases never sent at all. For instance, Sudan has reneged several
times on its promise to contribute to the funding of the organization. (Ashok, 2002)
Industrial pollution also has caused considerable pollution in Swaziland,
negatively affecting poor communities who live at the catchment areas of the watersheds.
In 1991, the Atomic Energy Corporation in South Africa caused a spillage of 80,000 100,000 tones of caustic soda near the Hartbeesport Dam, leading to the massive deaths
of fish and other aquatic life. (Ngonidzashe Moyo & Sibekhile Mtetwa, 2007)
These polluted water bodies pose severe health hazards, especially to poor
communities located along the water bodies who use untreated water for domestic
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activities. Although in most SSA countries, there are environmental laws in place for
watersheds, they are hardly enforced. (Hardoy et. al., 2001)
It must be noted that in recent times, many SSA countries have made attempts to
adopt policies to create new institutions for environmental protection and also strengthen
existing ones. In this direction, there has been an increasing awareness of and political
commitment to Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). (Lahtela, V. 2001;
Stephenson, 2003) The IWRM is an international framework that offers guidelines to
water management. The Technical Advisory Committee of the Global Water Partnership
defined Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) “as a process, which promotes
the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in
order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner
without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems,” and stressed that water
should be managed at the basin level through the principles of good governance and
public participation. The principles of the IWRM framework have been carefully
formulated through a consultative process involving international experts leading to the
International Conference on Water and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland in 1992.
(Global Water Partnership, 2002) Although countries have committed to the principles of
IWRM in water management, its implementation has been very challenging. (Rahaman &
Varis 2005) At the Hague Forum and the Bohn Conference, information on privatization
and private sector participation in water management was disseminated extensively as
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one of the integral parts of IWRM.

7

In SSA, attempts at private sector participation in

water have been met with stiff opposition from civil society groups. Institutional and
legal problems also have led to early abrogation of public-private attempts at water
management. (Hall et. al., 2002; Clark et. al. 2004; Balance & Tremolet, 2005)
2.3.b Demand Side Issues
Demand side issues of water supply in SSA relate to the management of
competing demands for available water resources. The demand side issues consider the
extent to which such conflicting demands are managed in an equitable and sustainable
way. It looks at the issues that confront water policy makers in their quest to satisfy the
demands of the urban dwellers.
2.3.b.i Infrastructure Development
Many cities in SSA spend an equivalent of $1 to $2 per person per infrastructure
compared to cities such as Vienna, Tokyo and Helsinki which spends $1000 to $2000 per
person on infrastructure. In SSA therefore very little capital expenditure is expended for
infrastructure development in urban areas. (UNCHS, 1996) A major contributing factor
to the inadequate water supply in SSA is the neglect in the maintenance of installed
equipment. In Conakry, Guinea for instance the sanitation network which was built in
1954 has ceased to operate because of lack of proper maintenance of the facilities.
(Champetier et. al., 2000) Currently, in many SSA countries, a considerable amount of
borrowed resources for water supply goes towards rehabilitating installed equipment

7

Second World Water Forum & Ministerial Conference (The Hague 2000); International Conference on
Freshwater – Bonn 2001
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instead of expanding services. This practice therefore constrains efforts aimed at
expanding services to the poor in urban areas. (WaterAid International)
One of the underlying causes of the lack of adequate infrastructure to support
water supply in SSA is political instability and corruption in officialdom. Upon gaining
independence from European colonial powers in the 1950s, many SSA countries
descended into a spiral of internal power struggles that often led to political and social
chaos. (Clapham, 1996; Rothchild, 1997, Young, 1993; Middleton, 1997) The struggle
between various ethnic and tribal groups for political control of their respective countries
generated political instability in many SSA countries. (Clapham, 1996; Rothchild, 1997;
Schraeder, 2004) Numerous coups d'état and political instability in SSA maintained the
corrupt rule of dictators for many years in total disregard to established constitutions and
in turn slowed down infrastructure development. For the 48 SSA countries granted
independence between January 1956 and December 2001, there have been 80 successful
coups d'état, 108 failed coup attempts and 139 reported coup plots. (McGowan, 2003)
Most of these coups d'état have been orchestrated with the help of other neighboring SSA
countries. (Clapham, 1996) For instance, in Burundi from 1993 to 1996 there were six
different heads of state. Although beginning from the late 1990s, there has been a
considerable reduction in the number of coups d’etat, SSA is still the most conflict prone
and politically unstable region in the world. (Deng, Kimaro, Lyons, Rothchild and
Zartman, 1995) Transparency International rates SSA as having the highest corruption
index in the world. (Transparency International, 2007)
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Wars and civil conflicts that resulted from these political instabilities are a
primary reason for SSA’s lack of adequate water supply systems. This political instability
created a sense of insecurity for most of SSA countries consuming political agendas.
(Clapham, 1996) There was therefore little time for political leaders to pay any attention
to the infrastructural developments of their respective countries. (Clapham, 1996;
Schraeder, 2004)) Bureaucrats and civilians were helpless as most of these military
leaders and civilian dictators were unaccountable. Existing water infrastructure in
particular did not see any meaningful maintenance and there was little or no attempt
whatsoever for expansion or development. For instance, Liberia has not had any major
refurbishment of it water infrastructure system since its construction. In fact the small
incremental gains that were chalked during the 1970s and the 1980s under the then
relatively prosperous government of the Tolbert administration have been totally
destroyed by the destructive civil wars of the 1990s. In Burundi, the civil wars of the late
1990s have reduced the capacity of the water system from its pre war coverage of 70% to
less than 45% coverage. In Ghana, the Akosombo Dam and the Brimbrimso Water
System which provide water to urban centers in the south has not seen any major repairs
since they were built in the 1960s. (African Development Bank, 2005)
2.3.b.ii. Urban planning – urbanization
Africa experiences the most rapid rate of urbanization in the world – at 5% per
annum. (AfDB, 2000) Population in cities such as Abidjan, Dar es Salaam, Dakar,
Kampala, Kinshasa, Nairobi, Lagos, and Lusaka grew more than twenty fold between
1950 and 2000. (UN HABITAT, 2003) UN estimates suggest that growth in urban
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populations far outstrip rural population growth. They estimate further that 85% of
population growth in the world will be in urban areas and almost all this growth will be in
Africa, Asia and Latin America. (UN HABITAT, 2003) It must be noted that rapid urban
growth is not only peculiar to developing countries; many countries in Western Europe,
Japan and USA have also had periods of rapid urbanization. (Preston, 1979) However,
there are other peculiar issues in developing countries that make rapid urbanization a
difficulty for urban utility provision in SSA. The extent of utility coverage varies from
city to city depending on location, natural resource endowment, demographic structure,
existing economy and infrastructure development (a factor of past decisions and
investments). It must be noted also that there is no clear association between availability
of fresh water per person and the quality or extent of water coverage. There are many
cities with no piped water provision even though they have abundant fresh water
supplies. In addition to the availability of freshwater, the extent of urban water supply
depends on the adoption of appropriate policies like the requisite infrastructure
development, pricing mechanisms and the long term protection of freshwater sources.
Rapid urbanization has given rise to increased shanty towns, squatter
communities and enclaves of populations living in low income neighborhoods. (Rakodi,
1997; de Soto, 2000) For such disadvantaged communities, the basic structures of
government agencies with utility responsibilities are at best partially present and at worst
nonexistent. The unplanned nature of shanty towns in urban areas leaves little room for
infrastructure to be built. Government planning of cities is not able to keep up with the
rate of urbanization. Thus, it is common to find unauthorized structures springing up in
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public places and areas designated for infrastructure development. Often government
agencies are rooted in corruption, have undemocratic structures, favor elites and limit
disadvantaged communities from demanding their rights. Where urban structure plans
exist, public officials are ill equipped for enforcement.

Table 2.3 Urban Growth in Selected African Cities

Source: Collignon, 2000
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Table 2.4 Poverty, Informal Employment, and Urban Growth Rates in Ten African Cities

2.3.b.iii Political Causes
Civil wars and tribal conflicts are a key contributory factor to the increased
urbanization in SSA. During wars and conflicts, a considerable proportion of the
internally displaced people move to the urban areas, in part, to seek refuge and also to
establish new bases for their families to live. For instance, during the 1980s and 1990s
civil wars in Angola, Mozambique and Sudan, millions of displaced people fled to urban
areas. The same trend occurred earlier in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia during their liberation
struggle of the 1970s. (Potts, 1995) Movement patterns and trends make it difficult to
accurately determine population counts for planning purposes. For instance, since the
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1970s, Angola has not had any full census. (Cain, Daly & Robson, 2002) Yet, since the
1970s, there have been huge population movements in Angola. Rural areas became
unsafe during the 1980s conflicts, and this triggered a mass movement to small towns,
inland cities and major cities along the coast. (Cain et. al. 2002) Throughout SSA, the
number of internally displaced people increased markedly during the 1990s and most of
these people ended up living in urban areas. (Castle & Miller, 1993)
2.3.b.iv Squatter and Illegal Settlements
Increased urbanization has accelerated the growth of squatters and illegal
settlements in urban centers. It is common to find between a quarter to half of all city
dwellers living in informal or illegal settlements. (Hardoy & Satterthwaite, 1989) That is
to say there is some illegality with either the land being settled on or the housing
development on the land. Squatter and illegal settlements have significant importance for
water provision because public and official private water providers may be precluded by
law from operating in these areas. In addition, such illegal settlements may lack the
preconditions necessary for water service delivery. Plots on which houses are built may
not have the proper legal documentation that will allow them to be registered, houses
may not have any identifiable or formal addresses, or they may not have the right
documents to show plot boundaries and legal ownerships. (de Soto, 2000) Such informal
and illegal settlements areas suffer particularly from bad utility services because some
countries make ownership or proper documentation a condition for such services. For
instance, in Senegal, applicants for social water connections (subsidized water to poor
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households) must among other things prove that he or she has proper legal documentation
to the residence. (Lauria, Hopkins & Debomy, 2005)
The nonexistence of proper property titles also poses a challenge to situations
where the private sector involvement has been sought to increase water services.
(Nickson, 2001) The absence of legal title may remove any legal requirement for the
private provider to extend services to these illegal settlements. For example, in 1999 in
Cartagena, Columbia, the World Bank reported that about one-third of the residents did
not have access to running water and sanitation. The concessionaire on the other hand
argued that over 90 percent of the residents were served by the water network. The
concessionaires arrived at their 90 percent coverage figure without counting the
numerous squatters in the city. (Nickson, 2001)
It must be noted that the degree of illegality varies from country to country and
within countries, from city to city. Although illegal and informal settlements inhibit
supply of improved water services by utility operators, the extent to which the operator
can reach the informal settlement varies from city to city. Many water supply agencies
may have no difficulty in working in many illegal settlements. For instance, water
agencies may routinely support water supply in illegal housing complex where the land is
not occupied illegally, but were built without obtaining official permission. In some
cities, most of the illegality is due to the fact that no official permission was obtained for
building, or buildings were built in violation of the existing zoning regulations. In such
instances, utility operators are less apprehensive in providing water services, especially if
the settlement has many middle or upper income residents. Also, water companies may
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normally provide water services if the residents of the illegal settlement have reached an
agreement with the authorities or the water and sanitation agency to regularize their stay
over time. The problems of illegal settlements are compounded by the fact that in many
cities such settlements spring up with the tolerance and tacit approval of local and
national governments. For instance, in 2004, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly evicted a
considerable number of illegal traders, among them squatters from public lands as part of
a citywide decongestion exercise. But before the exercise would be completed, the
government ordered it to stop and the squatters returned to their illegal settlements
overnight.
Small scale water providers may be reluctant to invest in illegal settlements for
fear of future eviction. Residents may also refrain from investing in any permanent water
supply structures for fear of future eviction. The problems do not go away even in
instances where the government takes steps to regularize the stay of squatters and other
illegal settlers. Because the initial settlement was executed without adherence to any
rules, it is common to find houses built on any available space in the community. The
resultant effect is a settlement with few access roads and few access points for water
utilities. Thus, after regularization of such settlements, it becomes next to impossible to
lay utility pipes. The haphazard nature of the developments leaves very little room for
utility pipes. It is more difficult and expensive to install water systems in settlements that
lack clearly demarcated plots, good plot layout and access roads and paths to each house.
In SSA, historical conditions have not been conducive to favor development of
effective local authorities. The European colonists paid little attention to developing local
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governmental structures. There was therefore very little to build on after the wave of
decolonization in the 1950s, 60s and 70s. (Schraeder, 2004; Clapham, 1996) Newly
independent SSA countries were confronted with the shock of massive urban changes as
restrictions in working and living in urban centers were removed. 8 (Potts, 1995) In most
countries, the colonial governments had put in place water infrastructure strategically to
benefit their commercial and industrial interests. Local government systems that will
allow a functional water system were nonexistent. Thus, at independence, only weak
structures existed for urban water and utility planning.

At independence, the new

national governments failed to put emphasis on strengthening the capacities of local
government systems to meet the challenges of urban planning. (Schraeder, 2004) Many
national governments rather placed emphasis on consolidating security to perpetuate their
rule. (Clapham, 1996) In addition to this, many SSA countries descended into years of
conflicts and anarchy not too long after independence. It therefore comes as no surprise
that many SSA countries have woefully inadequate urban water supply.
2.3.b.v Capacity of Local Utilities
The ability to supply water to urban areas is affected by the nature and operations
of local utility companies. It has increasingly been recognized that one of the problems
affecting water provision in urban areas in developing countries is the poor performance
of utility companies. (McIntosh & Yniguez, 1997) For many countries in SSA, tariffs
charged by the utility agency are not enough to cover the cost of production. Tariff
limitations imposed by regulatory agencies limit the ability of utility companies to
8

Almost all European colonial powers kept down urban population during colonization by imposing
apartheid like restrictions on the right of people to live and work in urban areas
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accumulate resources for future repairs or extension of services to new settlements.
(Balance & Tremolet, 2005) For many local utility agencies financial resources for
capital expenditure can be possible only through grant financing.
The incapacity of local utility agencies is partly due to institutional problems.
Utility agencies like other bureaucratic agencies in SSA suffer from inefficient
administrative practices, insufficient information and communication, inadequate skilled
human resources and overstaffed agencies.
The World Health Organization (WHO) reported in 2000 that the use of water
meters is very prevalent in urban areas in Africa. About 80 percent of all domestic water
users are metered. However, the frequency with which these meters are replaced is very
low. On the average, meters are replaced every eight years. (WHO & UNICEF, 2000)
Taking into consideration the fact that water meters under-read as they age, it is likely
that consumers pay less for water as their meters age. This increases the unaccounted for
water rate and further compounds the unsustainability of water utility agencies in Africa.
According to a 2000 assessment report of WHO and UNICEF, meter
replacements represent a substantial expenditure for a water supply agency. In many
countries, meter replacement may form a high proportion of foreign exchange
expenditure in the water supply sector. It comes as no surprise therefore that the average
replacement time for water meters is high even though this may lead to broken meters,
underbilling and increase in the unaccounted-for water. For instance, the unaccounted-for
water rate in Uganda is 37% and as high as 55% in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. (Balance
& Tremolet, 2005)
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2.4 Impacts of Inadequate Water Supply
As depicted in the preceding sections, the majority of urban areas in SSA suffer
from inadequate supply of portable water. The lack of adequate water supply presents
very serious negative consequences for urban settlements in SSA. Negative consequences
such as health problems, cost of finding alternative water supply through high monetary
cost and time cost in finding alternative water sources ricochets through urban areas in
SSA. The inadequacies in water supply disproportionally affect low income households
within urban centers. And within the low income households, much of the burden for
finding alternative sources of water rests on women and children. Apart from the effects
on persons and households, the inadequacy in urban water supply also affects the
economic development potential of cities and nations.
2.4.a Health Effects
Urban centers are characteristically a concentration of dense human settlement
patterns. Such human concentration centers are also characteristically full of waste from
residential settlements and industrial estates. According to WHO, whenever infrastructure
and services are inadequate, urban centers become one of the most life threatening human
environments in the world. (WHO, 1999) Inadequate water supply gives rise to many
diseases and in urban slums, living in close proximity with one another fuels the spread
of some of the diseases. At any particular time, almost half of urban dwellers in SSA are
suffering from one or more of the major diseases associated with inadequate water
supply. (WHO, 1999)
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Water related diseases are classified into four main groups in accordance to the
way by which such infections are contracted. The four groups are fecal-oral, waterwashed, water-based and water-related insect vector. (Cairncross & Feachem, 1993)
Diarrhea is the most common fecal-oral diseases and it accounts for a significant
proportion of illness in children and adults. Diarrhea also accounts for a high percentage
of water related deaths in infants and children. (Songsore & McGranahan, 1993) The
diarrhea causing microorganisms can be water borne and can also be transmitted through
fecal-oral routes by which the organisms enter the mouth. (Example, refusing to wash
hands properly after using the bathroom) In poor urban areas where the provision of
water is inadequate, fecal-oral diseases can pose a serious health challenge to the entire
city. (Songsore & McGranahan, 1993) In Nairobi, Kenya for instance, the occurrence of
diarrhea in children under three years old living in informal sectors were found to be
twice the national average. (UN-HABITAT, 2003) Human congestion and improper
human hygiene can fuel the spread of such diseases. It is not uncommon to find three to
five persons sharing a room in poor neighborhoods in urban centers in SSA.
Inadequate water supply for washing and bathing is the leading cause of waterwashed diseases. Such diseases include various forms of skin and eye infections like
scabies and trachoma. In a study of 1103 primary school students in the urban area of
Bamako, Mali, the occurrence of scabies among pupils was around 4%. The occurrence
of scabies ranged from 1.8% at the schools with the highest socio-economic levels to 5%
in schools serving poor neighborhoods. (Landwehr et. al., 1998)
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Bilharzia and guinea worm are the two most prevalent water-based diseases.
These diseases predominantly affect people living in rural areas because of the fact that
infection mostly takes place in people working in irrigated farms and walking in streams
and rivers. Increasing number of cases of bilharzias and guinea worm are beginning to
show up in urban areas as well. As a result of the increasing tide of rural-urban migration,
infected people find themselves in urban centers. In addition, it is not uncommon to find
water bodies in urban centers harboring the aquatic snails through which the disease is
contracted. Poor neighborhoods in urban centers are the most vulnerable to the incidence
of water-based diseases. Low income households are more likely to fetch water from
streams and ponds to augment their daily water needs.
Malaria is by far the most serious effect of diseases spread by water related
insects in urban centers. Once considered a rural disease, malaria is now one of the
leading causes of illness and deaths among urban dwellers. (UN-HABITAT, 2003) In
SSA, drinking water storage containers among others have become breeding grounds for
the parasite carrying mosquitoes. Inadequacy in urban water supply has forced many
urban dwellers to store water in containers in their homes. The Anopheles mosquito
which carries the malaria parasite breeds in standing water and therefore finds small
water containers and other domestic storage facilities which are not covered properly
good breeding grounds. (Cairncross & Feachem, 1993)
Diarrhea and malaria are the two main killers in Luanda. (Cain et. al., 2002) It is
interesting to note that opinions differ in regards to the extent to which inadequate water
supply contribute to diseases. Data at the city level from Global Urban Indicators indicate
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that child mortality rates are highly correlated with the availability of portable water and
sanitation than with other variables like household poverty and access to health care.
(Shi, A, 2000) In other studies, the link between environmental factors and health are
very strong even with constant social and economic variables. (Victoria, et. al., 1988;
Woldemicael, 2000) It is however clear that the linkage of water to health and other
socioeconomic variables is very complex. This linkage can vary from place to place. In
Ghana for instance, the effect of environmental factors on diarrhea prevalence are modest
when socioeconomic factors are held constant. This may be due to the fact that provision
of water in urban areas is very poor. On the other hand, in Thailand, environmental
factors have a strong correlation with the prevalence of diarrhea, but not to mortality.
This may be explained by the relatively high access and use of health services. (Timaeus
& Lush, 1995) In spite of the place differentials, children have a higher propensity to
contract diarrhea, worm infestation, malnutrition and other diseases where there is
inadequate supply of water and sanitation and improved conditions lower this risk. (Shi,
2000; Timaeus & Lush, 1995)
2.4.b Costs and Perpetuation of Inequality
The health impacts resulting from inadequate supply of water in urban areas cost
a lot of money for the victims to treat. The cost can also result in lost wages and lost time
pursuing economic activities. Inadequate water supply also means huge physical efforts
on the part of urban dwellers to fetch water and carry water. Residents spend long hours
in queues and suffer the inconvenience of carrying water over long distances. There have
been reports of children getting killed by cars while crossing the street to fetch water. It is
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interesting to note that these impacts are disproportionately felt by poor neighborhoods
and disadvantaged urban communities. The UN has noted that the extent to which
segments of the urban population feel the effects of such impacts are difficult to estimate.
It is often difficult to get accurate data on the demographic structure of urban areas in
developing countries. In small urban centers, data on urban demographics are virtually
non existent. Available data on quality and extent of service is calculated in averages.
Thus, outlier information can significantly skew the accuracy of the data. In Accra, two
thirds of the poorest households did not have water supply in their households compared
to 12% for the wealthiest households.
Apart from the fact that most poor urban households pay a large proportion of
their income on water than non-poor households, they also pay higher prices per liter of
water than non-poor households. Studies have found that low income households which
rely on vendors in large urban centers spend 5 to 10 percent of their total income on
water. In Nouakchott for instance, it is estimated that low income households spend
between 14 to 20 percent of their total income on water. (Azandossessi, 2000) In
Khartoum, Sudan, as much as 35 percent of household income for poor households went
to payment of water from vendors. (Cairncross, 1990) Expenditure for water reduces the
amount of money spent on food thereby increasing malnutrition and eventually
contributing to increasing levels of child mortality.
Water costs are particularly high for those who depend on some form of vendor
services for their water supply. The price of water from vendors can range from 10 to 100
times higher than the unit price of water connections for house connections. It has been
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estimated that water vendors serve between 20 to 30 percent of all urban population
dwellers in low and middle income countries. (Briscoe, 1986) This number is estimated
to have risen considerably in Africa, Asia and Latin American which has seen a
population increase of over 700 million since Briscoe’s analysis. In a survey of selected
Asian cities by the Asian Development Bank, it was found that the unit cost of public
taps may also be much higher than the unit cost of house connections.
In many urban areas where dwellers are dependent on vendors for their water
supply, 150 liters of water a day will cost more than US$1. (In general each person uses
20-30 liters of water per day.) 150 liters for a household of 5 is generally not sufficient
for good hygiene. For purposes of ensuring general hygiene, about 600 liters of water will
be required. (UN-HABITAT) The cost of 600 liters will run into several US dollars per
day and this would be beyond the means of many poor urban dwellers. This presupposes
that the price of water limits the ability of many urban dwellers from getting access safe
and adequate supply of water. Although generally very expensive, vendor services are
very important to the survival of many urban dwellers. In addition, most water vendors in
urban areas operate in a competitive market and the price of vendor supplied water is an
indication of the operating cost of vendors.
2.4.c Travel Time and Associated Costs
In poor urban communities where there is no piped water into households, a
member of the household has to spend time to get water. Compared to households with
piped water where virtually no travel time is spent on water, unconnected households
spend an average of an hour every day to get water. (UN-HABITAT, 2003) A
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considerable amount of time is spent is long queues for water in the morning and in the
evening. Since low income people spend long hours at work, this time spent getting water
diminishes their economic earning potential. Staying in queues for a long time at stand
pipes which have erratic water flow is a source of tension and they often degenerate into
conflicts. In a study of households in 16 sites in 9 urban areas in Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania in 1997, it was found that households with no piped water spent an average of
92 minutes every day collecting water. (Thompson et. al., 2000) This translates into an
average of over 500 man hours spent each year on water. Compared to the 1960s when
average water collection time was 28 minutes, 92 minutes represent more that a threefold
increase in collection time.
The person or persons responsible for fetching water will have to wake up very
early in the morning to ensure there is enough water in the household for morning chores.
Women and children are normally designated with the responsibility of collecting water.
It must be noted that in some disadvantaged urban communities where the majority of the
people are made up of rural migrants, it is not uncommon to find men in queues for
water. This is explained by the fact that some men leave their families in the rural areas
while they migrate into the cities in search of jobs to provide for their families in the
villages. Irrespective of who the responsibility falls on to fetch water, water is very heavy
to carry. The longer the distance traveled with water, the more the physical strain on the
person carrying the water. Thus, the amount of water used will depend to a large extent
on the distance that one has to carry the water from. A household that maintains
consumption rate of only 150 liters a day (ie equivalent of 4 buckets) will mean carrying
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150 kilograms of water from the fetching point every day. It is therefore not surprising
that those who have the responsibility for carrying water develop severe back problems.
The strain of carrying water for long distance coupled with the chance of road accidents
put children at high risk.

2.5 Government Response to Urban Water Crisis in SSA
It is reasonable to assume that no responsible government will be happy about the
effects that inadequate water supply has on its citizens. In SSA, various efforts have been
attempted to ease the effect of inadequate water supply while at the same time planning
to increase water supply. Policy options and institutional arrangements available to the
government to respond to the water crisis are affected by some distinguishing features
from other utilities and infrastructure that set it apart. (Noll et. al., 2000; Hanemann,
1998) Noll et. al. (2000) point out that these distinguishing features of water influence
the choice of reforms applied to the water sector. There is substantial local variation in
the cost, availability and quality of water. This variability in locality affects the choice of
appropriate water market structures, the right regulatory institution and pricing
mechanisms. Also, there is limited possibility of incorporating competition in water
supply. (Clarke et. al. 2004) In aspects of water supply where competition is feasible, it is
often times viewed negatively as socially undesirable. (Noll et. al. 2000, Shiva, 2005)
Another distinguishing feature of water is the enormous capital assets that make up the
bulk of water supply infrastructure. Frequently, such assets have a very long life span.
Hanemann estimates that the infrastructure associated with a pipe network can have an
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economic life span of 50 – 100 or more years. This is far longer that capital investments
in other comparable public utility infrastructure. Where the private sector is involved in
infrastructure development, there have to be measures to allow the private operator to
recoup the sunken cost. Any agreement to supply water that involves substantial
infrastructure construction therefore has to be for a long term. Governments in
developing economies face an uphill task of convincing private companies that their
fragile economies will be sustainable over an extended period of time to allow sunken
capital cost to be eventually recovered. (Privatization is therefore mainly management
and leasehold with little expansion of service.) A final distinguishing feature of water is
that health and environmental externalities associated with its coverage are very difficult
to internalize or to regulate efficiently.
Response to water adequacy problems in SSA has been mainly on the demand
side. Water policy in SSA over the last twenty years has chiefly been geared towards
increasing and developing new water systems to cater for the growing water demand. In
this direction, water policy has focused on building more dams and water ways and also
looking for new water bodies to harness new water supply. Considering that a high
percentage of people in SSA do not have adequate supply of water, building new dams
and harnessing new water resources sounds like a step in the right direction. However,
the population of SSA is increasing faster than current water supply systems are
expanding.

According to Getches, the “mistaken approaches to water policy are

characterized by a perpetual insistence on addressing all water problems with a quest to
provide more water”. (Getches, 2004)
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The underlying assumption of the supply side policy is that water supply can
expand indefinitely as the demand for water grows. This assumption poses a lot of
problems as it gives the wrong incentives to the consumers. In addition, water supply is
finite and erratic in flow. Available evidence indicates that supply throughout the world is
fast dwindling while demand is growing (Rosegrant, 1997; Stiassny, 1996; Postel, 2000).
In SSA, increasing desertification in the Sahara and Kalahari regions is threatening water
bodies. Also, deforestation and pollution are threatening water bodies in West and
Central Africa’s highly forested areas. The Nile, Niger, Victoria and Zambezi rivers have
for the last twenty years been declining in flow and water level.
Governments’ response to urban water crisis has mainly been through an overall
sector reform through the adoption of legal and regulatory structures that establishes a
clear separation between water policy making, water regulation, tariff reforms and
operations functions. (Balance & Tremolet, 2005) This sector reform has been chiefly
geared towards the introduction of private sector participation (PSP) into the water supply
sector. Private sector participation in water supply in SSA tends to range from the most
limited, like service or management contract where the operator only contracts to manage
the water utility usually with no agreement for major expansion to the more extensive
like concession or long term leaseholds or affermage where the operator takes charge of
the whole urban water system and usually includes an agreement for major network
expansion.
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2.5.a Selected Private Sector Participation in SSA
Burkina Faso
Urban water in Burkina Faso is supplied by the National Water and Sanitation
Authority (ONEA). ONEA is a limited liability company which is charged with the
responsibility of producing and distributing water to a total of 41 urban centers in
Burkina Faso. Although ONEA is perceived as innovative and relatively efficient, water
service coverage under ONEA has remained low. Only 20% of residents in the area
served by ONEA have access to domestic water services. ONEA however has a policy of
developing standpipes across its coverage area to serve the urban poor and unconnected
areas to make up for the low network connection. With the standpipe water policy,
ONEA is able to reach an additional 50% of the population in its service area. It must be
noted though that service is unevenly distributed through out the coverage area. As such,
there is a high incidence of water resale activities especially for unconnected residents
who live further away from the standpipes. ONEA’s

commercial

and

financial

performance has contributed to weakening of its operations. ONEA however has a
relatively strong technical performance reflected through its rather low unaccounted-forwater rate of just 15%.
PSP in Burkina Faso was pushed by donors who provided funding for the Ziga
Dam, a major investment project termed the Ouagadougou Drinking Water Project to
increase the supply of water to the capital Ouagadougou and surrounding areas. As a
condition for their involvement, the donor agencies placed emphasis on efficiency and
financial reforms of ONEA. ONEA was thus to enter into a management service
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agreement with an international water supply company and a financial management
agreement with a reputable financial firm to see to the financial integrity of ONEA. In
2001, an international water supply company (Veolia) and an International auditing firm
(Mazars & Guerard) formed a joint venture and signed a five year service contract to
manage the affairs of ONEA.
Mali
Mali has a dual water supply system in its urban areas. Traditionally, a national
operator, Energie du Mali (EDM) has been responsible for providing water supply
services to 16 major urban areas. As of 2000, the 16 urban areas made up almost 20% of
the urban population in Mali and EDM’s coverage was estimated at 60% within this
segment of the urban population. More than a third of EDM’s services is through the
provision of public standpipes.
Apart from the 16 urban centers covered by EDM, an additional 49 urban centers
and municipalities are charged with the provision of water supply. These municipalities
are however required by law to delegate their water provision authority to a private
operator or a user association.
Years of low investment left EDM under-resourced, inefficient and in need of
serious reform to survive. To salvage EDM, a management contract was entered into with
a consortium of the international firm SHEC in 1995. The management contract was
however prematurely abrogated at the instance of both parties due to conflicts in
performance improvement target rates. In 2000, SAUR International with 60% ownership
in EDM signed a 20 year concession contract to operate water and electricity. The
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concession contract was mainly to expand services and to improve the financial and
technical performance of EDM. (Hall et. al., 2002)
The concession contract puts EDM in charge of operations and investments in the
service area. A directorate within the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water monitors the
contract while a regulatory agency established in 2000 is charged with regulating the
water and electricity sector. This concession contract was riddled with conflict right from
the start with both parties accusing each other of sabotage. The Malian authorities started
to criticize the performance of the concessionaires and the criticisms increased when the
concessionaires failed to raise the long term finance needed to fund its investment
obligations under the contract. A series of cuts in tariffs also compounded the ability of
the concessionaires to raise the needed investment capital. Investments in the service area
slowed down considerably and this increased the accusations of unsatisfactory
performance. A World Bank brokered peace between the two parties still did not end the
animosity between the parties. Balance & Tremolet, (2005) argue that the genesis of the
bad relationship between the parties to the concession contract stems from a weak
contract design.
Tanzania
In 1997, the government of Tanzania adopted a new legal framework which broke
up the National Urban Water Authority (NUWA) into separate legal entities with
different water coverage areas. For the 20 regional centers in Tanzania, the government
established 20 separate Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Authorities (UWSAs) to
provide water and sanitation to these areas. In total, the UWSAs are in charge of
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providing water to about 3 million people which makes up 38% of urban population in
Tanzania. District Urban Water and Sewerage Authorities (DUWSAs) were established
to provide water and sanitation to small towns. In the capital city of Dar es Salaam, water
and sanitation services have been managed independently from the rest of the country
since the 1980s. Tanzania in 2001 established the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage
Authority (DAWASA) to provide water and sanitation services to the over 3 million
residents (38% of urban population) in the capital.
In 2003, a ten year lease contract was signed between DAWASA and a private
consortium, City Water Services. Under the lease contract, City Water had responsibility
for billing, tariff collection and operation and maintenance of water systems. In May
2005, the ten year lease contract was abrogated due to complaints by the government that
City Water was performing poorly.

A new company, Dar es Salaam Water and

Sanitation Corporation (DAWASCO) was established by the government to take over the
services provided by City Water Services.
The governments’ response to the urban water crisis can be summarized as
follows;
1. To defer to the private sector and market forces to provide urban water instead of
relying heavily on public production.
2. To push the responsibility for urban water production to individual urban units
instead of keeping all decision making centralized.
3. To encourage the complementary role of water vendors and the activities of non
governmental organizations that focus on water supply.
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The influence of these policy options on actual water supply policy has been mixed. The
policy options used varies from country to country depending on the actual conditions
present at the local level. In spite of this, prevalence of private sector participation in
water supply in SSA has been on the increase. (Clarke et. al., 2004; Bakker, K., 2003)
Private sector participation in water supply has at the same time been hotly debated as to
its effect on urban water supply.

2.6 Private Sector Participation in Water
The idea of private sector involvement in the operation of water utilities is based
on a neo-liberal market ideology. This neo-liberal market ideology advocates that private
sector participation in water and sanitation can bring technical know-how and efficiency
improvements and, in developing countries, private capital. (Gortner et. al, 1997; and
Chong & Rama, 2002)
Privatization or private sector participation in water utility was introduced into
sub Saharan Africa in the beginning of the 1990s. (Hall, et al. 2004) Since then, a number
of African countries have undertaken water sector reforms to incorporate the private
sector in their water utility delivery and management. (Hall, et al. 2004; Bakker, 2003)
Other countries are in the process of reforming their water sector for introducing the
private sector participation in their water utility systems.
The gains from private sector participation in water supply have been mixed and
very controversial as well. (UN-HABITAT, 2003) The controversy stems from the fact
that there has been mixed reaction as to the benefits of private sector participation in

55

water utility. (Dore, et. al. 2004, Clarke, et. al. 2004, Anwandter and Ozuna 2002) A
number of scholars have argued convincingly that private sector participation in water
utility management does not increase efficiency in water supply significantly. (Vickers
and Yarrow 1991; Hall, et al., 2004, Estache and Rossi 2002; Smith, 2003) Yet, other
authors have also argued in favor of the efficiency and utility gained in private sector
participation and have therefore advocated for market based reforms as the lead strategy
for water sector reform. (Rogers, P. et al. 2002; Boardman and Vining, 1989; Tynan,
2000). The lead organization in favor of market based reforms in the water sector in
developing countries has been the World Bank.
In Africa, the controversy is compounded because of the distinct problem of poor
infrastructure, poverty and low income among other factors. In spite of local and
international protest against privatizing water supply in Africa, it seems to be the lead
reform tool in Africa today. (Clark et al, 2004; Bayliss, 2004)
Up until the mid 1980s, utility services were monopolies owned and managed by
the public sector in almost every country. By the late 1980s, scholars had began to
question the rational and effectiveness for the public sector to manage these utilities.
These were mainly due to technological changes and better understanding of the cost of
monopolies. (Clarke et al, 2004) Starting from central Europe, a sweeping reform of the
way and manner water utilities were managed took place. Britain under Margaret
Thatcher was credited as undertaking the most far reaching privatization of water utilities
in the world during the 1980s. (Dore, et. al., 2004) The privatization of water utilities has
spread throughout the western part of Europe and to the Americas. Currently, the
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Environmental Protection Agency of the United States estimates that about 15% of the
population of the United States receives their water services directly from the private
sector. (USEPA, www.epa.gov)
In SSA, coupled with management problems, population growth had outstripped
the capacity of water systems to provide adequately for the population. (UN-HABITAT,
2006; Bayliss, 2004) In spite of the fact that the 1990s was declared the water decade, the
progress within Africa has not been encouraging. (Whittington, 2006) These facts
bolstered the argument of the advocates of market based reforms and thus gave them the
ammunition to push more forcefully for sector reform, particularly privatization and
competition within the water sector.
Privatization and competition have remained controversial due to a lack of
agreement about how best to organize the sector. It has also raised concerns about
equitable distribution of water and appropriate water tariffs. Because of this, reform in
the water sector has proceeded slowly and when reforms are introduced, private sector
involvement has usually been limited. The relatively slow involvement of the private
sector is due to the impracticability and the expensive nature of having to transfer water
over a long distance to the consumer. Also, most of the cost of water supply is tied at the
distribution sector which makes it difficult for multiply providers to get on board.
(Tynan, 2000) Thus the private operator will virtually have to operate as a monopoly. The
monopoly status of the private production has in itself proved to be very troubling as it
will be easy to justify competition when there is more than one operator. Besides these
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issues, governments face legal constraints in selling off a water system because of its
sensitivity and importance to human survival and needs. (Zerah, 2001)
In spite of these difficulties, reform in the water sector is still predominant
throughout the world. Starting from the 1980s, many countries, predominantly the
developed world began experimenting with private sector participation in the delivery of
water as a way of increasing coverage, efficiency and water quality. (Megginson, 2000)
In SSA, there were over 50 water projects involving private sector participation in the
1990s. (rru.worldbank.org, 2007)
Although there is little rigorous statistical study in the literature about the effect of
privatization on water supply and efficiency, the reaction to privatization is clear.
Scholars and stakeholders have expressed mixed reaction as to the effectiveness of
privatization in promoting increased coverage and efficiency in the literature. (Holland,
2005; Clarke et al, 2004; Yarrow and Vickers, 1991)
Existing studies in the literature have been mainly on case studies of specific
projects. Case studies normally make a comparison between water utility performance
before and after privatization in a single country or town. The advantage of this method is
that it allows the researcher to consider a broad range of peculiar issues in a country and
the particular design of private participation and then describe how transactional
characteristics will affect the outcome or output of such private involvement. This
approach however has some shortcomings. Chief among them is sample selection bias.
Case study selection is not done in a random manner. The researcher mainly selects a
project to study without giving any scientific basis for doing so. Thus, choosing an outlier
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project to study which is extremely successful or precariously bad example will give a
slanted view of private participation. It is therefore difficult for such result to have
universal application. Also, in cases of failure, it will be difficult to ascertain with
certainty why the project failed, and lessons learnt from one project might not necessarily
be applicable to others. (Yin, 1989)
A few have however based their study on a multi utility statistical analysis or an
econometric model. The results from such study also tend to be weak. This is due to the
limited availability of data generally when dealing with research in the developing world.
(Clark et al, 2004) Thus, statistical studies looking at the effect of privatization on the
delivery of water tend to be based on small samples. Despite the above problems, some
scholars have either argued in favor of privatization while others have argued against
privatization.
2.6.a. Arguments for PSP
It also has been argued that water is a scarce commodity and when the public
sector provides scarce goods (many times subsidized), the good tends to be overused.
Consumers do not have the market incentive to use only what they need. They consume
beyond the point where the value consumed becomes less than the cost of production.
(Hanemann, 1998) In a competitive market, the private producer produces at the point
where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Thus, economic theory suggests that given
a free and competitive market, goods should be priced at the marginal cost.
In the developing world, the World Bank had championed the course of
privatization, advocating for opening up water systems for private participation to ensure
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efficiency and increased coverage. (World Bank, 1993) The Organization for
Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD) also has given full backing to this
privatization drive and in a report in 2002 stated, based on case studies in Eastern Europe
and Central Asia that private participation in water utility increases capital investments
and thereby increase water supply. (OECD, 2002) In a subsequent study, McIntosh used
household data to analyze the effect of privatization on water utility supply in Asia.
McIntosh arrived at the conclusion that privatization increased urban water supply
significantly.
Brocklehurst and Janssens, conducted a case study of water systems in Senegal in
2004 to ascertain the effect of private sector participation in the delivery of water. They
also arrived at the same conclusion that private participation has increased water supply
in Senegal.
2.6.b. Arguments Against PSP
There seem to be a controversy as to the economic categorization of water. On the
one hand, some economists refer to water as an economic good subjected to the law of
demand and supply and will therefore be supplied efficiently by the market. (Hanemann,
2006) On the other hand, some scholars categorize water as a quasi public good which
should be provided or supplied by public institutions. The scholars who argue against
water privatization belong to the school of thought that characterizes water as a public
good. (Shiva, 2005 & Barlow, 2001) Urban water systems are seen as quasi public goods
that provide important public benefit such as protection from infectious diseases and
floods. Innocent community dwellers tend to suffer the externality of diseases from
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improper disposal of waste by others. Thus, it is uneconomical to exclude people from
drainage systems because of their inability to pay for the service. Such externality can be
eliminated if water systems are managed within the public sector. Apart from using
appropriate regulatory regimes, the public sector has the legitimacy to impose
compulsory fees in the form of taxes on all citizens for the provision of water supply. It
must be noted that in low income countries it is possible for private investments to be
insufficient to finance the adequate provision. This is especially true when people do not
comprehend the private health benefit of network utilities.
Total costs are lower in the water sector when a single enterprise provides water
through the water network. Multiple networks competing for the same consumers will
result in higher infrastructure costs than a single network. Thus, water utilities enjoy huge
economies of scale and any additional provider diminishes the economies of scale in
production. Water utilities are therefore termed as natural monopolies. Unlike firms in a
perfectly competitive market, monopolists have an incentive to under-produce and overprice thereby realizing abnormal profits. Economic theory advocates that in general
terms, natural monopolies require public supervision and regulation to prevent overpricing. Thus, it has been argued that because of the natural monopoly status of water
utilities, it should be provided through the public sector to prevent under-production and
over-pricing. In SSA where most of the private water companies have annual sales more
than double the GDP of some countries, opponents of privatization have argued that such
private companies will be too powerful for any government regulation to work in the
private sector.
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In addition, environmentalists are quick to point out that harvesting water from
natural water sources often imposes other environmental costs which is more than what a
private operator will incur. The extent of damages to the ecosystem and wildlife habitat
from harvesting water from natural water systems may become apparent in the future at
which time the private operator may have finished its contract.
Fundamental to the argument against water privatization in sub Saharan African
has been the issue of affordability. (Hall et. al. 2004; Bayliss, 2002) Existing case studies
on water privatization throughout the world overwhelmingly support the view that water
tariffs increase significantly in the wake of privatization. (Bayliss, 2002; Hall, 2004) In
addition, scholars have argued that the “willingness to pay” research (Whittington, et al,
1989; Whittington, et al, 1992) on which pricing theories are based appears to be faulty.
Merrett argues that there should be a distinction between willingness to pay and ability to
pay. (Merrett, 2002) In addition to questioning the statistical validity of the research,
(especially those undertaken by Dale Whittington and associates between 1986 and 1994)
Merrett also argues that willingness to pay does not mean ability to pay. Thus,
communities like Onitsha and Nsuka in Nigeria, Lugazi in Uganda and Kumasi in Ghana
cannot in actuality pay for the commercial rate of water services in the advent of
privatization. To this, Balance & Tremolet, (2005) have argued that progressive tariff
increase to cost recovery levels should be adopted since it is less socially disruptive. They
argue further that this progressive approach has been utilized successfully in some
countries. When Senegal agreed to private sector participation in its water sector, the
parties agreed to a progressive tariff increase of 3% annually until tariffs reach full cost.
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This gradual increase in tariffs was well received by water customers in Senegal.
(Balance & Tremolet, 2005)
Clark et al (2004) used household level data to look at the effect of privatization
and how it affects water and sewage coverage over time. Their study, which is done
across cities in Latin America, compared privatized cities to controlled cities which never
privatized. They then studied the effect of private participation on water coverage,
productivity, prices and water quality. They found that while connections seem to have
generally increased in the wake of the privatization, the increase appears to have been the
same also in the controlled cities that retained public ownership. Thus, there was no
evidence that privatization increased water supply significantly. (Clark et al, 2004)
In a study done in 2002, Hall et al conducted a case study of 21 water utilities in
19 Sub Saharan African countries. They found that privatization did not significantly
increase water supply in the utilities under study. Rather, it brought untold hardship to the
communities in these countries in the form of unaffordably high water tariffs, corruption
and in some cases public health disasters. They advocated for communal ownership of
water instead.
Based on an empirical study of some public utilities in some parts of the
developed world, Vickers and Yarrow lashed out against privatization. They concluded
that there was no clear evidence that private participation increased efficiency over public
ownership. In fact, they argued that privatization will only be beneficial if it can promote
some form of competition. Private participation in water being mostly monopolistic in
nature, governments should be careful when inviting private participation. Due to the
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sensitive nature of the water sector, governments can not commit effectively to negative
market incentives and punish economic failure. Water and sanitation issues are so
essential that the central government will invariably be left with no choice but to bail out
local failures. Vickers and Yarrow therefore warn that governments should be slow in
their privatization bid.
Laila Smith (2004) believes in the application of management principles of the
private sector to water delivery services.

She differs on who should apply these

management principles, arguing that the superiority of the private sector is in their
management skills. However, the public sector has a mandate to the public that the
private sector does not share. Using case studies in two utilities in South Africa, she
argues that to increase water delivery services, the public sector should retain ownership
but employ private sector management principles. This she terms ‘corporatization’ of the
water systems within the public domain. (Smith, 2003)
Studying 50 water utilities in 19 countries in Asia, Estache and Rossi (2002)
explored the effect of ownership on utility performance. Twenty two of the 50 companies
had some form of privatization, while the other 28 did not have any private participation.
Estache and Rossi did not find any evidence that ownership per se significantly affected
the performance of the utility companies.
As noted earlier, there seems to be no clear trend in the literature as to the effect
of privatization on the performance of the various water utility companies within subSaharan Africa. Evidence from the developed world also shows that there is a split in
scholarly studies as to the effect of privatization on utility performance. (Anwandter and
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Ozuma, 2002) In addition, many of the big water supply companies operating in SSA
have shown very little interest in expanding water services to communities with low
income residents who have less capability to pay for the water services.
In a nutshell, private sector participation in urban water supply is not likely to be
the panacea for all the ills in urban water supply in SSA. There exist a lot of obstacles to
improving urban water supply that has nothing to do with the role of private sector
utilities. The absence of adequate regulatory institutions which affect government supply
of urban water can also affect the private sector. Institutional corruption which permeates
the very fabric of some SSA countries can affect the operations of the private sector as it
affects the public sector. Political instability will affect utility provision no matter the
kind of institutions that control water utilities. In addition, the pro-poor measures that
confront public run utilities can also confront the private sector.
2.6.c. The Urban Poor in SSA and PSP
Although PSP has been the policy of choice in SSA, results from PSP have been
mixed. Poor contract design, inadequate finance to back projects and weak regulatory
regimes have contributed to the mixed performance of PSPs in water supply in SSA.
(Plummer, 2003) In the case of Burkina Faso’s three year service contract and Mali’s
twenty year concession contract, Balance & Tremolet, (2005) report that the performance
of the private operator was affected by weak incentive mechanisms from the government.
In the case of Mali, weak regulatory regime and political considerations gave way to
tariff reductions in 2003 and 2004. The weak regulatory regime and tariff reduction
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significantly affected the performance of the private operator to extend services to
unconnected neighborhoods in Bamako and its surrounding areas.
Governments in SSA have often times used water pricing mechanisms as an
important policy tool to help the urban poor acquire adequate water supply. (Balance &
Tremolet, 2005) This is mainly done through incorporating a lifeline tariff pricing into an
increasing block rate tariff structure. The first block of water in an increasing block rate
water tariff is typically referred to as a social block and its aim is to provide cheap water
for minimum usage. The social block or lifeline water is thus priced cheaply so that the
poor can be able to afford it. Whittington points out that this policy will only achieve it
aim of providing water cheaply to poor households if each family has its own water
meter. (Whittington, 1992) Poor neighborhoods in SSA have a very high population
density with multiple families living in one “Compound House” and sharing one water
meter. When extended families of 30 to 40 people share a building or a compound, the
concept of household as defined for water billing purposes become ineffective. Using
household level data in Kumasi, Ghana, Whittington showed that poor residents in
compound housings are charged higher than what a non poor resident will be charged for
the same level of water consumption. Because multiple families share one house and thus
one water meter, though each family’s water usage may be within the social block, the
aggregate water usage far exceeds the social block. As characteristic with the increasing
block rate water tariff, the price for water compounds with increase in the blocks of water
consumed.
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In addition, any benefits accruing from social pricing can be enjoyed by poor
urban neighborhoods if they are connected to the national grid. With increasing numbers
of neighborhoods falling outside the coverage of the national grid, the policy of social
blocks does not extend to them at all. Balance & Tremolet, (2005) have pointed out that
poor PSP contract design, lack of finances and inadequate urban renewal among other
things have prevented the timely expansion of national water grids to uncovered urban
neighborhoods. In addition, the urban poor characteristically have low income and
therefore are likely to consume water within the social block. To maximize profits,
private operators will rather emphasize expansion into areas where consumption will
exceed the social block.
In cases where the national grid is available, some national governments have
embarked on subsidized domestic water connections. In Uganda, a connection fund
which is made up of 10% of revenues from water tariffs is channeled to subsidizing all
new water connections. Tanzania offers a free first time water connection through the
first time domestic connection fund provided the household has three water points. In
Senegal, a social connection fund offers subsidies for first time water connection for
consumers. However, to qualify for the subsidy, the consumer must prove legal title to
the land or house. (Lauria, Hopkins & Debomy, 2005) This condition puts the subsidy
beyond the reach of many poor residents because most of them live in shanty towns and
have no way of proving title to their living quarters. In spite of this, social connections
have averaged over 16,000 annually.
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In countries like Zambia, Kenya, Mali and Burkina Faso, standing pipes are
provided at vantage points for use by residents who are not connected to the national grid.
For instance in Burkina Faso, 50% of the population served by ONEA receives their
water supply through standpipes. In Mali, 40% of the population served by EDM receives
their water through standpipes. (Balance & Tremolet, 2005) A flat rate is charged for
water consumed through standpipes. However, standpipes are inadequately distributed
throughout the entire urban area. A lot of people are left miles away from the nearest
standpipe.
Thus, in neighborhoods served by the national grid, living arrangements put water
prices beyond the reach of the poor. Neighborhoods not served by the national grid may
also find themselves very far from the nearest standpipe which makes obtaining water
costly and highly inconvenient.
2.6.d. Where Do the Urban Poor Get their Water?
Access to water supply in the urban poor neighborhoods is through a myriad of
service delivery mechanisms. The nature of the service available to poor neighborhoods
to a large extent varies from city to city and from country to country. Services available
to the urban poor are also dependent on the extent of network pipe connection in the city.
Poor neighborhoods in cities with extensive network connections like Cote d’Ivoire are
more likely to get water easily than poor neighborhoods in cities with very limited urban
network pipe connection like Ethiopia.
Plummer, (2005) points out that most urban poor households consume between 5
and 30 liters of water daily. Water consumed is paid for on a daily basis. Poor households
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may not have a steady income to be able to afford monthly water payments. Paying on a
daily basis ensures that water consumed reflects daily available funds. Plummer argues
further that the water consumed by poor urban neighborhoods come from different
sources. Water may be obtained from hand dug wells, boreholes, private outlets or
government provided stand pipes. The majority of poor neighborhoods however purchase
their water through intermediaries including landlords, private outlets and vendors.
In SSA, the small scale water supplier has become a very important water source
for the urban poor. The small scale providers have stepped in to fill the water service gap
left by the citywide water utilities companies. Small scale water providers have existed in
the informal sector of most SSA countries for a long time and their importance has grown
as the number of urban dwellers without access to portable water from the national grid
has grown. (Collignon, 2000) A significant proportion of the un-served and underserved
urban dwellers by official water systems rely heavily on the services of the small scale
water providers to make up for the shortfall in their water needs. (UN-HABITAT, 2003)
As an institution in the informal sector, small scale water providers do not have a
uniform standard of operation. Their operation depends on the choice of the operator and
the needs of the consumers in the locality served. In a study of small scale water
providers in cities in ten African countries, their operations included;
•

“hand-pushed carts” that carry 100-200 litres of water;

•

horse- or donkey-pulled carts with up to 500 litres (especially in cities of
the Sahel, where draught animals are raised in abundance)
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•

water truckers who serve larger customers – for instance, filling water
tanks in large houses or offices; and

•

various types of water re-sellers operating from fixed points of sale,
including standpipe vendors and, in some cities mini-piped networks.”
(UN-HABITAT, 2003)

It is clear that PSP has been the policy tool of choice for majority of SSA
countries that have embarked on water sector reforms. The extent of PSP involvement
varies from country to country and is dependent to a large extent on the local conditions
and also the interest of the donor community. The effect of water policy on the supply of
water to the urban poor hinges on the combination of the extent of PSP involvement and
the institutional arrangement within each country. Thus, with a strong institutional
arrangement, local regulatory institutions can ensure that the service provided by the
private provider meets the requisite regulatory standards and the private providers’
overall performance is in consonance to the letter of the PSP agreement.
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Chapter 3
Urban Water Supply Policy in Ghana

3.1 Introduction
Under the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I and II (GPRSI and GPRSII -2003
and 2006), adequate water supply is featured as one of the priorities to reduce the
incidence of poverty in Ghana. The GPRS sets out strategies to “to reduce human
deprivation, promote human rights and achieve sustainable growth.” In spite of the
emphasis on increasing access to water as part of poverty reduction, urban water supply
is still under 65% coverage.
Ghana has a land area of 239,460 sq km, slightly smaller in size to the state of
Oregon. The total population of Ghana at 2008 is estimated at 23.3 million. Fifty-eight
percent of the people live in rural areas whiles 42% live in the urban centers. Urban
population growth is estimated at 3.5% per annum while rural population growth is
estimated at 1.5%. (WaterAid Ghana, 2007)
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Figure 3.1: Map of Ghana Showing Distribution of Urban Centers
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Ghana is drained by three main river systems. The largest river system, the Volta
River system is made up of Rivers Oti and Daka, the White and Black Volta Rivers and
the Prru, Sene and Afram Rivers. The Volta River system covers 70% of the land area in
Ghana. (FAO, 2005) The southwestern river system which is made up of rivers Bia,
Tano, Ankobra and Pra covers 22% of the land area of Ghana. Another 8% of the country
is covered by the coastal river system which comprises the rivers Ochi-Nakwa, Ochi
Amissah, Ayensu, Densu and the Tordzie. Completed in the 1960s, the Akosombo Dam
impounds the Volta River to form the Volta Lake. The Volta Lake with a surface area of
8,502 km2 and a maximum dept of 91m is the world’s largest artificial lake.
Three separate aquifers make up the bulk of groundwater in Ghana. The first
aquifer which is close to coastal Ghana is unconfined with depth of between 2 and 4m
and contains meteoric water. The second aquifer occurs in the Red Continental Deposits
of sand clay and gravel. It is either semi-confined or confined with depths measuring up
to 120m. Groundwater in this aquifer is fresh and exists in artesian conditions. The third
aquifer alone has an average yield of 184 m3/hr.
The total renewable water resource in Ghana is estimated to be 53.2 km3/yr out of
which 30.3 km3/yr is produced internally. In 2000, only 0.982 km3 of water was
withdrawn for use. 0.652 km3 representing 66% was withdrawn for irrigation, 0.095 km3
representing 10% was withdrawn for industry and 0.235 km3 representing 24% was
withdrawn for domestic use. (FAO Country Stat, 2005)
Source: Ghana Aquastat FAO, 2005
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Figure 3.2: Drainage Map of Ghana

Source: FAO Country Statistics, 2005
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Figure 3.3

Total Renewable Water/Withdrawn Water in Km3- 2000
0.982

Total Renewable Water
Resource

Total Amount of Water
Withdrawn

53.2

Source: Based on figures from FAO Country Statistics, 2005
Figure 3.4

Water Withdrawal Use in Km3 - 2000

0.235

Total Water Withdrawn
for Agriculture

0.095
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for Industry
Total Water Withdrawn
for Domestic Use

Source: Based on figures from FAO Country Statistics, 2005
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In spite of the abundance of water resources, Ghana still suffers from inadequate
water supply to its rural and urban areas. Only 61% of urban residents have access to
improved water supply. Available data shows that, in Accra, the capital, only 25% of
residents have 24 hour water supply. For about 30% of residents, water supply service
averages 12 hours a day for five days a week. For another 35% of residents, water supply
is estimated at two days per week. For the remaining 10% who live mainly in poor
neighborhoods at the periphery of town there is no access to piped water supplies.
(WaterAid Ghana, 2005) Ghana Water Company, the only regulated utility service which
provides water to all urban areas in Ghana, has water coverage of only 59%. The total
daily water demand is estimated at 763,300 m3. However, with an unaccounted-for-water
rate of 50% for the Ghana Water Company Limited, the amount that is effectively sold is
about 280,000 m3.
The high unaccounted-for-water contributes to the low water supply coverage of
GWCL. Several factors account for this high unaccounted for water. A remote cause is
the protracted political instability which left the country without a development agenda
until the middle of the 1980s. GWCL has therefore not been able to grow to meet the
growing demands for water supply. Population growth in Ghana has also exploded in the
last 50 years. With a population of 6.7 million in 1960, the population is estimated at 23
million currently representing almost a 350% increase. The population has grown faster
that the government has been able to keep up with infrastructure development.
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Table 3.1: Ghana: Population Growth from 1921 to 2005
Year

1921

1931

1948

1960

1970

1984

1990

2000

2005

2008

Pop. in
Millions

2.3

3.1

4.1

6.7

8.6

12.2

15

18.8

22

23

34.78

32.26

63.41

28.36

41.86

22.95

25.33

17.02

4.55

% Growth

Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 1921 – 2000 Population Census reports
Starting in 1994, there has been an increased effort on the part of the government
of Ghana to restructure the water sector and position it to meet the water demands of
Ghanaians. Two management arrangements, one for rural water supply and the other for
urban water supply were set up to manage the water system in Ghana. In the urban sector,
the restructuring has been aimed at encouraging private sector participation (PSP) in the
delivery of water. As part of the restructuring and in preparation for public sector
participation in urban water supply, the government has set up various institutions in the
water sector to serve as facilitators and provide the backbone for a viable PSP regime. In
this direction, the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation which hitherto was a full
government corporation operating both rural and urban water was changed to Ghana
Water Company Limited, a publicly owned. A Community Water and Sanitation Agency
was set up in 1998 to facilitate rural water supply and a Water Resources Commission
was established in 1996 to see to the environmentally sound management of water
resources in Ghana. In 1997, the Public Utility Regulatory Commission was established
to see to the regulation and provision of quality utility services. To coordinate the
activities of the various institutions and get them to conform to government policies in
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the water sector, a water directorate was created within the Ministry of Works and
Housing to coordinate all activities in the water sector.

3.2: Institutional Development
The first urban piped water system was built around 1928 in the city of Cape
Coast. The Water Supply Division of the Public Works Department (PWD) was charged
with the responsibility of supplying water to both urban and rural areas. After Ghana
attained independence in 1957, PWD was divested of its Water Supply Division in 1958.
The Ministry of Works and Housing (MWH) gained the Water Supply Division until
1965 when water supply and sewerage was placed under Ghana Water and Sewerage
Corporation. The Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) was established by
the Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation Act of 1965, ACT 310. ACT 310 charged
GWSC with the provision, distribution and conservation of water supply and the
establishment, operation and control of systems in both urban and rural areas. GWSC
also had the responsibility of setting tariffs for water and sewerage, conducting water
research, making engineering surveys and plans, constructing and operating water works
and conducting any other activity related or incidental to water and sewerage supply.
ACT 310 therefore gave the GWSC a catch-all authority in water with the responsibility
to build, operate and regulate water and sewerage services in Ghana.
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After 1965, a series of protracted military takeovers in Ghana adversely affected
the economy and thus the water and sewerage functions of GWSC.

9

Clapham (1996)

argues that protracted conflicts in Africa directed governments’ attention to security
issues away from development in the social infrastructure of the economy. In 1983, when
some semblance of stability had been established, Ghana took advantage of a World
Bank sponsored economic recovery program aimed at macro economic stability in Ghana
to put the GWSC on track to recovery. GWSC adopted a 5 year rehabilitation and
development plan under a Water Sector Rehabilitation Plan aimed at institutional
strengthening through manpower development, rehabilitation and expansion of existing
service and decentralization of water and sewerage supply.

Following the

decentralization plan in the five year rehabilitation and development plan, GWSC was to
concentrate on the provision of water and sewerage in urban areas only. A semiautonomous division within the GWSC called the Community Water and Sanitation
Division was created in 1994 and charged with the responsibility of rural water and
sewerage supply
As part of the water restructuring policy, a Community Water and Sanitation
Agency (CWSA) was created by the Community Water and Sanitation Agency Act of
1998, ACT 564. ACT 564 created CWSA as an autonomous public agency charged with
the responsibility of playing a facilitating role along side district assemblies to provide
“safe water and related sanitation services to rural communities and small towns”. This
change now absorbed the Community Water and Sanitation Division within GWSC.
9

Between 1965 and 1981, there were at least six attempted or successful military coups d’etat reported in
Ghana.
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GWSC itself was transformed from a statutory corporation by a Legislative
Instrument (LI. 1948) into a limited liability company called the Ghana Water Company
Limited (GWCL) in 1999. With this change, GWCL was certified as a company charged
solely with the provision of water supply in urban areas in Ghana. It no longer had
responsibilities for sewerage, rural water supply, water research or regulation of the water
sector. The transformation of GWCL was part of World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) sponsored Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in Ghana. In line with
SAPs emphasis on economic liberalism, the transformation of GWSC into a limited
liability company was to position it to invite PSP in urban water supply. Under the SAP,
it was envisaged that private sector participation in the public sector will help reduce
operating loses, improve management standards, inject more capital and thereby increase
efficiency and effectiveness culminating in quality services in the water sector.

3.3: Legal and Institutional Framework for Water
Before Ghana was colonized by the British, an elaborate regime of rules and
regulations were formulated by the communities to guide their water use. Colonialism
and the emergence of modern Ghana has led to the creation of other supplemental rules
guiding domestic and agricultural use of water. Faced with increasing pressure on water
resources as a result of dwindling supply and increase in population, the government has
introduced a series of legislation and policies to regulate the water sector. The customary
rules and regulations pertaining to water use have therefore been supplemented or done
away with completely. For instance, in customary law, water in all its forms, rivers, lakes,
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streams and ponds was regarded as public property and therefore not subject to individual
ownership. Water resources existing in a particular community was held or protected by
the traditional authority in trust for the people of the community. Members of the
community in which the water resource existed had the first priority of use. It must be
noted that no matter how long a community member used water, such usage did not ripen
to ownership or a right to the amount of water used. In the dry season, the traditional
authority had the right to make reasonable apportionment of water to community
members. Nonmembers of the community were allowed to use the water only in times of
plenty when there is enough to spare.
The customary rules pertaining to water use have been changed and in some cases
supplemented by statutory law. The Water Resources Commission Act of 1996, Act 522,
altered the customary water regime in existence before 1996. Act 522 created the Water
Resources Commission as a body corporate and clothed it with ownership of water
resources, its management and control. According to Sarpong (2000), these statutory
changes for the most part took place without the knowledge of the customary water
custodians. It presupposes therefore that, in traditional settings, people still regard water
as a public property subject to use by the members of the community.
A number of statutory institutions have since been created to among other things
ensure a comprehensive water resource management in Ghana. Among these institutions,
the most important are the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL), the Public Utility
Regulatory Commission (PURC), the Water Resources Commission (WRC), the
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Community Water and Sanitation Agency and the District Assemblies. The institutions of
interest with direct responsibility to urban water supply are PURC and GWCL.
3.3.a. The Public Utility Regulatory Commission
The Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC) is an independent regulatory
institution set up to regulate water and electricity services to consumers. PURC was set
up in October 1997 under the Public Utility and Regulatory Commission Act of 1997,
ACT 538. The functions of PURC as provided under Act 538 are to provide guidelines on
rates chargeable for provision of utility services; to examine and approve rates chargeable
for provision of utility services; to conduct studies relating to economy and efficiency of
public utilities and to maintain a register of public utilities. Other functions of the PURC
include the protection of the interest of consumers and utility providers, monitoring
standards of performance of utility services and conducting investigations into standards
of quality of service given to consumers. The PURC also must take steps to promote fair
competition among utility providers in urban water supply.
From the functions as provided under ACT 538, PURC has identified their main
regulatory tools as setting water rates, regulating and monitoring the activities of GWCL
and embarking on public education to sensitize consumers about the functions of PURC.
Section 16 of Act 538 provides guidelines as to how water tariffs are to be fixed by utility
companies. These functions are aimed at ensuring that there are safe, clean, adequate,
reliable and efficient services to the consumer while at the same time ensuring that
consumers pay reasonable prices for the sustenance of utility providers.
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To further ensure consumer protection, PURC directs utilities to display copies of
their schedule of charges at their offices for the public. Public utility companies must also
develop a comprehensive Customer Charter outlining expected services to be provided,
and the rights and obligations of the consumers. This charter is therefore expected to
serve as a guideline as to what standard the utility company holds itself up to and the kind
of services consumers should expect.
In consonance with the functions under Act 538, the PURC has adopted as its
mission a commitment to the “development and delivery of the highest quality of utility
services to all consumers and potential customers, while building a credible regulatory
regime that will respond adequately to stakeholders concerns and also ensure fairness,
transparency, reliability and equity in the provision of utility services”
It must be noted that in the water supply sector, under Act 538, PURC interprets
its obligations as being limited to the regulation of the activities of GWCL only. Thus,
PURC jurisdiction is limited to urban water supply and has no jurisdiction in the
regulation of water supply in small town and villages. Their current regulatory
jurisdiction does not extend to the activities of small scale water providers too.
3.3.a.i: Tariff Structure
By far, the most important function of the PURC is setting of tariffs by which
utility companies charge consumers. PURC has been setting tariffs since its inception in
1998. Act 538 provides in section 16 (3) that the tariff guidelines provided by PURC
must strike a balance between consumer interests, investor interests and the cost of
production for the service providers. Act 538 gives PURC a blanket authority in rate
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setting. Section 17 provides that PURC must take all costs into consideration before
setting tariffs and utility companies are under obligation to follow such tariffs. Act 538
does not provide for a challenge as to the reasonableness or otherwise of the tariffs set by
PURC. PURC therefore has a wide discretionary power in tariff setting.
Since GWCL is the only recognized company providing water in urban areas,
PURC uses a nationwide uniform tariff structure. In addition, a core principle of PURC is
to set tariffs at cost recovery level. PURC recognizes that water tariffs in urban Ghana
have for a long time been subsidized and underpriced. To make it easy on consumers,
PURC has opted for a transitional phase in approach to full cost recovery. Thus, since
1998, water tariffs have been increased gradually and in 2005, PURC stated that tariffs
will reach full cost targets by 2010. (PURC, 2005)
The tariff structure reveals a cross subsidization between different user categories.
Although supply cost to non-domestic users is lower due to economies of scale, nondomestic customers are charged a higher tariff than domestic customers. For domestic
customers, PURC utilizes an increasing block rate pricing scheme to set prices for water
consumed. In 1998 and 1999, PURC used two separate three tier increasing block rate
tariff structure. Then from 2001 to 2006, PURC used a two tier increasing block rate
tariff structure.
According to the PURC, the lowest tier of water blocks reflects a lifeline tariff.
The lowest tier of blocks of water is set to cover the basic water needs of the poor and its
price is determined taking into consideration the ability of the poor to afford them. It
must be noted however that lifeline rates are not necessarily set within the affordability
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range of the poorest urban dwellers. PURC recognizes that a sizeable number of urban
dwellers, a majority of whom are poor, who are not currently not served by piped water
from GWCL are paying more per unit of water than those currently served by piped
water. Thus, to be fair to those who are not currently served by piped water service,
lifeline water rates “are not overly generous and at least cover basic operational costs”.
PURC designates 1000 liters of water as one block. The blocks of water which
constitute the first tier or qualify for lifeline pricing has changed three times within the
last 10 years. PURC does not offer any reason as to the changes; whether they felt less
water was needed for basic necessities when they reduced it from 1999 to 2001 or
whether they felt more water was needed for basic household chores when they increased
it from 2002 to 2006. (Table 3.2)
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Table 3.2 PURC Approved Monthly Tariffs for GWCL
DATE
Quantity of water used
(1000 Liters)
0 -13
1998
13 - 45
45+
0 - 10
1999
10 – 40
40+
0 - 10
2001
10+
0 - 20
2002
20+
0 - 20
2003
20+
0 - 20
2004
20+
0 - 20
2005
20+
0 - 20
2006
20+

Approved Rates in cedis
(per 1000 Liters)
400
1000
1400
500
1300
1820
990
3600
3000
4500
3500
4800
4031
5528
4031
5528
4850
6750

Source: Based on water tariff information provided by PURC

3.3.b. Ghana Water Company Limited
GWCL is an independent public company created in 1999 to succeed GWSC. The
creation of GWCL was part of the water sector restructuring effort of the government.
The restructuring of GWCL was partly to increase its efficiency and effectiveness and
also position it to encourage private sector participation in the water sector. The main
objectives of GWCL are;
• planning and the development of water supply systems in urban communities in Ghana,
• provision and maintenance of acceptable levels of service to consumers in respect of
water quantity and quality which is supplied,
• preparation of long term water supply plans in consultation with the appropriate
coordinating authority established by the president,
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• conduct water supply related research,
• make engineering surveys and plans as appropriate,
• construct and operate water works in urban areas,
• submit tariff proposals to PURC for review and approval, and
• conduct other related or incidental activities.
Currently, GWCL operates under the direction of the Ministry of Water Works and
Housing which has oversight authority over the sectorial policies within the water sector.
GWCL is governed by an eight member board of directors. GWCL operates 86 urban pipe
water systems in urban areas across the country. The total installed capacity of the water
systems operated by GWCL is 737,000 m3 per day as against an estimated urban demand of
939,070 m3 per day. There is therefore a shortfall in urban water supply because of the fact
that potential demand outstrips potential supply. Water supply problems are compounded by
the fact that even though GWCL has the capacity to produce 737,000 m3 per day,
administrative and distributional inefficiencies put actual supply at 551,451 m3 per day. The
inefficiencies in GWCL account for most of the shortages in urban water supply to customers
within the piped network of GWCL.
Most of the problems that affect GWCL were inherited from GWSC. GWSC was a
public corporation that was, for a considerable period of time, kept under the dictates of
politicians. (Mensah, 1999) It operated at a time when there was no independent regulatory
institution to monitor its activities. GWSC operated as a water supplier, water resources
manager and a water supply and resource regulator. Accordingly, politicians were able to
keep water tariffs low with the aim of protecting consumers for a long period of time.
(Ministry of Works and Housing Report, 1998) From 1990 to 1997, average tariffs ranged
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from $0.15 to $.20/m3. Public policy objectives of GWSC were to a large extent geared
towards satisfying political ends instead of strengthening the corporation to efficiently and
effectively supply water. With low tariffs and interference from politicians, the corporation
was plagued with low investment and general breakdown of some of its water systems.
(Mensah, 1999)
One of the important problems that confronted GWCL when it came into existence in
1999 was therefore capital investment to maintain the existing water systems and to
undertake expansion work to cover the ever increasing urban population in Ghana. In 2005,
PURC estimated that a total of $891 million will be required to meet the MDG goal of 85%
urban water coverage by 2015. (PURC, 2005) According to calculations put up by WaterAid
Ghana, a total expenditure of $85 million is needed each year to be able to reach the MDG
goal of 85% urban water coverage by 2015. However, current spending averages only $17
million annually. GWCL is therefore in need of an average of $68 million in investment
funds annually to reach it MDG goals.
Currently, the commitment of the government and other donor partners to the water
sector is woefully inadequate. In the 2002 government of Ghana Budget for instance, 21% of
funds were allocated to poverty reduction under the GPRS program. Only 1% of the poverty
reduction budget or 0.2% of total spending was allocated to the water and sanitation sector.
(WaterAid Ghana) From 1990 to 2003, Ghana’s major donors contributed $220 million to the
urban water sector. It is estimated that within the period of 2004 to 2010, donor support
(excluding NGOs) for the urban water system will be $185 million. The government of
Ghana should therefore increase its financial commitments in the water sector and at the
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same time convince donor partners to increase theirs as well in order to meet it water supply
targets in 2015.
Another significant problem faced by GWCL is the inefficient collection of water
bills. The proportion of bills collected for all customers has not seen any significant

improvement. Figure 3.6 shows a significant decrease in the proportion of bills collected
from 2000. A major reason for the low rate of bill collection is the failure of the
government of Ghana to pay for water services used in government facilities. Figure 3.5
depicts that GWCL collection rate for government is worse than other consumers.

Figure 3.5: Performance of Ghana Water Company Limited, 1992 – 2000

Source: WaterAid Ghana (Retrieved August, 2008)
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Figure 3.6 GWCL Billing and collection performance (%)

Source: PURC Review of Performance of GWCL 1998-2003

Figure 3.7 Real Cost/Income Analysis

Source: PURC Review of Performance of GWCL 1998-2003
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The low collection rate significantly affects the financial stability of GWCL.
Figure 3.7 shows that though sale of water outstripped cost of production in 1998 and
2003, GWCL revenue collected from sales was not enough to cover the cost of
production. From 1996 to 2003, collection rates have always been lower than actual sale
of water. Although the cost of production for the period under review was always more
than the value of water sold, getting the collection rate to equal the value of water sold
will better the financial situation of GWCL.
GWCL continues to perform poorly in the quality of water supplied at
‘consumers’ tap’. A performance review taken by the PURC from 1998 to 2003 into the
quality of water supplied by GWCL showed that water quality in eight out of the ten
regions served by GWCL was unsatisfactory. Since most of the independent water
regulatory institutions were established in the late 1990s, available data on water quality
from an independent regulator only starts from the late 1990s. Without any independent
regulation during the existence of GWSC, it is highly likely that water quality under
GWCS was even worse. Thus, a satisfactory water quality in two of the ten regions
served by GWCL may constitute a change in the quality of water supplied at ‘consumers’
tap’ and represent an upward match to score satisfactory water quality for all ten regions
under its jurisdiction. Until the next performance review is conducted, one cannot
authoritatively draw a conclusion on the overall performance of GWCL with regard to
water quality. However, the prospects are not looking good as a World Bank sponsored
water supply review indicated that chemicals needed at treatment plants were in short
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supply and dosing instruments were faulty at some treatment plants. (Ghanaweb.com,
2008)
It must be noted that since the inception of GWCL in 1999, the government has,
as part of the water sector restructuring, undertaken various water development projects
with the view of increasing the quantity and quality of water served by GWCL. Such
development projects have focused on rehabilitation of existing water supply systems to
increase its designed capacities. With funding provided by the government, GWCL has
also embarked on limited system extensions and construction to harness new water
sources to serve consumers who are currently not covered by the GWCL piped water
system. Among the projects being undertaken are the Accra-East-West-Weija (AEWW)
interconnection and the Kpong Water Supply Expansion Project. The AEWW involves
the laying of a 12 kilometer pipeline from the Accra terminal to the Weija treatment
plant. When completed in the third quarter of 2008, this project is expected to add 15
million gallons of water a day to residents of the eastern part of Accra. The Kpong Water
Supply Expansion Project involves the expansion of the existing water treatment plant to
increase its capacity to 250,000 m3 daily and the construction of a new treatment plant
with the capacity to supply 285,000 m3 of water daily. When completed, the project will
increase the water supply to eastern Ghana and the eastern part of Accra.

3.4. Private Sector Participation
One of the main reasons for the restructuring of the water supply system in Ghana
was to position the sector to engage the private sector in the supply of urban water. Under
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the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) the government placed strong emphasis
on ensuring adequate water supply to Ghanaians as part of efforts to reduce the incidence
of poverty. (GPRS, 2002) Under the GPRS the government stated that “[t]he policy on
private participation in operation and maintenance of service delivery will be
finalized…” The government argued that involving the private sector in the supply of
water in urban areas will increase financial resources for investment, improve technical
management and efficiency and improve the quality and quantity of water supplied to
consumers. This position taken by the government of Ghana is also well supported in the
literature. (Vickers & Yarrow, 1991; Clarke et. al., Cowen &Tynan, 1999; Nicola, 2004;
Bakker, 2003) The poor performance of GWSC as evident in the data above also
supported the argument for a public-private sector collaboration in the water system.
An earlier attempt at private sector participation in the water sector failed when a
10 year lease contract between the now defunct Azurix, a subsidiary of Enron and the
government of Ghana was cancelled. This lease contract failed mainly due to allegations
of corruption and also increasing public opposition to water privatization. (Public Citizen,
2002)
In 2006, Ghana Water Company Limited entered into a five year management
contract with Vitens Rand Water Services BV of Netherlands and its subsidiary in Ghana,
Aqua VitRa Limited operating under the joint name of Aqua Vitens Rand Limited
(AVRL). The main components of the management contract are system expansion,
rehabilitation of existing water systems, capacity building to enhance the skill and
competence of the staff of GWCL and project management. Under the system expansion
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and rehabilitation component, the operator must work to increase the amount of treated
water for sale, extend service to low income areas and rehabilitate existing networks to
reduce non-revenue water (unaccounted-for-water). The operator also must work to
ensure safety at the various dam sites and also procure and install billing meters for
consumers. Under the capacity building and project management component of the
contract, the operator shall among other things train seconded staff and offer technical
assistance to the grantor.
Since the agreement is only a management contract, AVRL does not have to
provide any funding for the project. They rather get paid for the services of managing the
urban water system in Ghana. The grantor, in this case the government of Ghana through
GWCL, has to provide the funding for the realization of the target components set out
under the contract. The contract is estimated to cost $120 million. The government of
Ghana is providing $12 million while its development partners, the World Bank and the
Nordic Development Fund, are providing $103 million and $5 million, respectively.
Under the contract, AVRL is entitled to contract with consumers for the supply of
water on behalf of the GWCL. AVRL will therefore issue bills, receive payments and
disconnect consumers for non payments. The facilities of GWCL also shall be under the care
of AVRL for the duration of the contract. Upon satisfactory execution of the contract, AVRL
shall have the right to submit a bid for a leasehold agreement. After a retrenchment program
to reduce excess personnel, the regional staff of GWCL will be transferred to AVRL for the
duration of the contract.
AVRL shall be paid a base fee for it services and the base fee shall be increased by
incentive packages or decreased by performance penalties as contained in the management
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contract. In addition to the base fee, AVRL shall receive financial incentives based on the
extent to which it exceeds performance targets as stated in the contract. The base fee will also
be reduced by penalties based on the extent to which AVRL falls behind on the targets of the
contract.
The success of the management contract depends to a large extent on the ability of
GWCL and other regulatory agencies to monitor the performance of AVRL. For instance,
adjustments in the base fee can be made only with data on the performance of AVRL.
Performance measures like reduction in the unaccounted for water needs an accurate water
production levels to measure. Other indicators like extension of services to areas outside the
network are relatively easy to measure. Extension of water supply services to areas outside
the coverage areas will have physical infrastructure and consumer satisfaction as indicators of
performance. Personal interviews conducted with officials at the GWCL show that GWCL
does not have the capacity to collate the data necessary for a full performance review of the
management. Speaking on condition of anonymity, one senior policy staff of GWCL said that
almost three years into the management contract, GWCL has not been able to establish a
baseline for AVRL on which to measure the unaccounted-for-water.
In the second year of operation by AVRL, the residents of Accra experienced an
uncharacteristically acute water shortage in the first quarter of 2008. Residents and civil
society groups who were initially opposed to the management contract did not hesitate to call
for the immediate abrogation of the management contract with AVRL. AVRL responded to
the water crisis by pointing at power shortages and scheduled maintenance of the water
systems that serve the Accra metropolis. According to the minister in charge of Water Works,
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a mid term review is underway and the performance of AVRL in the water sector will fully
come to light once the review is completed.

3.5. Urban Poor
Although extension of water infrastructure to serve the poor was a component of the
management contract, two years into the contract no significant improvement in the services
to the poor has been recorded. Under the contract, low income areas are defined as all areas
which do not receive piped water services from GWCL. For purposes of this research, low
income areas have been defined as areas which do not receive regular or piped water services
from GWCL and areas with higher concentration of residents with average annual income at
the threshold level of $400.

The urban poor in Ghana find themselves in a very vulnerable situation. When
GWCL was created in 1998, it was mandated to supply water to urban areas in Ghana,
i.e. cities or towns with population exceeding 5000 residents. There are areas or
communities within these urban centers which exist almost as autonomous communities,
but are regarded as part of the larger city because of their proximity to the city limits.
Thus, though these communities would have been regarded as rural because of the size of
their populations, there are regarded as urban because of their geographic location. These
communities tend to be at the urban fringes, exhibit shanty town characteristics and have
a high concentration of poor people. The communities are characterized by low income
dwellers, squatters, inadequate infrastructure, and low levels of education. A sizeable
proportion of the residents are also rural-urban migrants who have migrated to the cities
in search of work. GWCL, which caters to the needs of the more traditional urban
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centers, therefore severely disadvantage these poor urban dwellers. Although there is a
severe inadequacy of water supply in such areas, their plight is hidden within the
aggregate data obtained for the entire urban areas. Thus, though GWCL says that urban
water coverage is 59%, coverage in the poor neighborhoods is around 20% and in worse
areas below 5%. In Accra, GWCL water connection rates average 90% in high-income
areas and 16% in low-income settlements. (UNDP, 2006) In fact in some of these poor
neighborhoods, the living arrangements make it almost impossible for the GWCL to
extend pipe service to the area. Residents raise up structures anywhere within the
community, in most cases, without official approval. In Nima and Ashiaman for instance,
cars cannot easily drive through most of the area. Buildings and structures have been
erected on every possible space in the community. GWCL will have to demolish almost
half of all the structures in the neighborhood to lay new pipes.
As part of the water restructuring project, a Community Water and Sanitation
Agency (CWSA) was created in 1998. The main function of CWSA is to assist district
assemblies with water supply in rural areas. Since some rural dwelling units are not
suitable for piped water systems, CWSA facilitates the construction of boreholes and
hand dug wells to make water readily available to such rural dwellers. Boreholes and
hand dug wells are also a suitable alternative to rural communities with fewer people to
economically afford the convenience of network piped water systems. Boreholes and
hand dug wells therefore serve as a cheap alternative to get reliable and clean water
supply throughout the year. However, since poor communities within the urban centers
are not rural areas as defined by the government of Ghana, they do not come under the
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jurisdiction of CWSA and can therefore not benefit from the boreholes and the hand dug
wells provided by CWSA. Poor communities in urban centers therefore resort to buying
water from water vendors and small scale water suppliers. Where there is a piped water
system close by, family members walk to fetch water or pay for people to cart water to
their residence. In communities which are far from piped water supply, residents pay
small scale water suppliers who fetch water in motorized tanks for delivery. There is a lot
of controversy about the source and quality of the water supplied by the motorized tanks.
Residents in poor communities pay three or four times what residents on the GWCL
network pay for water. In Accra, many of the 800,000 people living at or below the
poverty line pay 10 times more for their water than residents in non poor areas. (UNDP,
2006) The operations of the small scale water suppliers do not come within the purview
of the PURC and therefore are not required to adhere to the regulations of PURC. PURC
itself has not shown any interest in regulating the activities of the small scale water
providers. In its 2005 tariff policy statement, though PURC agreed that the best pro-poor
measure of water supply will be to extend GWCL coverage to such areas, it said that the
operations of the small scale water providers should be left to the market forces. Because
of information asymmetry, consumers do not have the necessary information to make the
right decision as to whom to buy water from and how much to pay. The urban poor are
therefore left at the mercy of the small scale water suppliers while the non-poor enjoy the
protection of PURC and the convenience of piped water from GWCL. It is the plight of
the urban poor that forms the basis of this research.
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Chapter 4
Methodology
4.1 Introduction
Urban water supply continues to pose a problem for SSA countries. SSA
countries still lag behind the rest of the world in urban water coverage. Most urban areas
across SSA have relatively very little provision of water. And water provision in these
urban centers suffers from low pressure and intermittency in service. For instance in
Burkina Faso, only 61% of urban population has access to water. And on the very low
side, Guinea Bissau and Mauritania’s urban water coverage is 29% and 34%,
respectively. (UN-HABITAT, 2003) Within these cities are the peripheral municipalities
or the disadvantaged urban communities. These disadvantaged urban communities or
peripheral municipalities that tend to have high concentration of low income dwellers
have very low water coverage in comparison to the rest of the larger urban communities.
Using the case study approach, this research looks at how to ensure adequate
water supply to disadvantaged urban communities in Ghana

4.2 Hypothesis
To answer the question of how to ensure adequate water supply to disadvantaged
urban communities in Ghana, this research revolves around the following hypotheses;
H1 Small scale water suppliers in the informal sector provide a valuable water service to
disadvantaged urban communities.
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H2 Disadvantaged urban communities pay substantially more per amount of water
consumed relative to non disadvantaged communities
H3 Disadvantaged communities are willing to pay more for improved services in water
utility.
H4 Disadvantaged communities are not well informed about the decision making
institutions in the water sector.

4.3 Mixed Method
This research utilizes the mixed method approach to investigate how to ensure
adequate water supply to disadvantaged neighborhoods in urban places in Ghana. The
mixed method approach combines quantitative and qualitative research methods either
during the data collection stage or the data analysis stage of a research project.
(Creswell, 2003; Cooper & Schindler, 2001) The usefulness of the mixed method of
research lies in the fact that a research that combines both qualitative and quantitative
data analysis enhances better understanding of the research questions than using either
approach exclusively. (Creswell & Clark, 2006) For instance, where both methods lead to
a convergence in the results or solutions to the research questions, results can be deemed
more accurate.
4.3.a Mixed Method Type
In this research, a simultaneous mixed method design was used to gather data on
water use patterns, water institutions and water infrastructure problems. A congruent
nested mixed method design was used to analyze the relationships between water sector
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stakeholders. This method involved simultaneously collecting qualitative data via
interview of stakeholders in the water sector and focus group discussion with water
consumers while at the same time taking quantitative data from water consumers via
survey methodology.
The mixed method approach was used, first, because of its benefit of
corroboration. Conclusions reached at the end of this research will be more accurate if
data gathered via qualitative means about water use patterns and the nature or state of
water systems and water stakeholders converge with quantitative data gathered from
water consumers. In addition, by the nature of survey methodology, there is a limit to the
depth of information that can be provided by respondents. An interview on the other hand
allows the researcher to explore the questions better and where necessary ask follow up
questions for clarification.

4.4 Subjects of the Study
The subjects for this research include city and community staff, key employees of
public agencies with direct responsibility in the water sector, small scale water providers,
key staff of the GWCL and selected residents of disadvantaged urban communities. All
subjects were at least 18 years old and none of the subjects were in the vulnerable
population group as defined under Institutional Review Board’s (IRB) criteria for
research involving human subjects.
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4.5 Case Study Approach
To a considerable degree, an effective local governance regime with inputs from
water providers and water consumers is very essential to ensure that there is adequate
water supply to poor neighborhoods and underserved urban centers. However, the best
means to achieve this is not that simple. This is because, to a large extent, there are
considerable differences in urban centers in SSA. In SSA, urban centers are springing up
continuously and there are wide variations in their demographic composition. (Baker,
2003) In addition, the technical capacity of government support and local economic base
differ from area to area. However, water policies towards these urban centers have for the
most part been uniform. Thus, national governments and international agencies often
support policies in urban centers with very little or no area specific information. (UNHABITAT, 2006)
Getting the right and detailed information to make a firm policy choice entails
detailed household data, data on available water provision, data on the particular needs of
the area, property regimes and demographic changes. The best way to get reliable
information for policy decisions is to go to the source – at the local level. The case study
approach is therefore appropriate for this research. According to Yin (1984), case studies
are appropriate research methodology when the focus of the research involves “how” or
“why” questions. Case studies are also appropriate when “the focus [of the research] is on
a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context”. Using the case study
approach, this research investigates how to ensure adequate water supply to
disadvantaged urban communities in Ghana. The case study approach is very flexible in

102

this circumstance as it will allow the opportunity to examine the complexity of living
arrangements in disadvantaged urban areas. Direct research at the case study areas
through direct observation and interviewing can reveal subtle information that would
have otherwise not be apparent in a ‘survey only research’ or in evaluating written
documents and other government regulations. For instance, through direct observation,
the researcher was able to observe different water use patterns in disadvantaged
communities. In addition, subtle ways in accessing water in these communities which
may be deemed illegal are very difficult to capture in regulatory documents.
The multiple case studies approach was used for this research because of a
number of reasons. Multiple case studies offer the investigator an opportunity for
comparing identified cases. Also, evidence obtained from multiple case studies is
frequently deemed more persuasive. Multiple case studies therefore add to the overall
robustness of the research design. (Yin, 1984)
Using the case study approach for this research is not necessarily to find the one
best way to cater for water supply inadequacies, but rather, to be able to identify common
patterns in categories of urban centers and then design and suggest a policy or mix of
policies to help ensure adequate water supply.
4.5.a Case Study Selection
In choosing the case study area, the researcher sought large urban centers with a
high migrant population. Looking at the demographic figures for the principal urban
centers in Ghana, Accra stood out. Accra, which also serves as the political and
commercial capital of Ghana had 41% of the population of the principal urban centers. In
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addition, with a migrant population of 41%, it was the single largest urban center in terms
of migrant population. (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000) The case study areas were
therefore selected from Accra and its environs.
In selecting the case studies, the researcher sought to identify disadvantaged urban
communities that have various characteristics, including communities with a high
concentration of low income dwellers, multi ethnic communities, communities with a
high concentration of squatters, settler communities and communities that have a
particularly low or no coverage of water supply. The case study areas were selected
through consultation with water policy stakeholders in Ghana, current research and
review of the literature.
One of the important criteria for selecting the case study areas was the extent of
water availability or coverage in the area. To this end, the researcher sought places that
had little or no piped water coverage from the Ghana Water Company. Other areas
considered were areas that are deemed to be under the water coverage of GWCL but
experience erratic flow. To be included in the case study as an erratic flow area, the area
must have water flow at least once every three weeks.
The choice of case study areas also included income levels. According to the
Accra Metropolitan Assemble (AMA), almost every residential community had enclaves
of poor and non poor residents. Since this research is interested in disadvantaged
communities, the researcher sought areas that had high concentration of poor residents.
The AMA has divided residential communities into four income zones for the
determination of poverty levels. Average Income levels diminish from zone one to zone
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four residential communities. (Local Government Bulletin, 2002) Zone one residents
have an average household income of US$ 1,519. Zone two residents have an average
household income of US$ 883. Zone three and four communities have an average
household income US$ 793 and US$ 460, respectively. Using AMA’s four income zone
residential categorization as a guide, communities that were included in the case study
has to exhibit zone three or zone four characteristics.
Communities that have a high concentration of one ethnic group were avoided
because it may slant the research findings. Particular tribes or ethnic groups may have
their unique cultural practices when it comes to water use and there may also be a strong
sense of community which will lessen the effect of inadequate water supply on the
elderly and children. Thus, to be considered as a case study community, the community
must be cosmopolitan in nature with various tribes and ethnic groups represented.
Rapid urbanization in Ghana and attendant increased rural-urban migration has
led to the springing up of many illegal and unauthorized housing structures. (Illegal or
unauthorized housing structure is defined as houses built without a valid building permit
or a building constructed on unauthorized places within the community) Most of the
communities that have illegal and unauthorized structures have high population density
and are filled with many low income residents who lack basic infrastructure facilities.
Thus, one other criterion for the case study selection was the presence of illegal and
unauthorized housing structures.
The specific case study areas were selected through a combination of expert
advice and literature review. The researcher consulted experts in water supply
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management, community development and community experts. Advice was sought from
the executive director for Grassroots Africa, a senior official of the Ghana Water
Company, an official at the Ministry of Water Works and Housing, and the Assembly
Members of selected communities. Various reports by the United Nations on water
supply such as ‘Meeting Development Goals in Small Urban Centers and ‘Water and
Sanitation in the World’s Cities were also consulted.
Using the selection criteria described above, the case study was narrowed to the
communities of Ashaiman, Ashaley Botwe, Madina, Nima and Sukura. Due to time and
financial constraints, the researcher selected the three communities of Ashaiman, Ashaley
Botwe and Nima to form the basis of the case study research. In selecting the final three
cases, the researcher was careful to select the most unique to ensure that cases
represented different disadvantaged communities.

Nima is the oldest disadvantaged

community that meets all the case study selection criteria. Ashalley Botwe is one of the
most dynamic disadvantaged communities in terms of development. Since this
community is at the urban fringe with more room for expansion, new construction and
settlements are spring up every day with new migrants moving in. Ashaiman is the
farthest community from Accra central and yet located between the urban area of Accra
and Tema.
In addition, case study research with three cases is not unusual. Many case studies
research in the literature are conducted with three cases. In Maton and Salem (1995) three
cases were selected in studying community empowerment. Eisenhardt (1989) also argued
that in a multiple case study approach, grouping cases into three or four different cases
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would suffice to learn about the subtle differences and nuances in the case study areas as
they relate to the subject under study.

Figure 4.1: Map of Greater Accra Metropolitan Area showing the Case Study Areas

Ashalley
Botwe

Ashaiman

Nima

Source: AMA Rapid Assessment Survey 2001
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4.6 Selecting Key Informants for Interview
Interviewing key informants was very critical for finding the state of water
supply in disadvantaged urban communities. It also provided insight into how residents
coped with inadequate water supply and efforts at the local and national level to address
the problem. Key informants also provided a rare insight into the operation of small scale
water providers. The key informants consisted of officials from the Public Utility
Regulatory Commission, municipal assemblies, selected water tanker providers (small
scale water providers), Ghana Water Company, The Ministry of Water Resources, Works
and Housing, and Non Governmental Organizations in the water sector.
Individual interviewees were selected based on their official position in their
organization. The small scale water providers were selected based on their ownership and
operation of water supply business. The researcher explored organizational charts and
identified interviewees based on their position in the organization and their work
responsibilities. Thus, an effort was made to select as close as possible subjects whose
work schedule directly involved water supply management or regulation. Once an expert
is identified, the researcher asked the person for suggestions in identifying interviewees
in the other organizations.
Arrangements for the actual interviews were made after all the key officers had
been identified. Arrangements for interviewing small scale water providers and officials
at the municipal assemblies were completed first. Since they dealt directly with the
communities of the case study, their responses were helpful in designing follow up
questions that were asked officials in the other organizations. With the rest of the
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organizations, the order for the interviews was purely for convenience sake. However, the
interview time table had to be abandoned midstream when it became obvious that most of
the selected interviewees had very tight schedules. Most of them could not meet on the
mutually agreed time. The interviews were therefore conducted when an official could
spare some time. Some interviews were therefore conducted during lunch break; others
were conducted after 6pm and even on weekends.
Interviews were requested mainly via telephone and personal visits. At the first
contact with an interviewee, the researcher explains the purpose of the study and why he
or she has been identified as a potential interviewee. The next step then was to ask their
permission to be interviewed at their convenience. At this time, a copy of the research
protocol and an introductory letter as approved by Clemson University Institutional
Review Board (IRB) was made available to the interviewee. The actual questions for the
interview were not made available in advance to the interviewee since could have
influenced their responses during the interview. An appointment for the interview was
then set up at the convenience of the subject. Most of the interviews took place at the
subject’s office or within the office premises.
On the day of the interview, copies of the research protocol and the letter of
introduction were given to interviewees to refresh their memory. At the beginning of each
interview, permission was requested from the subject to record the interview session by a
tape recorder. Each interviewee then had to sign an audio consent form with their initials
permitting the audio tape and releasing the tape for research related uses. Subjects were
assured that the recorded tape would be used to make up for gaps in the interview notes
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and their names will not be identified on any documents resulting from this research
unless an additional consent has been sought.
The interview sessions varied considerably from one interviewee to the other. The
duration of the interview was typically between one to two hours. Where necessary,
follow up interviews were conducted to seek clarifications on earlier statements.
Telephone calls were generally made to request follow up interviews and the same
consent procedure was followed for the use of an audio recorder. The interviews were
mostly one-on-one.
4.6.a The Interview Questions
Since the organizations included in the interviews were varied with different goals
and missions, the questions were diverse. However, in general, the questions for the
interviews were designed to elicit relevant information pertaining to water supply
management and regulation in Ghana. The questions therefore explored the regulatory
regime in Ghana and the participation of consumers in regulatory changes and decision
making process in setting tariffs. It also explored the role of local assemblies and Non
Governmental Organizations in the urban water sector. What is the existing government
policy on water supply in urban areas and what are the perceived changes to this policy in
the future? In addition, the questions looked into the operations of small scale water
providers and what the providers perceived to be their bottlenecks.
The interview questions explored these general areas;
•

Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC)
 Responsibilities of the PURC
 Citizen participation in the work of the PURC
 Decision making process in the tariff and pricing regimes
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•

Municipal Assemblies
 The collaborative role of the municipal assemblies

•

Selected Water Tanker Providers
 Operations of the small scale water provider
 Perceived bottlenecks in their operation
 Possibility for government assistance in their operation
Ghana Water Company
 Role of Ghana Water Company in urban water supply
 Extent of water coverage for consumers of Ghana Water Company
 Any collaborative efforts with other small scale water providers
Non Governmental Organization (Water Sector)
 Specific water related services provided to urban communities
 Community participation in the work of the NGO
 Funding sources for the NGO
Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing
 Government policy on urban water supply
 Statistics on urban water supply
 Availability of fresh water sources
 Strategies for reaching the urban poor

•

•

•

The complete list of questions as administered to each interviewee has been attached in
Appendix A.

4.7 Focus Groups
The focus group discussions were conducted in the three case study areas. The
focus groups method was chosen because of its advantages. Krueger (1994) points out
that focus groups are social in orientation with the ability to obtain valuable data in a
socially conducive environment. Krueger points out that people are social beings and
when they interact with and listen to each other they are able to inform and provide
valuable insight about a particular topic.
Another advantage of the focus group method is that it affords the researcher the
flexibility to probe further into a particular issue to elicit important information. Kruger

111

(1994) argues that this approach works especially well when the researcher uses an
unstructured probing method with the aid of question guides instead of having set
questions for the focus group.
Logistically, this method is inexpensive and relatively easy to conduct. Focus
groups allow the researcher the opportunity to have many people at the same location to
speak to a particular issue. This works particularly well when the members of the group
are representatives of the population of interest and have divergent views. (Krueger,
1994) Information gathered is immediate unlike a survey where you have to allow time
for mailing.
Finally, focus groups are inexpensive as compared to other research methods.
With about 7 to 10 participants, paying for a meeting venue, refreshments, services of an
assistant and monetary incentives for participation, this method is cheaper that paying to
conduct 100 or so individual surveys. (Krueger & Casey, 2000)
There were two focus group discussions in each of the three case study areas
making a total of six focus group discussions. Each group comprised a representative
group of seven residents in the case study areas. According to Krueger & Casey, the ideal
size of a focus group for noncommercial topics is six to eight participants. (Krueger &
Casey, 2000) Seven participants are big enough to ensure that a wide variety of
experiences are shared in the group discussion and also not too large to prevent
participant ample time to share their experiences.
To ensure a representative sample of residents in the area, participants in the focus
group discussion were drawn from different categories of water users living in the areas.
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The selection was therefore based on a combination of demographic information and
expert advice.
The help of the assembly member for the area was solicited to recruit potential
focus group participants. (Assemble Members are elected representative of the
community to the municipal assembly) At the first contact with an Assembly Member,
the purpose of the study and why his help will be very helpful to the research is
explained. A research protocol and an introductory letter as approved by Clemson
University Institutional Review Board (IRB) were then made available to the Assembly
Member. At this meeting, the researcher also explained the criteria for selecting
participants to the Assembly Members and then invited them to suggest possible focus
group participants. To ensure that the Assemble member did not suggest only his friends
or acquaintances, the suggested list of participants is vetted to ensure that they meet the
requirements set for participation in the focus group. The participant must be a full time
resident in the community. Since the communities are cosmopolitan in nature, no three
participants must come from the same tribe or ethnic group. Participants should vary by
age and gender. And participants must not live in only one section of the community, but
must represent all areas of the community.
After the participants were identified, the researcher met with them individually
and explained the purpose of the study and why their input in the focus group would be
helpful. Once they agreed to participate, copies of the research protocol and an
introductory letter as approved by Clemson University Institutional Review Board (IRB)
are made available to them. At this time, the participants were also informed about the
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meeting place and the time for the meeting. The researcher also made it clear to the
participants that refreshments would be provided at the meeting and a token of $1 will be
available to reimburse transportation cost. The focus group discussion took place within
about a two mile radius of the residences of the participants and going by local transport
$1 was about enough for fares. There seems to be a consensus in social science research
that participants in focus groups need to be given incentive packages to motivate them to
show up for the discussion. (Morgan, 1997; Morgan & Krueger, 1998; Krueger & Casey,
2000). In fact, in each of the three communities, at the day of the focus group discussion
all participants showed up on time and stayed throughout the entire one and half hour
period.
The venues for the focus group discussions were identified with the assistance of
the Assembly Members. At Nima, the focus group discussion took place at the
Community Social Center. At Ashalley Botwe, it was held at the house of a medical
officer in the area. Most local meetings took place at this address. At Ashiaman, the
discussion took place at a ‘hang out joint’ which played the role of a community center.
These venues were selected carefully to ensure the comfort and convenience of the
participants. According to Litoselliti, participants in a focus group need to be comfortable
and at ease to freely discuss their experiences. (Litoselliti, 2003)
To ensure that participants fully engage in the discussion, the decision was taken
to divide the focus groups into two groups in each community. Group one comprised
participants between the ages of 18 and 35 and group two comprised participants above
the age of 35 years. Studies have shown that young people refrain from challenging or

114

contradicting elderly people in public settings. Given Ghana’s patriarchic society, it was
felt that it was particularly important to group participants by age. (Kandiyoti, 1988; der
Geest, 2004)
On the day of the focus group discussion, the researcher briefed the participants
again about the purpose of the study and why their input in the focus group discussion
will be helpful. At this time, the ground rules for the discussion were set. The researcher
made sure that participants were aware there was no right or wrong answers to the
discussion points. The researcher’s was only interested in their personal views as
pertaining water use in their communities. At this time, permission was requested from
the participants to audiotape the group discussion. Each participant then had to sign an
audio consent form with their initials permitting the audio tape and releasing the tape for
research related uses. Participants were assured that the recorded tape would be used to
make up for gaps in the written notes and their names would not be identified on any
documents resulting from this research.
To ensure the full attention and effective moderation of the focus group
discussion by the researcher, an assistant was hired to take notes during the group
discussion. Once all the ground rules had been laid, the discussion began. During the
group discussion, each participant was given ample time to express his or her views. In
the few occasions where one or two participants tried to dominate the discussion, the
researcher politely asked them to allow others to share their experience as well. Specific
questions were directed to people who seemed particularly quiet so as to get their views
as well. Krueger & Casey warn that a focus group moderator must look out for the one or
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two people who try to dominate the group discussion. They explain further that to get
good information from a focus group discussion, the moderator must ensure that every
participant is given ample time to share their views.
The focus group discussion lasted between an hour and half to two hours. The
participants were allowed to have their refreshments during the group discussion. Since
the refreshment was either a canned soda or a bottle of water, it was felt that having it
during the group discussion would not significantly affect the quality of the audio
recorder or the discussion. At the end of the group discussion, $1 was given to the
participants to cover their transportation cost.
Points discussed followed the following theme;
•
•
•
•

Personal background information
General knowledge about water institutions in Ghana
Participants’ water use behavior
Participants’ perception of the state of water supply in their communities

Attached to appendix B is the complete list of discussion points in the focus group
protocol.

4.8 Survey Method
The objective of this survey was to collect more information about water use
patterns from residents in the case study area. Unlike the personal interviews and focus
groups, the survey method allowed efficient collect of data from a bigger sample of
residents in a relatively timely manner. A total of 100 respondents were surveyed in each
of the three case study areas. Since the research focuses on disadvantaged urban
communities which have predominantly low income residents and people with very little
education, the survey questions were read out to most of the respondents instead of
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allowing survey respondents to fill it out on their own. In addition, administering the
survey removes the possibility of confusing questions by the respondents.
Two research assistants were hired to help administer the surveys. The research
assistants were given copies of the research protocol so that they would familiarize
themselves with the research. The researcher also discussed each of the survey questions
with the assistants to ensure that they were ad idem as to the meaning of each question
and what the nature of the response should be. The researcher also explained to the
assistants the method to be used to identify the survey participants.
Stratified systematic sampling method was used to identify the respondents for
the survey. Patten (2001) argues that, when used properly, systematic sampling produces
a population sample that is basically as valid as a sample obtained by using simple
random sampling. A respondent was identified in every third house in the case study
communities. To further ensure that the respondents were a representative sample of the
community, participants were selected based on the sub areas of the communities. For
instance Nima is divided into Nima east and Nima west. Ashalley Botwe and Ashiaman
had ‘old town’ and new town’. These divisions were therefore taken into consideration to
ensure that respondents were drawn from each sub area of the community. In addition,
steps were taken to ensure that females and males were well represented in the survey. In
developing countries, women play a very important role in ensuring that their families
have sufficient water. (Shiva, 2002) Women therefore have very important information
when it comes to water use patterns in their communities. In addition, disadvantaged
urban communities are often times the recipient of rural-urban migrants. Rural-urban
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migrants often times include a sizeable number of men who go to urban areas in search of
greener pastures for their families back in the villages. Thus, it is not uncommon to find
males-only households in disadvantaged urban communities. Having left their families in
the villages, such men are solely responsible for their water use. In disadvantaged urban
communities, men also have very important information on water use patterns. A male
participant was therefore identified in every sixth house. This was not so difficult to do
since almost all the houses in the case study areas are ‘compound houses’. (Common
houses are multiple family dwellings) Such houses have an average of 15 residents and it
is therefore not difficult to identify a male or female in the household.
Once a participant is identified, he or she is read the survey participant statement
as approved by the Clemson University IRB. The statement gave a brief description of
the research and the nature of their participation. It also stated that the survey was
anonymous and participants were free to opt out of the survey at any time. (Attached to
Appendix C is the full statement as read out to survey participants)
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Chapter 5
Case Study 1 – Nima
The community of Nima is located at the northeastern part of the city of Accra
and is one of the suburbs within the Accra Metropolitan Assembly in the Greater Accra
region. Nima has a total population of 69,044 and 2429 households. (Ghana Population
and Housing Census, 2000) Nima community is a quintessential peri-urban community in
Accra made up of a constellation of people of mosaic ethnicity. (Konadu-Agyemang,
2001; Turner & Kwakye, 1999) In the household survey, all respondents answered that
they live in a compound house. The name Nima, which means “strangers resting place”
was first applied to parts of the city of Accra settled by Alhaji Amadu Futa, a settler from
the northern part of Ghana in 1931. Futa, a Muslim cattle dealer, acquired the property
from a traditional GA family purposefully as a settlement and also for cattle grazing.
Due to Futa’s Muslim norms of hospitality to strangers, Futa accommodated ‘Muslim
strangers’ who were thronging to the area in search of jobs at the time. Futa’s compound
attracted many strangers who had come to the city of Accra, especially from the Northern
part of Ghana. The area therefore grew as a place that socializes new migrants to the city
life in Accra. Today, though Islam is still the predominant religion in Nima, the place is
made up people from different ethnic groups in Ghana as well as migrants from within
the West African sub-region. Residents have nicknamed the community United Nations
to reflect the many tribes and nationalities represented in the community.
The population of Nima grew tremendously as a result of the growth in the city of
Accra. Starting from the 1960s, through the seven year development plan of Kwame
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Nkrumah, the city of Accra experienced rapid industrialization culminating in the
expansion of the manufacturing and commercial sectors within the Accra metropolis.
The bust and boom of rapid industrialization, though short lived, served as the genesis of
the rapid growth in Nima. From an estimated population of 29,797 in 1984, the
population of Nima had grown past 69,000 in 2000. (Ghana Statistical Service) Many
rural migrants who were attracted to the city of Accra during the later part of the 1960s
through the 1970s and 1980s ended up at Nima. In the 1960s, Nima served as a ready
shelter for the many construction workers who found themselves in Accra working on the
numerous infrastructure development projects commissioned by Ghana’s first president,
Kwame Nkrumah.
Nima continues to be a popular destination for new arrivals from villages within
Ghana and other economic refugees from neighboring West African countries. (Huber,
1999) The community also serves as a transit point for many traders who bring their
goods from all parts of the country to the city of Accra for sale. Thus, the growth in
Nima is not attributed only to natural growth but predominantly to in-migration. (Ghana
Population and Housing Census, 2000) Residents from other parts of the city who have
been edged out of residential areas where property rates and cost of living have shot up
have also found Nima to be an accommodating and affordable alternative.

5.1 Source of Water
The Nima community is within the piped network of the Ghana Water Company
Limited (GWCL). However, according to GWCL, approximately 50% of households are
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connected to the piped network. Thus, about half of residents get their water supply not
directly from GWCL but through middlemen or water vendors. (Songsore et al, 1998) In
the household survey, 56.7% of respondents indicated that they get their water from a
neighbor’s house pipe and 43.3% responded that their source of water was a pipe located
within their compound house. (Figure 5.1) It must be noted that these results do not
account for residents’ source of water during seasonal water shortages where water from
GWCL operated pipes becomes extremely erratic. In times of extreme water shortages
where there is little or no water flowing through the pipes, residents travel outside the
neighborhood to get access to water.
Figure 5.1

Source of Water Supply - Nima
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

The focus group participants indicated that they used water primarily for the
essentials of drinking, cooking, bathing and washing. This fact is corroborated by the fact
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that the Nima community is a predominantly poor neighborhood with low income
residents. (Songsore et al, 1998) The Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) has classified
Nima as a third class residential area with a mean annual income of $793. Few people
have personal cars or any of the possessions that more affluent groups own which
demands high water usage. The compound housing type is typically a rectangular block
with numerous rooms. Each room is rented and occupied by one family unit. The housing
structures are such that no individual tenant has enough personal space for gardening or
maintaining green grass, which will demand high water usage. During the field study in
the community, the author did not notice any green area in the whole community except
occasional flower pots containing flowers.

5.2 Water Scarcity and Stress
Frequency of flow of water is a major concern for the residents of Nima. Erratic
flow does not affect only households with piped water but also poses a major challenge
for households without piped water too. As indicated in figure 5.1, 56.7% of the survey
respondents indicated that they get their water supply from their neighbor’s house pipe.
Thus erratic flow affects all residents. In figure 5.2, 53.3% of the survey respondents who
reported having water pipes in their households said water flowed about once every
week. Another 24.4% reported that water flowed through their pipes about every other
day while only 2.2% responded that their water flowed daily. Of the 20% who responded
‘other’, 95% indicated that even though they have water pipes in their households, water
hardly flows through them. Respondents at the focus group did not hide their frustration
at all when it came to the issue of water reliability. Focus group participants were
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particularly frustrated with the nocturnal flow of water. One person retorted that when
water flows, it flows from midnight to 5 am when most of them were asleep. Thus, if you
are not lucky enough to realize the water is flowing during the night, you will be left with
no water in the morning. Another explained that she will really appreciate it if there was
an advance notice from GWCL as to the exact date and time that their pipes will be
flowing.
Madam F, a focus group respondent, is 62 and has lived in Nima for most of her
life. Her husband is deceased and she lives with 5 of her grandchildren and their parents
together with 3 other families in a big compound house. Madam F, a rice and soup seller
gets to the market to sell her wares by 8 am and gets back home at 6 pm. She is lucky to
have a water pipe in the compound house that she lives in. However, the water flow is
very unpredictable - flows an average of 4 hours twice in a week. Madam F’s frustration
is that she does not know when water will flow through her pipe. Thus, residents in the
compound house leave the tap running all the time so that they will know when the water
is flowing. However, when nobody is home and the water starts flowing, their container
can overflow for the duration of the water flow or until a residents get home. Whenever
this happens, they see an increase in their water tariffs. To Madam F, even though water
flows only twice a week, her life would be much easier if she knew exactly what time and
the duration of water flow.
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Figure 5.2
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In interviews conducted at the GWCL headquarters, officials did not deny these
figures neither did they deny erratic flow of water in the community. In fact GWCL
officials corroborated the severe water shortages in the area and went ahead to give a
litany of reasons for the water flow problems in Nima. A senior official at the GWCL
acknowledged that Nima is within the coverage area of the GWCL and should under
normal circumstances receive regular water supply like any other area within the city.
However, a contributory factor to water shortages in the community is as a result of the
rapid expansion of population and structures in the area. Population and housing units
have more than doubled since the 1960s while pipelines laid in the area have not seen any
major facelift. Official development plans have not been able to catch up with the rapid
population growth in the area. The official indicated that GWCL planning in the area has
been limited due, in part, to the fact that most of the growth in the area is extra legal.
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Structures have been erected haphazardly without proper legal authorization. Most of
these developments went unchecked during the protracted political instabilities of the
later part of the 1960s through the 1980s. For instance, uphill areas of the community
have not seen a drop of water from their pipes in the last seven years because of the fact
that high concentration of development at the lower elevations prevents the pressure of
the water from climbing to uphill areas in the relatively small pipes. Thus, utility and
urban planners are confronted with the development of a settlement which has left very
little room for infrastructure planning. Officials at GWCL stated that even if they had
enough resources to upgrade pipes in the community, they would have to demolish over
half of the structures in Nima to be able to upgrade the water system in the area. It seems
like this option is almost out of the question now. Breaking down structures would come
with a huge resettlement cost to the government. Even though the initial erection of these
structures was illegal, allowing the structures to stand for so many years can be said to be
a tacit approval by the government. The residents can therefore not be evicted now
without any form of resettlement package. In addition, there are now in Ghana a number
of human rights activists who stand ready to embark on legal action to protect the rights
of the disadvantaged city dweller. In any case, the political cost associated with such an
action might be too costly to be borne by a politician. The actions of the government in
relation to squatter communities in Accra speak volumes about this. There seem to be
very little political will on the part of government to evict squatters or break down illegal
structures. In 2007, for what many in the press described as being fear of losing electoral
votes, the government reversed a decongestion exercise in central Accra embarked on by

125

the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA). AMA had embarked on a decongestion
exercise including evicting squatters and permanently removing traders and illegal
residents within the central business district of Accra. The official reason given for
halting the actions of the AMA was that it was inhumane to evict people when it was so
close to the Christmas holidays. The traders and the residents were never evicted after the
holidays and have since continued in their illegality. In addition, the relatively poor
performance of the NPP political party in the 2008 election in the city of Kumasi was
blamed on the decision by the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly to decongest the Kumasi
Metropolis.
The severe level of water scarcity in the area has led to all sorts of illegal water
activities in the area. At the focus group discussion, participants mentioned illegal
tapping and sale of water in the area as very widespread. At Nima East, some residents
have broken laid pipes to the area and have resorted to extracting water from the pipes
with the help of portable motorized water pumps into large containers for sale. These
pipes which are supposed to be hidden underground have been exposed due to prolonged
erosion and human activities. The illegal water connections are going on with great
impudence as perpetrators are not doing much to hide their activities. It seems like illegal
water tappers know they can indulge in their illegality with no consequences from the
authorities because even open water pipe leakages have received almost no attention from
the authorities. Some landlords in the community do not allow tenants to fetch water
directly from the pipes in the household. They rather let the pipes flow directly into large
tanks and then resell them to tenants. These landlords engaged in water reselling have
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explained that the water flow is erratic and thus the way to ensure continued water supply
in the household is to store water. Participants in the focus group claimed that though
they have reported the illegal activities of residents in the area to the police as well as to
GWCL, no action seems to have been taken against them. At GWCL, officials attributed
the high un-accounted-for water of 50% partly to the activities of such unscrupulous
illegal tappers who do not pay for the water services. In addition, in the process of
illegally tapping water from laid pipes, a lot of treated water is spilled. GWCL officials
explained that they were doing everything possible to apprehend people who engage in
illegal connections. They however acknowledged that their efforts are hampered by
personnel and budgetary constraints.
In a way, it seems that residents in the area do acknowledge the veracity of the
problems in their community.

An exhaustive solution to the problem might be

decongesting the area to get rid of illegal structures. However, this is a solution most of
the people are not willing to go with. Some participants have lived in the area for a
number of years and have established deep social ties to the area. So, it will be very
difficult to move them out of the area entirely. In addition, even if they were
compensated to move, they might not find affordable housing alternatives in the city as
property rates have increased sharply in other parts of the city. It is important to note that
respondents to the survey were more interested in a convenient water supply system and
not necessarily a pipe network in their living quarters.

In fact, at the focus group

discussion, 10 out of the 14 participants said they were not interested in owning their own
pipe. They did not want the responsibility of having to pay monthly bills. To most of
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them, paying for every bucket of water used was more bearable instead of paying a lump
sum at the end of the month. They felt that they are better able to monitor their budget if
they pay for services daily instead of monthly.
Figure 5.3
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In the survey, 74.7% of the respondents said they will prefer piped water in the
house where they lived to be shared by other tenants and not necessarily in their
individual living quarters. (Figure 5.3) Another 24.2% of residents preferred a public
standpipe that was close where they lived. (Figure 5.3) In fact, to the survey respondents
and the focus group participants, the most important issue was the reliability of water
flow. Madam A, a 58 year old lady who sells boiled rice and beans at the local market
said; “if the water flows consistently for four hours every other day, I will be very
content. I will be able to plan my life well if I know exactly when the water flows”.

128

5.3 The Water Business
The people of Nima over the years have developed an intricate extra legal market
for buying and selling water. Leading this extra-legal water business in the Nima
community is the landlord or his agent. In households with piped water, two types of
arrangements exist. First, since compound houses share a common water meter, the
landlord or his agent receives the water bill and then shares the water bill among the
tenants in the household. The criterion for sharing the bill is based predominantly on the
size of every family unit within the compound house. With this arrangement, non-tenants
are not allowed to fetch water in the household. This method of sharing the cost of water
however can be unfair as some small families may free ride on the others by using more
water than some big families. Thus, other criteria used have been based on the number of
times members of a family unit shower in a day or the number of times a family unit do
laundry. In sharing the water bill, participants explained that the best practice is for the
landlord to display the water bill together with each tenant’s share of the bill in a
common area to ensure transparency in sharing bills. However, as noted by participants
in the focus group discussion, the method of sharing the water bill is not transparent as
some landlords are in the practice of not showing the water bill to the tenants. They only
display what each individual tenant is responsible for paying. It is not surprising therefore
that some participants accused Landlords who refuse to make full disclosure of water
bills as being exploitive.
In the second arrangement, tenants pay the landlord or his assigned representative
for every bucket of water used. Landlords buy poly-tank containers typically with a
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storage capacity of 3000 to 5000 gallons to store water for retailing. If the compound
house is connected to the piped water network, the tank is filled with water during water
flow or the landlord buys water from independent water tanker operators. Though the sale
of water is predominantly to tenants of the house, it is however not uncommon to get
water customers from other compound houses in the neighborhood, especially during
times of acute water shortages.

There is an informally constituted water sellers’

association in the community to regulate the activities of the water sellers’, however, not
every water seller in the community adheres to the rules of the organization. For instance,
even though the association had posted a price list for water based on container size at
vantage points within the community, the price of water in the community varied greatly
and with no enforcement mechanism in place the association has no means of enforcing
compliance with its rules.
There are also individual water purveyors who fetch water using buckets or some
other container for sale in the community. If for any reason, a resident can not walk to the
water vendor to fetch water, these individual water purveyors can be contracted to go and
fetch water. These individuals, mainly made up of immigrants from other West African
countries, can be called on the streets and sent to fetch water. The charge for this type of
water is based on the travel time as well as whether the source of water is piped water of
hand-dug well water. This is the most expensive way of getting water in Nima. The
services of the water purveyors are therefore utilized by customers in the areas of the
community with the most water stress or areas that are further away from the nearest
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water vendor. Residents who live by themselves or do not have relatives or children to
send for water typically utilize the services of the individual water purveyors.
There are a lot of public health concerns with the services provided by the water
resellers. Tanks are hardly cleaned for contaminants and when they are cleaned,
unsuitable laundry detergents are used. The health concerns are compounded in the case
of the individual water purveyor as the source of their water cannot be easily ascertained
by the consumer. Community participants to the research talked about instances where
hand-dug well water has been sold by the individual water purveyors as treated piped
water. The purveyors also use old paint containers to fetch water. For fear of losing their
containers, consumers prefer that the water purveyor uses his own container to fetch
water. The water is then emptied into the consumer’s container when the purveyor
arrives. A cursory examination of the paint containers revealed residue of paints in and
all over the container.
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Used Paint Containers Used to Fetch water by the individual water purveyors

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

An Individual Water Purveyor on His Way to Fetch Water

Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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Children seem to be affected most by the water scarcity in Nima. (Songsore et al,
1998) Apart from being the most vulnerable group to various water related diseases like
Malaria and Diarrhea, they are also the likeliest group of people to be struck by cars.
Parents and guardians send their children to fetch water, and in Nima this in most cases
entails crossing the main highway that cut through the community. Respondents in the
focus group lamented that on average about 10 children are involved in a water related
car accident yearly in the community.

5.4 Payment for Water Service
Data collected from Nima indicate that residents pay more for water in real terms
and also as a percentage of their income than other parts of the urban area. Irrespective of
whether there was a pipe in a household or not, members of the community consume
water mainly by buckets and thus pay for each bucket of water used. This study therefore
wanted to find out the number of buckets consumers used per day and how much they
paid for each bucket of water. In the survey, 39% of respondents indicated that they used
more than 5 buckets of water a day and 59% indicated that they used between 2 and 5
buckets a day. (Figure 5.4) The average bucket used for water in Nima can hold about 35
liters of water. Respondents reported paying an average of .07 cedis for each bucket of
water used. (Table 5.1) Thus for the 59% of respondents who reported using between 2
and 5 buckets of water per day, they spend between 0.14 – 0.34 cedis a day for water.
And the 39% who reported using more than 5 buckets spend more than 0.34 cedis a day
for water. The PURC, the legislatively mandated organization to determine tariffs for
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water, has a two step increasing block rate pricing mechanism for the water sector. In
2006, the first 20,000 liters of water supplied by GWCL was priced at 0.4850 per 1000
liters of water used. Consumption beyond 20,000 liters is priced at 0.6750 per 1000 liters
of water used. However, the residents of Nima pay an average of 2 cedis every 1000 liters
of water consumed. Residents of Nima are therefore paying as much as 4 times what non
disadvantaged urban water consumers with piped water in their houses pay.

Table 5.1: Water Prices in Nima

Number of
Buckets

Number of
liters

Nima Price
(Cedis)

PURC
Approved
Price (Cedis)

1

35

0.07

0.0145

2

70

0.14

0.029

3

105

0.21

0.0435

4

140

0.28

0.0581

5

175

0.35

0.0726

134

Figure 5.4

Buckets of Water Used Daily
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40%
30%

33%
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10%

0%

0%
More than 5 buckets

2 and 5 bucket

Less than two buckets

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

The two tier pricing structure adopted by the PURC prices the first block of water
very low to ensure that low income consumers will at least be able to afford enough water
for their essential use. PURC terms this first block of water as the lifeline water block.
(PURC, 2005) In the compound household in Nima, there is mostly a single water meter
serving the entire household. However, since compound households are mostly multiple
family dwellings, the number of family units within the compound house ends up sharing
the same water meter.

In this housing arrangement, GWCL sees the compound house

with multiple family units as one household for the purpose of billing. The high
occupancy nature of the compound household often puts the collective consumption of
the residents above the lifeline water block and into the relatively expensive block. This
system of household living arrangement is very prevalent in peri-urban neighborhoods in
developing countries. (Whittington, 1992) Although compound housing presents a very
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cheap and affordable housing alternative for the urban poor, according to Whittington, it
renders the life line water pricing useless.
In the household survey, 52.6% of residents reported that they lived in a
compound house that had more than 25 people living in the household. (Figure 5.5) Out
of the 52.6%, 68.8% reported that they used more that 5 buckets of water a day. Based on
their water consumption per day, an average family unit of 4 will consume an estimate of
5500 liters of water per month. However, a compound house with 5 different family units
will consumer almost 30,000 liters of water per month. Thus the aggregate consumption
of a household in Nima will exceed the lifeline water block of 20,000 liters which is
priced relatively cheaper to accommodate the urban poor.

Figure 5.5

Number of Residents in a House
60.0%
50.0%

52.6%

40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

1.0%

17.5%

12.4%

16.5%

1-6 people 7-12 people 13-18 people 19-24 people More than 25
people
Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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5.5 Consumer Involvement in Water Planning
There seems to be a shift towards a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down
approach to public decision making and public administration. (Pressman & Wildavsky,
1984; Ostrom, 1990; Osborne & Gabler, 1993; Gortner et al, 1997) The theory behind
decentralization is predicated on the idea of involving citizens at the local level in the
decision making process. (Hope, 2000; Francis & James, 2003) Public involvement and
awareness of decision making processes ensures that government policies are well
targeted. There is also a sense of ownership of projects that comes with public
involvement of community projects. Once there is a sense of communal ownership,
communal protection of public projects is easily achieved. The governing body therefore
saves on policing cost. (Ostrom, 1990)
At Nima, there seems to be very little awareness of the decision making process
pertaining to the water sector. Without the requisite knowledge of the decision making
process, residents cannot fully participate in the decision making process. At the focus
group discussion, participants said that the authorities have kept them in the dark about
the decision making process and actual decisions made within the water sector that
affects them. Within the last 5 years, participants recounted only two occasions when a
nonprofit organization had come to the community to elicit their views about the water
situation in the community. Further enquiries determined that these nonprofit
organizations that went to the community were neither affiliated with the official water
agencies nor acted on behalf of the water agencies. Participants displayed very little
knowledge about the problems that confront the water sector and knew almost nothing
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about the decision making process. It comes as no surprise therefore that the survey
results indicated very little knowledge about decision making matters within the water
sector. In the survey, 77.9% of the respondents in Nima said they did not know the
agency that determined the price of urban water. (Figure 5.6) It is interesting that even
though they had the choice of naming either GWCL or PURC, the majority of the
respondents chose ‘don’t know’ as answer. From interacting with the respondents, the
general sense was that people have very little trust for these public agencies whether or
not they knew their names.
Figure 5.6
Agency that Determines Water Price
Don't Know

PURC

GWCL
.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

Percentage

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

Act 538 which set up the PURC mandates it to receive and act on consumer
complaints about water pricing issues. Act 538 also mandates a consumer representative
on the board of PURC to ensure that consumer interests are taken into consideration
during tariff adjustments and other regulatory deliberations of the institution. PURC is
also required to carry out public education about its activities and important issues
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affecting the water sector. However, only 6.7% of respondents said they would complain
to PURC about pricing issues while 68% of respondents indicated they had nobody to
complain to. (Figure 5.7) In fact, officials at the PURC indicated that their mandate was
limited to the regulation of prices for GWCL. They regarded water pricing by
intermediaries or water vendors as falling outside their jurisdiction. Thus, to them they
were not the right institution for consumers in Nima to complain to.
When respondents were asked if they knew there was a consumer representative
on the board of PURC to represent consumer interests, 96.1% of respondents did not
know about the existence of such a consumer representative. Thus, even those who
receive their water directly from the GWCL did not know of the existence of a consumer
representative through whom they can channel their views on regulatory issues and
performance of the GWCL.
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Figure 5.7

Consumer Complaints About Water Pricing
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

Figure 5.8
Awareness of Consumer Representative on PURC Board
3.9

Yes
No

96.1

Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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It must be noted that officials at GWCL and PURC indicated a strong
commitment to public education and public involvement in the decision making process
in the water sector. PURC, for instance has conducted a number of public education
sessions as well as participatory meetings to elicit the views and ideas of civil society
groups. The success of these efforts have however been limited as meetings have been
very few and limited to organized groups. At GWCL, a senior planning officer reiterated
the need for public education and public involvement in the planning and decision
making process. Budgetary and personnel concerns seem to limit the abilities of these
agencies to embark on a wide scale public education.
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Chapter 6
Case Study 2 – Ashalley Botwe
Ashalley Botwe is one of the fastest growing suburbs in the city of Accra.
(Yeboah, 2003) In 1960, Ashalley Botwe was a small town located north of the city of
Accra with a few dwellings and less than 200 inhabitants. However, since the 1980s, the
population and housing stock in Ashalley Botwe has grown steadily. Population figures
in 2000 indicate a growth of over 3000% since the 1970s with population increasing from
the low 300s to 11,974 in 2000. (Ghana Population and Housing Census, 2000)
In terms of income levels, Ashalley Botwe is a mixed settlement area with both
low income and middle income dwellers. Thus, housing types are also mixed featuring
the compound housing style which is mainly occupied by low income earners and the
single family unit or self contained house which is mainly occupied by middle income
and high income earners. In the survey, 47.5% reported that they lived in a compound
house while 52.5% reported living in self contained houses.
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Figure 6.1

Type of House
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52.0%

52.5%

51.0%
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48.0%
47.0%

47.5%

46.0%
45.0%
Self Contained House

Compound House

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

6.1 Source of water
Ashalley Botwe is one of the most water stressed areas in Accra. (Adjibolosoo,
2007) According to GWCL, its water supply to Ashalley Botwe meets only 45% of the
water needs of the community. In some areas within the community, no pipes have been
laid at all and in some areas where pipes have been laid, no water has flowed through
them for the last 10 years. The experience of Mr. A, a long time resident of Ashalley
Botwe sums up the level of water stress in the area.
Mr. A is gainfully employed as an accounts clerk in a government agency. His
wife is trader at the local market. They have lived in Ashalley Botwe for the last 7 years
after they moved from the eastern region of Ghana. He and his family live in a house with
two other families. When he rented the apartment, there was already a pipe connection in
the house; however, for the last seven years that he has lived in Ashalley Botwe, not even
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a drop of water has flowed through the pipe. Every morning, the children will have to
fetch water from a neighboring vendor for bathing before they go to school. Mr. A said
further that “my brother, the water is so expensive that I am forced to take one shower a
day and when I do that I only use half bucket (about 17 liters).”
Mr. A’s story is very typical in the community of Ashalley Botwe. Portable water
is so scarce in the community and so expensive that simple daily routines like washing
and bathing become a burden to many residents. One participant in the focus group
discussion recounted a situation where a woman was caught stealing water from a local
water vendor and was nearly lynched. This woman had no money to purchase water, but
desperately needed some water for household chores. When she thought nobody was
looking, she made a quick dash to steal a bucket of water. When the vendor who was
watching from his window saw what was going on, he accosted the woman amidst shouts
of thief! thief! A crowd quickly gathered and the woman was nearly beaten if the
respondent had not opted to pay for the water. Respondents to the survey as well as the
focus group discussions were so eager to participate, because they wanted to voice their
displeasure about the state of water supply in the area. In fact, it was difficult controlling
the focus group discussion in Ashalley Botwe. Respondents were so emotional about the
water situation and they just wanted to vent and not necessarily speak to the questions
being asked. At any opportunity, someone would say “we have been buying water from
vendors for so long that we are just tired.” Residents living in this area do not enjoy
adequate water supply services from GWCL. Some focus group respondents explained
that their houses were fixed with network pipes, but water has not flowed through these
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pipes for years. Madam G, a 47 year old seamstress and resident of Ashalley Botwe for 5
years explained that she has not seen a drop of water flow through her pipe for the last 5
years. There was a general sense of frustration on the part of respondents because they
could not understand why as tax paying members of the society their area seemed to have
been forgotten by the government while other areas in the city have 24 hour water supply
service.
The survey result indicated that 48.5% of respondents got their water supply from
water vendors who plied their trade with mobile tanker service. (Figure 6.2) Another
51.5% of respondents got their water supply from a variety of sources which ranged from
hand-dug wells and boreholes to stream water. For the 51.5% of respondent who get their
water supply from other sources, the community has developed a sophisticated local
water supply system to meet their needs. This system provides water through buckets and
small containers for immediate use or storage for future use.
Because there is very little piped water in this area, the water sold in buckets is
mostly well water or water dispensed from stored tanks. Individuals who have the
financial means in the community arrange for their own hand-dug wells. The hand-dug
well may serve only one household or may be opened up for sale to other residents in the
community. Where water from the hand-dug well is sold to members of the community,
customers fetch water with their own bucket and pay an agreed amount for every bucket
of water fetched. If the hand-dug well is located in a compound house, then members of
the household will have to pay for every bucket of water used as well. It must be noted
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however that a group of residents in a compound house may pull resources together for
their own private well.
Another group of vendors sell water from their water tanks to members of the
community. In this group, the vendors buy a poly-tank container (containers range in size
from 200 gallon capacity to over of 1000 gallons capacity), fill them with water and sell
them by the bucket to consumers. Unlike the hand-dug well which depends on ground
water availability and thus depends on seasonal availability and flow of ground water,
poly-tank water sellers have water all year around. Poly-tank water sellers are able to buy
water from other parts of the city throughout the year. Poly-tank water sellers are
therefore more popular than the hand-dug wells.
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A Typical Poly-Tank Container

Source: Ghanaweb.com 2008

For the 48.5% who reported their source of water as tanker service, it must be
noted that most middle income earners of the community buy poly-tanks for their
personal use. Others also buy poly-tanks for the dual purpose of personal use and
retailing. Residents who can afford their own poly-tank enjoy a door to door water
service albeit at a rate more expensive than official water rates. Where the poly-tank is
for personal use, the water is not sold to people outside the home. The poly-tank
containers in the community range in various sizes, however, the storage capacity of most
poly-tanks are a maximum of 10,000 liters.
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Figure 6.2
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

In the nutshell, the choice of service, i.e. as to whether one will opt for tanker
service or other means of water, depends on the level of income. The cost of the polytank is beyond the means of the ordinary community dwellers. In addition, owning a
personal poly-tank means one must have the financial ability to pay a lump sum of
money upfront for water. Even though on the aggregate, it costs more to buy water by the
bucket, most residents who purchase water by the bucket often times do not have the
lump sum money to pay for filling a poly-tank size water container. As depicted in Table
6.1, all respondents who reported earning less than 35 cedis said they did not use water
tanker as their water source. For the respondents who reported earning between 50 cedis
and 100 cedis per month, 69.7% of respondents reported using other sources of water. It
must be noted that 75.6% of those who reported tanker service as their source of water
also reported earning more than 100 cedis per month.
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Table 6.1 Income levels and Source of Water
Categories
% within
Source
Tanker % within
service Income
% within
Source
Other
% within
Income

More than 100c

50-100c

35-50c

Less than
35c

75.6%

20.0%

4.4%

0

57.6%

32.1%

33.3%

.0%

50.0%

38.0%

8.0%

0.04

42.4%

67.9%

66.7%

100.0%

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

6.2 Mobile Tanker service
The market void created by the lack of network pipe in the community has been
filled by the operations of the mobile water tanker services. (GWCL, 2000; Triche et al,
2006) The mobile tanker services therefore provide access to water to households that are
outside the reach on the services of GWCL and households that experience erratic water
flows. Some households in the community do not possess the requisite legal permit for
the house and therefore cannot acquire water through GWCL even if given the
opportunity. Thus, the services of the tanker operators become very crucial for the extra
legal settlements. (GWCL, 2000)
Generally, two types of mobile water tanker operators operate in this community.
Type 1 is a water tanker truck or a light truck mounted with a water tank. The storage
capacity of these types of trucks can be up to 20,000 liters. The travel distance of these
water trucks varies considerably depending on the season. In the dry season, water trucks
can travel in excess of 50 miles in search of water for consumers.
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The second type of mobile tanker service is a locally manufactured two wheeled
motorized vehicle mounted with a water tank. The tank for this two wheeled motorized
vehicle is built locally out of scrap metals. The tank is fitted with a portable water pump
to aid the extraction of water as well as for the transfer of water from the tank to the
consumer’s receptacle. The second type usually has a short travel range. Type two is also
the most commonly used in Ashalley Botwe, especially among low income and middle
income earners. This study therefore focused on the operations of the type two mobile
tanker services.

Mobile Water Tanker: Type 1

Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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The two wheeled mobile tanker is usually individually owned. Its operation is
however done by a hired driver and a driver’s mate. Within the community, there is a
central place where the drivers wait everyday for their services to be called. (Appendix
D) The drivers have mobile telephones and can therefore be reached anytime to provide
water services. Consumers will have to inform drivers ahead of time what the water will
be used for. The type of use determines the source of water the driver will deliver. When
the water is for drinking, the drivers deliver treated tap water. The drivers travel to the
nearest neighborhood with pipe water to buy the piped water for the consumer. When the
use is bathing and washing, the drivers will deliver hand-dug well water or stream water.
The drivers deliver water from the nearest source irrespective of the quality if the
consumer’s use is construction or some other out door use.
At the focus group discussion, participants complained about the quality of water
from the two wheeled mobile tanker. One woman explained that in most cases there was
the presence of particles in the water as well as an unusual odor. Participants who used
the services of the two wheeled tanker service doubted the source of the water. They have
no way of checking the information provided by the driver. Hand-dug well water can
easily be passed as treated water. However, even though participants admitted the health
risk involved in this type of water, they explained that under the circumstances, this type
of water was the most affordable. To minimize the risks, some participants said they
boiled the water before they used it for cooking or drinking. Others said they used the
water solely for bathing and washing and rather depended on packaged portable water
(Sachet Water) as their source of drinking water.
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Mobile Water Tanker: Type 2

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

The drivers that were interviewed in the course of this research denied ever
deceiving their clients as to the source of water in their tanks. Further probing however
established that their practices itself was very detrimental to the health of their customers.
Because drivers must pay a fixed commission to the owners of the vehicle, which is
usually high, the more trips they make in a day the more money they will make for
themselves. Thus, it is not uncommon for a driver to cart dirty water for construction and
right after that cart treated tap water in the same tank, without washing it, for another
consumer for drinking. When the drivers were asked if they ever cleaned their tanks, all
respondents were quick to say they clean their tanks regularly. However, the time interval
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for cleaning differed significantly from one driver to the other. The most frequent
cleaning was once every two weeks. And the most infrequent was three times a year. The
response of most drivers put the average range of cleaning time from once a month to
once every other month. Another red flag was that the drivers climbed into the tank to
clean them and they reported using laundry detergents for cleaning their tanks.
The practices of the two wheeled mobile water tankers were brought up in the
interview with a representative of PURC.

The representative said the practice was

unfortunate, and then went ahead to explain that PURC does not regulate the operations
of the tanker operators. Consumers therefore have to be careful in choosing the services
of the two wheeled tanker drivers.
It must be noted that because the quality of the water can not be verified and thus
poses a health risk, the activities of the two wheeled motorized tanker services are not
recognized by the government. Surprisingly however, the operators claimed that they
paid taxes for their operations. At a visit to the local Internal Revenue Service, the officer
in charge explained that according to Legislative Instrument 1727, all commercial
vehicles had to pay a levy for the operation of their commercial vehicles. Thus, though
the services of the two wheeled motorized tanker are not officially recognized, they have
to pay tax for operating a commercial vehicle.

6.3 Payment for Water Service
The data collected show that consumers in Ashalley Botwe paid higher prices for
water than consumers in areas served by GWCL. Consumers reported paying an average
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price of 0.25 for a 35 liter bucket of water which translates into 7.14 cedis per 1000 liter
water consumed. However, PURC has set the price of every 1000 liters of water
consumed up to 20,000 liters at .4850 cedis. (PURC 2006 Water Tariffs) Thus, water
consumers in Ashalley Botwe who buy water by the bucket on the average spend 14
times as much as their counterparts being served directly by the GWCL.
The survey summary indicated that for respondents who reported using other
means of water source apart from tanker service, 50% used about 2 to 5 buckets of water
daily. (Figure 6.3) Another 48% indicated that they used more than 5 buckets of water a
day. Thus the majority of the respondents spend at least 15 cedis to over 37.5 cedis per
month for water service alone.
Figure 6.3

Buckets of Water Daily
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

It must be noted however that for respondents who reported using more than 5
buckets of water a day, 56% of them reported earning less than 100 cedis a month. For
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respondents who reported using between 2 and 5 buckets per day, 42.3% also reported
earning less than 100 cedis a month. Thus, a large chunk of the respondents’ income goes
to water supply alone leaving them with very little resources for food and shelter. For
these categories of respondents, a small health care situation becomes a crisis because of
lack of funds.

Table 6.2 Income levels and Number of Buckets of Water Used
More than
Categories
50-100c
100c
% within
44.00%
48.00%
More than Bucket
5 buckets
% within
42.3%
60.0%
Income
% within
57.7%
26.9%
Bucket
2-5
buckets
% within
57.7%
35.0%
Income
% within
.0%
100.0%
Less than Bucket
2 buckets
% within
.0%
5.0%
Income

35-50c

Less than
35c

4.00%

4.0%

25.0%

50.0%

11.5%

3.8%

75.0%

50.0%

.0%

.0%

.0%

.0%

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

Respondents who used the services of the two wheeled motorized tanker service
paid an average of 8 cedis for a 350 gallon tank. This translates into 22.8 cedis per 1000
liters of water consumed. 65% of respondents reported using tanker service at least once
a month while 25% reported using the service every other month. For respondents who
reported using tanker service once a month, 30% also reported earning less than 100
cedis a month. And for those who responded using tanker service twice a month, 11.1%
reported a monthly income of less than 100 cedis. Thus, consumers in Ashalley Botwe
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who depend on water tanker service for their water supply also spend a substantial part of
their income on water.
In spite of the fact that residents are already spending a sizeable portion of their
income on water, respondents in all income brackets reported that they will be prepared
to pay more for water if there was a guaranteed source of clean and reliable water supply.

Table 6.3 Income levels and Frequency of Tanker Service Use
Income
Category
Every
two
weeks
Tanker
Service

Every
month

Other

More than 100c

50-100c

35-50c

88.90%

0.00%

11.10%

23.50%

0.00%

50.00%

70.00%

26.70%

3.30%

61.80%

100.00%

50.00%

100.00%

0.00%

0.00%

14.70%

0.00%

0.00%

% within
Tanker
% within
Income
% within
Tanker
% within
Income
% within
Tanker
% within
Income
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Figure 6.4

Frequency of Tanker Service Use
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Other

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

Figure 6.5
Are you willingly to Pay More for Reliable Water Supply

22%

Yes
No

78%

Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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6.4 Consumer Involvement in Water Planning
Participants at the focus group said local officials do not engage them or consult
them on any issues related to water supply within the area. Some participants expressed
the opinion that local politicians do not consult them on any issue affecting their
community but only come to the people when the next election cycle is getting near. The
outcome of the focus group discussions was confirmed by the lack of basic knowledge
about the public institutions whose decisions and actions affect their water supply.
Among the survey participants, only 26.7% of respondents correctly identified the
government regulatory agency that was responsibly for determining the prices of water.
(Figure 6.6) A total of 67.3 survey respondents indicated that they did not know the
government regulatory agency in charge of determining water tariffs. 64% of respondents
said they did not know who they will complain to if they felt that water prices were too
high. (Figure 6.8) And 94% of respondents did not know that they had a consumer
representative on the board of PURC through whom they could channel their concerns.
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Figure 6.6

Agency that Determines Water Prices
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

Figure 6.7
Awareness of Consumer Representative on PURC Board
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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Figure 6.8

Where Consumers Complain About Water Pricing
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AM

Nobody

Chapter 7
Case Study Three – Ashaiman
Ashaiman is a sprawling community located northeast of the city of Accra. The
population of Ashaiman boomed during the 1960s with the development of the Tema
harbor in 1962. The Tema harbor now handles almost two-thirds of all goods coming into
the country as well as goods for neighboring landlocked countries. (Tema, 2009) After
the harbor was constructed, a 64 square mile area north of the harbor was acquired by the
government to be developed into an industrial/residential city. This area became a magnet
for new residents in search of jobs. The Tema Development Corporation, the agency in
charge of developing the city was however not able to cope with the influx of the new
arrivals. New arrivals unable to find housing in the harbor city ended up in an area north
of Tema that eventually became known as Ashaiman. Subsequently, residents who were
later priced out of the growing harbor city also ended up in Ashaiman. Ashaiman has
continued to be a popular destination for new arrivals from the rural areas as well as
migrants from the West African sub region.
Today, Ashaiman is one of the fastest growing communities in Ghana. The
population of Ashaiman grew from 22,549 in 1970 to 150,312 in 2000 and continues to
grow at the rate of 4.6% annually, the highest growth rate in Ghana. (Ghana Population
and Housing Census, 2000; World Bank, 2008) Population growth and the construction
of structures in Ashaiman have been faster than local officials’ attempt at regulating the
development. Like other disadvantaged communities in Ghana, people have built on
public spaces or erected structures without the requisite building permit. Because of the
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informal nature of the growth and development of this area, Ashaiman lacks many
amenities of a modern city. The community continues to struggle with sanitation issues
such as poor drainage systems and improper waste disposal systems. Ashaiman also is
regarded as one of the most severely water stressed areas in Ghana. (Amenga-Etego &
Grusky, 2005)

7.1 Housing type
Due to the informal nature of developments at Ashaiman, there is very little
planning and organization in terms of how structures are erected in the neighborhood.
Thus, some buildings are erected close to each other while others are constructed near
gutters and drainage systems. Many buildings, especially compound houses which house
multiple family units, have no toilet facilities. Every single space in these houses has
been converted to living quarters for rent. Some landlords in the area interviewed were
not able to provide any legal documents for their properties. Ownership in properties was
expressed verbally. One landlord said he could not find the document showing he had
legal ownership to his property. He expressed no worries about the fact that he has no
title to his property because he felt all his neighbors knew he owned the property. Of the
respondents who participated in the survey, 90.8 responded that they lived in a compound
house and 9.2% responded that they lived in a single family unit. (Figure 7.1) Compound
houses in the urban area have been associated with low income neighborhoods and the
residents of compound houses in the urban areas have also been among some of the low
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income dwellers in the urban area. (Tipple et al, 1999; CHF International, 2004; AMA,
2004; Fiadzo, 2004; Afram & Owusu, 2006)
As explained by Tipple et al (1999), compound houses are typically high
occupancy houses. Especially in the urban areas, compound housing provides cheap and
affordable housing to rural urban migrants as well as residents priced out of other parts of
the city. In the household survey, 91.4% of respondents who said they lived in compound
houses also reported a monthly income range of 50-100 cedis and 89.7% of those who
reported monthly income of less 35 cedis also reported living in a compound house.
Figure 7.1

Types of Housing
100.0%
90.0%
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

90.8%

9.2%
Self contained house

Compound house

Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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7.2 Source of Water
Although Ashaiman is within the network coverage of GWCL, water flow is
erratic and in some homes non-existent. Residents therefore depend on water resellers
and water vendors for their source of water. In a 2000 report issued by the GWCL,
Ashaiman was identified as one of the communities in Ghana where the practice of
individual water retailing is expanding rapidly. (GWCL, 2000) Results of the household
survey indicated that 67.8% of respondents depended on their neighbor’s house pipe for
their source of water. 23% of respondents reported depending on the house pipe in their
compound house for their water supply and 6.9% of respondents reported depending on
house pipes in their self contained house.
In Ashaiman, respondents reported using their water for the most basic
necessities. In the focus group discussion, participants indicated that they used their
water for washing, cooking, bathing and drinking. With the exception of a few flower
pots and small back yard gardens, there were no green areas in all the 120 houses visited
during the research field study. None of the high water consumption facilities like
swimming pools and elaborate front lawns were seen in the community. On the second
day of the field trip, a handful of community residents were observed washing their
commercial vehicles in front of their homes.
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Figure 7.2

Source of Water Supply
80.0%
70.0%
67.8%

60.0%
50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

25.3%
6.9%
Self contained house
pipe

Pipe in compound
house

Neighbor's house
pipe

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

The focus group discussion at Ashaiman revealed a water market similar to the
water market in Nima. Informal community water markets have over the years emerged
to serve consumers who experience erratic flow of water and those in the informal
settlements. In some areas within the community where there are a lot of illegal
developments, residents do not have the requisite legal documentation for their structures
and therefore cannot acquire water through the GWCL. Their main source of water
supply then is through the water vendors. The vending system thus fills an important
water supply gap within the community. Through the water vendors, low income
unapproved and unplanned communities have access to water supply regularly. Water
vendors identified within the community do not have any special permit from GWCL to
operate their business. Officials at the GWCL indicate that these vendors are treated the
same as any other domestic customer with no privileges or punishments.
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Often, individuals who have pipes in their houses build underground water tanks
or buy poly-tank containers for water storage. Typically, in a compound house, it is the
landlord or a relative of the landlord who owns and operates the water vending business.
At the focus group discussion, participants explained that these water tanks are filled
when the tap flows or are supplied by private motorized water tanker service. Water is
then dispensed into buckets for sale to individual customers within the community.
Residents in a compound house with piped water also have to purchase their
water from the landlord. Compound houses typically do not have plumbing in the
individual rooms. There is a common pipe in the court yard to be used by all the tenants.
In some cases, the tenants use the common pipe water within the house without paying
anytime they draw water. Rather, the landlord divides the bill among the tenants in the
house when the water bill is received from GWCL. In this arrangement, the use of the
common pipe is limited to tenants and their family members only. However, just like
Nima, participants questioned the modalities their landlord or his agent used to share the
water bill. Landlords wanting to make some extra money have done away with the
practice of monthly bill sharing so that they can sell their water to a wide range of
customers. In this arrangement, tenants in the compound house as well as water
consumers outside of the house pay for every bucket of water used. Landlords who reside
in areas where water bills are fixed make a windfall profit by selling to as many
customers as possible.
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7.3 Water Scarcity and Stress
Water flow from GWCL is severely erratic in Ashaiman. The frequency of flow
affects quantity of water that will be available for use by consumers especially those
consumers who live in illegal structures as well as the un-served. In addition, the
frequency of flow determines the prices at which consumers will pay for their water
supply. Infrequent flow means water vendors will have to buy water from the
independent motorized water tankers. As indicated in figure 7.3, only 27% of the
household survey respondents reported that their pipes flowed everyday and 17.2%
reported that water flowed about every other day. It must be noted however that daily
water service does not mean a 24 hour service. In most cases, water flowed for a few
hours either during the day or at night. For 55.2% of the respondents, water flowed a few
days a month; some also said water flowed a few hours in a month while others did not
have pipes in their hours at all. Officials of the GWCL indicated that though they have a
piped network in the area, population has far outstripped the installed capacity of the
water system. Thus, there are areas where the pressure of the water from the pumping
station is just not strong enough to make it to individual houses. It must be noted that the
number of households in Ashaiman that received water from GWCL varies depending on
the time of the day. Fewer households with pipe connections receive water during the
peak periods of early morning and weekends. Officials also noted that some households
are not connected with piped water because of an illegality with either the acquisition of
the property or in the construction of structures. Like Nima, there are also some
unscrupulous consumers who have illegally tapped into the main pipe system that brings
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water to the community thereby limiting the ability of law abiding consumers to have
access to water in their households. Although the problem of illegal water connections
has attracted a strong response from the GWCL, their efforts at curbing the practice has
been hampered by dwindling budgetary allocation and resilient law breakers.
Figure 7.3

Water Flow
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55.2%

50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%

27.6%
17.2%

10.0%
0.0%
Flows every day

Flows every other day

Other

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

7.4 Payment for Water Service
The quantity of water used by the respondents to the survey as well as the
participants of the focus group varied considerably. Family size was an important
determining factor in the quantity of water used by the respondents. Survey analysis for
Ashaiman indicates that 57.1% used about 2 to 5 buckets of water daily and another
40.3% of the respondents reported using more than 5 buckets of water every day. Only
2.6% reported using less than two buckets of water in a day. (Figure 7.4)
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Figure 7.4

Buckets of Water Used Daily
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

According to participants to the focus group discussion, there are numerous water
vending businesses spread throughout the community. Thus, it takes a relatively short
walk to travel to the source of water. Analysis of the survey response showed that 85.9%
of respondents walked less than 10 minutes to get to their source of water. And only
14.1% of the respondents walked between 10 to 20 minutes to get to the source of their
water. (Figure 7.5) This phenomenon was supported by officials interviewed at the
GWCL. In addition, in a report published by the GWCL in 2000, it was explained that the
business of water vending was fast expanding in peri-urban communities which included
Ashaiman. It must be noted however that the travel time to the source of water varies
considerably during the dry season or in periods of acute water shortages. In the dry
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season, consumers in peri-urban neighborhoods can travel 2-3 miles to get to their source
of water.
Figure 7.5
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

At the time of this research, the average price of 35 liters of water for a bucket in
Ashaiman was 0.07 cedis which translates into 2 cedis per 1000 liters of water consumed.
Thus, for the 57.1% of residents who reported using between 2 and 5 buckets of water,
they spent 0.14 – 0.34 cedis a day for water as opposed to the PURC approved rate which
should be between 0.0288 and 0.0721 cedis. Even for the few residents who shared a bill
from GWCL, the high occupancy of the compound house means that they pay more for
water than an average family of 5 using the same quantity of water in a self contained
house. Thus, in a compound house with 10 family units sharing a water meter and using
an average of 5 buckets of water a day each, their total monthly water consumption will
be 54,250 liters. According to the PURC, every 1000 liters of water consumed up to
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20,000 liters of water will attract a monthly bill of 0.4850 cedis and consumption in
excess of 20,000 will a higher tariff of 0.6750. However, if all these 10 family units lived
in a house where they had their own water meter, their water consumption would be less
than 20,000 liters per month and thus their bill will be calculated based on a tariff of
0.4850 cedis for every 1000 liters of water consumed.

Number of Residents in a House
35%
30%

31.40%

25%
23.30%

20%
15%
10%

16.30%

14%

15.10%

5%
0%
1-6 people

7-12 people 13-18 people 19-24 people More than 25
people

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

In spite of the relatively high prices consumers pay for water, research
respondents in Ashaiman expressed their readiness to pay more to ensure a reliable flow
of water. At the focus group discussion, participants lamented the daily chore of walking
to a neighbor’s house to fetch water. Disputes over prices and quantity fetched can easily
escalate into a quarrel between the consumer and the water vendor which can easily strain
the relationship. Once the relationship is strained, a consumer will have to find an
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alternative vendor for his source of water. Children seem to bear the brunt of the severe
water shortages in the community. At the focus group, Madam X, a ‘Kenkey’ seller at the
local market, has 2 daughters and a son. Every morning, the children will have to walk
about 150 meters to fetch water for the household chores before they go to school. A
Madam Y also explained that she has gotten into a fight a couple of times with the local
water vendor because of issues of the hygienic nature of the water tank. She is no longer
allowed to fetch water at this place and now has to go twice as far to get water on a daily
basis. Despite the already high prices that residents in Ashaiman pay for water services,
72% of the respondents to the household survey answered that they will be prepared to
pay more money for water if it was guaranteed that there will be a reliable and clean
source of water where they live.
It must be noted however that expressing a willingness to pay more for improved
services does not necessarily mean residents will be able to afford to pay more. The
ability to pay more for water will to a large extent depend on wage levels of residents. In
addition, the survey question did not establish a base level for the price of water, thus
respondents’ answers may be based on an assumed base level which may vary from one
respondent to another.
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Figure 7.6

Willingness to Pay More for Improved Service
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

7.5 Consumer Involvement in Water Planning
There seems to be very little awareness among the people of Ashaiman about
some of the important issues affecting the water sector. Overwhelmingly, respondents to
the focus group discussion felt the reason for their water inadequacies was because
successive governments have chosen to neglect them. One participant claimed that water
inadequacies were part of a grand scheme by the government to neglect low income
people and rather focus all its energy on the more affluent. In a way, the persistent water
inadequacies in the face of abundant water resources may seem like an attempt to prevent
some citizens from enjoying this basic need. However, though some government policies
or the omission of other policies may be complicit in water inadequacies, the problems
are far more complicated that a simple explanation that government has decided not to
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provide for disadvantaged communities. Other respondents pointed to government
corruption as the main reason for the water inadequacies in their communities.
Corruption may also play a role in the slow development of the infrastructure system in
the community, but there are also other equally very important issues affecting water
supply in peri-urban neighborhoods for which residents in these neighborhoods can help
address. Some very important problems affecting water supply issues are illegal water
connections, illegal settlements and construction projects that flout local ordinances.
Also, the high cost associated with harnessing new water resources and transporting them
to urban centers hinders the ability of the authorities to undertake new water projects in
the short term. Some participants did not see anything wrong with the population
explosion in the area. Some participants, obviously being oblivious to the huge capital
investments needed to process and transport water to needed places in urban centers, said
there was enough water in the Volta Lake to cater for all the people in the area.
Participants did not think that illegal structures and the unplanned nature of settlements in
the area were big enough problems to affect the water supply in the area.
Although some focus group participants and survey respondents were very bitter
about the exorbitant prices charged by the water vendors, they felt they had no avenue to
complain about such issues. The low knowledge of the community about water decision
making issues was reflected in the responses to the household survey. In the survey,
80.7% of the respondents did not know that PURC was the agency legislatively mandated
to determine the water tariffs. When respondents were asked who they would complain to
if they had issues with water pricing in their community, 89.5% said they would

174

complain to nobody. Then, 1.2% of the respondents said they would complain to their
DCE and another 1.2% said they will complain to the GWCL. Only 8.1% of the
respondents named PURC as the legislatively mandated agency to receive complaints
about pricing and performance issues.

Figure 7.7
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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Don't Know

Figure 7.8

Where Consumers Complian About Pricing Issues
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Perhaps the agencies responsible for water supply have to increase their public
education as well as public involvement in the decision making process. This low level of
information was reflective in the frustration of the people. Survey participants were very
angry about the water situation. They felt a sense of powerlessness in their predicament,
feeling nobody cares about their welfare and they have no avenue for redress. People
were of the opinion that politicians only show up during election year to ask for their
vote, but quickly forget about their needs as soon as the election season was over. When
respondents were asked if they knew there was a consumer representative on the board of
PURC through which they could channel some of their concerns, 94% of the respondents
were not aware.
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Figure 7.9

Awareness of Consumer Representative on PURC Board
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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Chapter 8
Case Study Comparison

8.1 General Overview of Case Studies
In this research analysis, the three case studies have revealed some of the key
problems that confront peri-urban communities in Ghana. Each case study divulges some
of the significant attributes of the quintessential peri-urban neighborhoods and how these
attributes have contributed to the problems in water supply. These communities are
dynamic in their development, are characterized by a mosaic of different land use
patterns and are inhabited by people of different economic status and ethnic identities.
These three communities like other disadvantaged neighborhoods are plagued with poor
infrastructure development and a continuous deterioration of the surrounding
environment. (Olumjimi & Gbadamosi, 2007) According to Birley and Lock (1998), periurban communities are the most attractive areas to rural migrants and they serve as the
most conducive location for the establishment of squatter settlements and affordable
alternatives in hopes of deriving benefits from the city. Thus, the area constantly changes
and reflects a rapid population growth. (Ford, 1999) As indicated in the case studies, all
three communities have proved to be a drawing point for migrants. Ashalley Botwe was
barely a community in 1970; it was at best a rural area with only a few inhabitants and
houses. The growth of the city of Accra in the latter part of the 1980s and the 1990s saw
an increase in the population of residents in the area. Migrants and new workers coming
into Accra to work increasingly found themselves settling in the relatively less expensive
areas in Ashalley Botwe. In addition, city residents who as a result of the growth have
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been priced out of neighborhoods like Cantonments, Airport Residential Area and
Dzowulu found Ashalley Botwe a cheap alternative.
In Ashaiman, rapid population growth in the area took place during and after the
construction of the main seaport terminal in Ghana. Migrants in search of jobs at the
harbor hub quickly filled up the area. Subsequently, returning peacekeeping troops with
saved income from their missions settled in Ashaiman as their income was not enough to
earn them places in other residential areas. Thus, within Ashaiman, there are suburbs
called Middle East, Lebanon, Jericho and Bethlehem named after areas where
peacekeeping troops from the various assignments settled. Nima grew as an area that
socializes new migrants to the city of Accra. Because the original settlers in the area were
Muslims, the community has grown as a Muslim community that welcomes people of the
Islamic faith of all tribes and nationality. There are also residents of other faiths like
Christianity and African traditional religions who are in the minority.
Available figures indicate a rapid population growth for Nima, Ashalley Botwe
and Ashaiman between 1970 and 2000. Between 1984 and 2000 for instance, Ashalley
Botwe and Ashaiman grew by 2820% and 195%, respectively, which was more than the
population growth for the entire Accra Region. (Table 8.1)
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Table 8.1 Population Change
Population
Area
1970
1984
734,896 1,203,292
Accra Region
383
410
Ashalley Botwe
22,549
50,918
Ashiaman
52,270
52,906
Nima

Population Change
197019842000
1984
2000
2,548,975 468,396 1,345,683
11,974
27
11,564
150,312
28,369
99,394
69,044
636
16,138

Percentage Change
197019841984
2000
63.74
111.83
7.05
2820.49
125.81
195.20
1.22
30.50

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

It must be noted however that the population growth rate for Nima was relatively
low compared to the other areas. This can be attributed to the fact that Nima, which is
one of the oldest peri-urban communities, had already seen its dramatic population
growth in the 1960s during the 7 year development plan of Kwame Nkrumah. Being
located at the middle of the city as opposed to the outskirts, it has had limited room to
grow as other residential areas in the city of Accra have expanded to the borders of Nima
during the same period. Although population growth has slowed down considerably
during the last two decades, Nima is still a peri-urban neighborhood with one of the
highest concentrations of people in the country. Available figures indicate that of all the
three communities Nima has the highest density of people living in one house. (Table
8.2) In this research, of the respondents who said they lived in a house with 25 or more
people, 78.5% of them lived in Nima as against 20% and 1.5% for Ashaiman and
Ashalley Botwe, respectively. In the 19-24 people in a house category, Nima once again
outranked the other communities and placed almost the same with Ashaiman and
Ashalley when it came to the 13-18 people in a house category. (Figure 8.1)
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Figure 8.1

Residence by Number of People in Household
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

With the housing density figures, Ashalley Botwe seems to be different from the
other communities. The influx of new people, mainly people who have seen an increase
in their incomes as a result of the relative economic prosperity in the 2000s is fast
changing the residential make-up of Ashalley Botwe. Middle Income earners who cannot
afford a single family unit is traditional residential areas have found Ashalley Botwe a
welcoming alternative. It comes as no surprise therefore that of the survey respondents
who reported living in single family units, 87% reported living in Ashalley Botwe.
(Figure 8.2) Single family units tend to have more affluent residents and a lower density
of residents and this explains the low density of residents in households in the
community. In addition, the data indicated that for respondents who reported earning
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more than 100 cedis per month, 65.6% lived in Ashalley Botwe. However, in spite of the
demographic changes in the community, as indicated from above, Ashalley Botwe is still
a disadvantaged urban area which suffers from acute water supply shortages.
The high concentration of people in Nima and Ashaiman in particular is because
of the presence of a high concentration of compound houses. (Figure 8.2) Compound
houses which are typically found in disadvantaged neighborhoods are rectangular
housing units with multiple family dwellings. Its construction is such that it allows
multiple families to dwell in one house. Often, compound house residents share
compound kitchen and toilet facilities. Where there is a piped water network in the
compound house, it is normally located in the common courtyard. (Figure 8.3)

Table 8.2 Housing Stock
Average Household Size (2000)
Area
Population Housing Stock
Household Size
2,548,975
238,078
10.71
Accra Region
11,974
1,667
7.18
Ashalley Botwe
150,312
9,813
15.32
Ashaiman
69,044
2429
28.42
Nima
Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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Figure 8.2

Housing type by Residence
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey

Figure 8.3
A Compound House Layout
Each room (R) is occupied by a separate family unit. Toilet and kitchen facilities are shared by
tenants in the compound house. Where pipe water exists, the pipe is located in the common
courtyard . The pipe is usually fitted with a tank and water is sold from the tank by buckets to
consumers.
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8.2 Role of the Small Scale Water Providers

Peri-urban communities are often the last to receive water services from official
water and sanitation providers. (Snell, 1998) In spite of this, like all communities,
residents must strive to get water for everyday activities like drinking, cooking, bathing
and washing. In cases where pipe networks reach poor neighborhoods, individual home
connections are often beyond the means of the average resident. In addition, public utility
pipes may be ill maintained and lack upgrades to allow new residents the opportunity to
legally connect to the system. Also, the informal nature of development may prevent
many from acquiring the necessary legal documents necessary for pipe connection. In
light of these circumstances, small scale and private water providers become a crucial
service of choice for the majority of peri-urban dwellers.
In all three case studies under review, small scale and private water providers
provide an invaluable service to the residents. Residents in the case study community
have come to depend on the services of the small scale water provider even though their
services are inefficient and sometimes come with public health risks. It must be noted
that although all the case study communities depend on small scale water providers, the
type of provider and market arrangements of the small scale water providers are
somewhat different for each community. In Ashaiman and Nima, 67.8% and 56.7% of
respondents answered that they bought water from their neighbors, respectively. (Figure
8.4) In Ashalley Botwe, 48.5% of respondent said they depended on water services from
the mobile tanker service and 51.5% of respondents depended on a combination of
private sources which included buying from middlemen who have purchased water from
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tankers for resale, hand dug wells and streams. (Figure 8.4) In Ashaiman and Nima, the
market arrangements for water are similar. In both cases, the private providers are usually
local residents in the community who sell water by buckets to their customers who are
typically members of the community. In this arrangement, the businessman or woman
acquires a poly-tank container or builds a water tank with concrete and then fills the
container or tank with water for subsequent sale. The water that fills the container or the
tank is usually piped water. During periods of water flow, the tanks and containers are
filled up and are topped regularly to ensure regular water supply to the customers.
During times of acute water shortages from GWCL, mobile tanker services are contracted
to fill the containers.

Figure 8.4

Source of Water Supply
80%

Own house pipe

70%
68%

60%
50%

Compound
house

57%

51%
49%

40%

43%

30%
20%
10%
%

25%
% % %

7%

Ashalley Botwe

% %
Ashaiman

Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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%

% %
Nima

Table 8.3

Source of water

Community

Main Use

All purposes
Neighbor connected
Ashaiman and Nima (Drinking, cooking,
to water system
washing)

Comments
Most trusted source
of water

Water Vendor

Ashalley Botwe,
Mainly cooking and May boil water for
Ashaiman and Nima washing
drinking

Water Purveyors

Nima

Cooking and
washing

Tanker Service

Ashalley Botwe

Most of these
consumers live in
Mainly cooking and areas with no piped
water from GWCL.
washing
Depend on sachet
water for drinking

Well

All purposes
Ashalley Botwe and
(Drinking cooking
Ashaiman
washing)

May boil water for
drinking

It must be noted that in both communities, research participants explained that
there are numerous instances of illegal water connections on the part of these small scale
providers. Some of the business men and women tap directly into the main lines coming
into the community and in the process limit the pressure of the water pressure from
reaching other consumers. This phenomenon was very prevalent in Nima. In spite of
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persistent resident complaints both to the police and officials of GWCL, nothing seemed
to have been done about them. Officials at GWCL admitted the problem of illegal water
connections, but explained further that their limited resources prevent them from cracking
down on all illegal connections. Thus, in both Nima and Ashaiman, illegal water tappers
operate with impunity. Sensing a lack of credible commitment on the part of the
authorities for cracking down on their activities, they have made no attempts to hide their
illegal practices. At Nima, the Assembly Members for both Nima East and Nima West
pointed out illegal connections to the researcher. However, the Assembly Members were
helpless as they do not possess the authority or the tools to stop the illegal connections.
In both communities, potential customers to the water businessmen and women
included both those who had piped water in their compound house and those who did not.
The purchase price of the poly-tank container or the construction cost for the water tank
is often beyond the means of the average resident. Thus, such residents only store water
in small containers which is often exhausted quickly in between flows. In between
periods where their small containers have been exhausted and the time when the pipe will
flow, these residents rely on the services of the water businessmen and women. For those
who do not have pipe water in their compound house, especially the illegal settlements,
the water retailers become their only source of water supply.
Ashalley Botwe shares some similarities as well as differences in the market
arrangement for water with the other two communities. The similarity is that there are
also private water retailers who buy poly-tank containers and build water tanks for water
business. The arrangement then is the same as exists in Ashaiman and Nima. However,
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the difference is that unlike the retailers in Ashaiman and Nima who depend
predominantly on treated water directly from GWCL pipes to fill their tanks, retailers in
Ashalley Botwe fill their tanks with water from small scale mobile water tanker
operators. Ashalley Botwe is an acute water stress area with some homes reporting no
water flow in the last seven years. Thus, the direct piped water to fill the container and
the tanks for resale are just not available.
In spite of the difference in the arrangement of the market structure of the small
scale water providers, all three communities face the same public health risks. Apart from
the fact that open drains and standing water in the communities breed insects, individual
households within the communities have literally become breeding grounds for
mosquitoes. Since water flow is erratic and unreliable, many consumers have adopted
the practice of storing water in containers for future use. The practice of storing water,
often in open containers attracts mosquito eggs. The high temperatures in the area aid the
development of eggs into larvae and eventually to a mosquito. Mosquito bites in the area
increases the incidence of the malaria infections. According to the Tema Health
Directorate, malaria is one of the top ten health conditions in Ashaiman. In fact, malaria
has been identified as a serious health problem for all peri-urban communities in Ghana.
(Warren, 1999; Robert, 2003; Klinkenberg, 2004; Keiser, 2004) It must be noted also that
the breeding of mosquitoes in peri-urban areas is a threat to other parts of the city as well
as mosquitoes do not respect boundaries. It is not surprising therefore that the Ministry of
Health reported that the economic cost of malaria in Ghana is $772.4 million annually.
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8.3 Water Prices in the Case Study Area
The case study analysis shows differences and some similarities in water pricing
in the study area. Residents who have piped water systems in their houses are expected to
pay less than those without piped water. According to the published pricing structure of
PURC, a bucket of water or 35 liters of water should be priced at 0.0145 cedis. (Table
8.4) Thus, an average family of 5 living in a single family house with piped water from
GWCL will have their water consumption priced at the PURC rate. However, in the
disadvantaged neighborhood, a compound house with multiple families may end up
paying more on average that a single family living in a single family unit. Although the
price of water consumed by this compound house will be priced using the PURC
approved rate, since multiple families share water meter in the compound house, they are
more than likely to consume past the 20,000 liters threshold into the second pricing tier.
However, as individual family units, their consumption will not be up to 20,000 liters.
(Figure 8.1)
It must be noted that many respondents in the case study areas including some
respondents who reported having piped water in their compound house still buy water by
the buckets. In Ashaiman and Nima, residents who consume water by buckets paid an
average of 0.07 cedis for every 35 liters of water consumed. In Ashalley Botwe, residents
who consumed water by buckets paid an average of 0.25 cedis for every 35 liters of water
consumed. In Ashalley Botwe, residents who bought their water directly from the two
wheeled mobile water tanker paid an average of 0.21 cedis for the same amount of water.
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Table 8.4 Water Prices in the Case Study Areas
Ashalley
Number
Botwe
Ashaiman
of
Number
Price
Price
Buckets
of liters
(Cedis)
(Cedis)
1
2
3
4
5

35
70
105
140
175

0.25
0.50
0.75
1
1.25

0.0700
0.1400
0.2100
0.2800
0.3500

Nima
Price
(Cedis)

PURC
Approved
Price
(Cedis)

0.0700
0.1400
0.2100
0.2800
0.3500

0.0145
0.0290
0.0435
0.0581
0.0726

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

The prices charged by the small scale water providers are higher than the
approved pricing guidelines because they do not have to adhere to the PURC pricing
guidelines. In addition, the small scale providers incur transactional cost like
transportation and purchase of equipments which is passed on to the water consumer.
Officials at PURC explained that PURC is only responsible for regulating the activities of
GWCL and thus the activities of all other operators fall outside their gamut. It must be
noted, however, that the price differentials in the case study areas reflect the level of
water scarcity in the locality. According to GWCL, unlike Ashaiman and Nima where
more than 50% of water demand is met, in Ashalley Botwe GWCL is able to meet only
45% of the water needs of the residents. In addition, residents in Ashalley Botwe reported
earning more than residents in the other two communities. Thus, there is a higher demand
for water in Ashalley Botwe than the other two communities.
Although the activities of the small scale water suppliers are not regulated, in all
three communities there were local institutions that have made attempt at some
regulation. In Ashaiman and Nima, there were a number of Water Sellers’ Associations.
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However, membership in these associations is voluntary and people can decide to be a
part of it or not. In Ashaiman, there were three different water sellers’ associations. In
Ashalley Botwe, there was a water tanker association in place to regulate the activities of
the water tanker operators in the areas as well as other surrounding communities. Like the
other water sellers associations in Nima and Ashaiman, the water tanker association in
Ashalley Botwe is also voluntary. With no compulsion and no selective incentives, very
few small scale water operators join these organizations.
The chief concern of these voluntary organizations is the regulation of prices that
can be charged by the small scale water operators. In Nima and Ashaiman, a list of
approved prices as stipulated by the respective water sellers’ associations were displayed
on a number of buildings. However, there was very little indication in both communities
that water sellers took the price list seriously. In both Ashaiman and Nima, water prices
varied considerably. Prices ranged from 0.05 cedis to 0.1 cedis per bucket. In Ashalley
Botwe, focus group participants said there was no consistency in the prices charged by
the water tanker operators. Participants explained that consumers have to bargain with the
driver for almost every trip of water. Thus, those who retailed water by buckets in
Ashalley Botwe changed their prices according to how much they paid the tanker drivers
for their water supply. The tanker drivers explained that they could not adhere to any
pricing guidelines because the bulk of their transaction cost was associated with
transportation cost. There is not a single source point for the drivers to fetch water for
their consumers. Drivers have to travel to wherever water was available which in turn
vary their transaction cost per trip.
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The water associations in all three communities were not so much concerned with
regulating the quality of water their members sold. In fact, in Nima and Ashaiman there
is no such attempt at all at quality assurance for their consumers. In any case, the
associations do not possess the technical know-how as well as the financial resources to
arrange for quality checks. In Ashalley Botwe, water tanker operators are generally told
to either cart construction water, which tends to be dirtier or domestic water, which tends
to be cleaner. However, there are no enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure that
individual drivers comply with this directive. In addition, the voluntary nature of the
associations makes any attempt at regulation futile. Membership in the water associations
does not give one any special advantages, thus associations risk loosing members if they
push any regulations that will increase the operating cost of members.

8.4 Consumer Desire for Improved Services
It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that residents in all three
communities paid higher prices that the fees approved by PURC, respondents to the
household survey in all three communities expressed a high desire to pay more for
improved water service. In the focus group discussion, participants, especially in
Ashalley Botwe lamented about the trouble they have to go through to get their water
supply from water vendors. In Ashalley Botwe 78.2% of survey respondents indicated
that they were willing to pay more than what they were currently paying for improved
service in water. In Ashaiman and Nima, 72.4% and 76% of survey respondents,
respectively, answered that they willing to pay more for improved water services. (Table
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8.5) It must be noted that participants in Ashalley Botwe were slightly more likely to
answer that they were willing to pay more for water than the other two communities. In
fact, of all the respondents who indicated their willingness to pay more for water service,
44.4% of them lived in Ashalley Botwe as opposed to 23.6% and 32% in Ashaiman and
Nima, respectively. (Table 8.4) This difference can perhaps be explained by the fact that
residents in Ashalley Botwe have a higher level of water scarcity than the other two case
study areas. Only respondents in Ashalley Botwe reported that they walked between 20 to
30 minutes to their water supply.

Table 8.5 Willingness to Pay More for Water Service
Pay More for Improved Water Service
Residence
Yes
No
Ashalley Botwe % within Residence
78.2%
21.8%

Ashaiman

Nima

% within Paymore

44.4%

39.3%

% within Residence

72.4%

27.6%

% within Paymore

23.6%

28.6%

% within Residence

76.0%

24.0%

% within Paymore

32.0%

32.1%

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

In addition, the survey results indicated that respondents in Ashalley Botwe
earned more than respondents in Nima and Ashaiman. Thus, their likelihood to answer
that they were willing to pay more may be borne out of the fact that they are likely to
have more disposable income than respondents in the other areas. The household survey
indicates that for respondents who answered earning more than 100 cedis a month, 65.6%
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of them lived in Ashalley Botwe as opposed to 22.2% and 12.2% for Ashaiman and Nima
responsible. (Figure 8.5)

Figure 8.5

Monthly Income
80.0%
70.0%
60.0%

71.4%
65.6%

50.0%
46.2%

40.0%
30.0%

22.2%

39.4%
33.7%

Ashaiman

44.6%
28.6%

20.0%
10.0%

Ashalley
Botwe

Nima

26.9%
12.2%

9.2%

.0%
More than 100c

50-100c

35-50c

.0%

Less than 35c

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

It must be noted that the work of other scholars have corroborated the results in
this research. In Gulyani et al (2005), in a willingness to pay study among peri-urban
neighborhoods in Kenya, it was found that residents in the area who do not have access to
water supply were willing to pay more for improved prices even though current prices for
water in the area was more than what the official utility service charge.
It is worth noting also that willingness to pay for improved services does not
mean ability to pay for improved services. (Olsen & Smith, 2001) It can be argued that
income levels within the case study communities may limit the ability of consumers to
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pay more for improved water services even though they are willing to do so. In the
household survey, a total of 76.1% of all respondents answered they were willing to pay
for improved services, however, 66.2% of respondents answered earning less than 100c a
month. At the current rate of water prices in the communities, consumers are spending a
substantial part of their income on water alone and any further increase will be almost
unbearable. (Table 8.4)

8.5 Community Involvement in Decision Making
In all three communities there was very little awareness of the basic decision
making agencies in the water sector. At Nima, none of the household survey respondents
knew that PURC was the regulatory agency tasked with the responsibility of determining
water prices. In Ashalley Botwe and Ashaiman, only 26.7% and 12.6%, respectively,
correctly identified PURC as the regulatory agency in charge of determining water tariffs.
It is interesting to note that when respondents where asked what government agency
determines water tariffs, a high percentage of respondents in all three communities said
they did not know even though only two agencies were given as options. In Ashalley
Botwe, 67.3% of respondents said they did not know, 74.7% of respondents in Ashaiman
did not know and 91.8% of respondents in Nima did not know either. It must be noted
however that of the respondents who correctly identified PURC as the agency responsible
for determining water tariffs, there were a lot of differences in the responses in the
communities. Participants in Ashalley Botwe were more likely to identify the correct
agency than participants in Ashaiman and Nima. Of all the respondents who correctly
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identified PURC as the agency responsible for determining water tariffs, 71.1% lived in
Ashalley Botwe and 28.9% lived in Ashaiman. (Table 8.6)

Table 8.6 Agency that Determines Water Prices
Agency that Determines Water prices

Re s id e n c e
Ashalley
Botwe
Ashaiman

Nima

GWCL

PURC

Don't know

% within Residence

5.9%

26.7%

67.3%

% within Agency

24.0%

71.1%

30.6%

% within Residence

12.6%

12.6%

74.7%

% within Agency

44.0%

28.9%

29.3%

% within Residence

8.2%

.0%

91.8%

% within Agency

32.0%

.0%

40.1%

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

In the focus group discussion in all three communities, participants expressed
their frustration about water supply in their community and said further that they feel left
out in the crucial decision making process that affects their water supply. Research
participants expressed the view that their interests were not taken into consideration when
decisions about water supply were made. Even when they complained to GWCL about
water leakages and illegal water connections, no action seems to be taken about these
situations. There was therefore a sense of general apathy among participants when it
came to water installations in the communities. In Nima, the Assembly Member for the
area took the researcher to areas within the community where there were cracks in the
pipe with water seeping out. The Assembly Member explained that these seepages as
well as others in the community have gone unrepaired for months.
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Although there were numerous pricing concerns expressed by research
participants, they seem not to know the proper agency to channel such complaints. The
overall service performance of GWCL including their handling of consumer complaints
as well as maintenance records are within the regulatory jurisdiction of PURC. In fact,
parliament has mandated PURC to handle water pricing complaints as well as complaints
about the performance of GWCL. However, in the household survey, when residents
were asked what agency they will complain to for issues pertaining to water pricing,
64.4% in Ashalley Botwe said nobody and 89.5% and 52.6% in Ashaiman and Nima,
respectively, also answered they will complain to nobody. (Table 8.7)

Table 8.7 Consumer Complaints About Water Pricing
Consumer Complaints About Water Pricing

Re s id e n c e

GWCL

PURC

MP

DCE

AM

Nobody

Ashalley Botwe % within Residence

1.0%

11.9%

4.0%

1.0%

17.8%

64.4%

% within Complaint

4.5%

63.2%

66.7%

50.0%

42.9%

33.7%

% within Residence

1.2%

8.1%

.0%

1.2%

.0%

89.5%

% within Complaint

4.5%

36.8%

.0%

50.0%

.0%

39.9%

% within Residence

20.6%

.0%

2.1%

.0%

24.7%

52.6%

% within Complaint

90.9%

.0%

33.3%

.0%

57.1%

26.4%

Ashaiman
Nima

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

PURC among other things is to protect the interest of water consumers and where
necessary initiate investigations into the quality of service provided to water consumers.
PURC must also take into consideration consumer interests when reviewing water rates.
To signify the importance of consumer welfare in water delivery, parliament has
mandated the governing board of PURC to include a domestic water consumer
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representative and also to embark on public education to sensitize consumers about the
work of the commission. Thus, the consumer representative will be a permanent
mouthpiece of consumers. Consumers may therefore channel their concerns to PURC
through their representative. Interestingly, there was very little awareness among the
research participants about a consumer representative on the board of PURC. In Nima,
none of the respondents to the household survey knew about the existence of a consumer
representative on the board of PURC. Ninety four percent of respondents in Ashaiman
and 94.1% respondents in Ashalley Botwe did not know of the existence of the consumer
representative. (Table 8.8) It must be noted that for the respondents who were aware of a
consumer representative on the board of PURC, 55% lived in Ashalley Botwe and 45%
lived in Ashaiman. (Figure 8.6) A higher knowledge of the consumer representative on
the board of PURC in Ashalley Botwe strengthens the assertion that this community has a
higher development prospects as indicated by a higher income level and higher number
of single family units as opposed to the other two communities.
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Table 8.8 Awareness of Consumer Representation on PURC Board
Awareness of Consumer
Re s id e n c e
Representative on PURC Board
Yes
No
Ashalley Botwe % within Residence
5.9%
94.1%

Ashaiman

Nima

% within Representative

54.5%

35.1%

% within Residence

6.0%

94.0%

% within Representative

45.5%

29.2%

% within Residence

.0%

100.0%

% within Representative

.0%

35.8%

Source: December 2007 Household Survey

Figure 8.6
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Source: December 2007 Household Survey
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8.6 Implications to Water Supply in Disadvantaged Neighborhoods
The findings in this research add to the body of research that establishes that there
are growing differentials in the water supply coverage in urban areas. Although urban
centers in SSA struggle to ensure adequate water supply coverage, there are communities
within these urban areas which are hit hardest by water supply shortages. (Champetier et.
al., 2000; Hall et al 2004) These disadvantaged communities are not limited to Ghana,
but exist throughout urban centers in SSA. In Nigeria, there is Okobaba and Shomuluin in
Lagos. In Kenya there is Nigeria, Kibera and Mathare in Nairobi, and in Tanzania, there
is Temeke and Changombe in Dar es Salaam. Although water supply is the cities of Dar
es Salaam, Nairobi and Lagos are inadequate; the disadvantaged communities within
these cities have peculiarly low water coverage. With the findings in Nima, Ashalley
Botwe and Ashaiman, this research establishes that the existence of disadvantaged
communities and their attendant water supply crisis is not a local issue but part of
systemic urban development problems across SSA. In fact, such disadvantaged
communities with severe water infrastructure problems are also present in developing
countries in Asia and Latin America. (Wilson, 2002; McIntouch, 2003) Thus, there is the
need to single out such communities in the urban centers, research their unique
characteristics to ensure that policy interventions are well targeted.
The study also throws light on the characteristics of the disadvantaged
neighborhoods in SSA. Although differences exist in terms of geographic location and
climatic conditions, there are also a lot of similarities. Thus, even though Ghana, Senegal,
and Nigeria have more water resources than relatively arid countries like Mali, Burkina
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Faso, and Ethiopia, water supply inadequacies are typical in all countries. The growth of
disadvantaged communities is due mainly to the high rate of urbanization throughout
SSA. As pointed out by the United Nations, population in cities like Abidjan, Dar es
Salaam, Dakar, Kampala, Kinshasa, Nairobi, Lagos, and Lusaka have grown more than
twenty fold between 1950 and 2000. (UN HABITAT, 2003) The city of Accra and its
environs grew by fivefold between 1970 and 2000. This rapid urban growth has
accounted for the growth in the disadvantaged neighborhoods of Nima, Ashalley Botwe
and Ashaiman. Urban infrastructure growth has however lagged behind partly because of
past protracted political instabilities and improper planning. (Clapham, 1996; Rothchild,
1997; Schraeder, 2004) In addition, the demographic makeup of Nima, Ashalley Botwe
and Ashaiman which is characterized by migrants, low income dwellers and, squatters
communities is in consonance with the demographic characteristic of disadvantaged
communities throughout SSA. (Rakodi, 1997; de Soto, 2000)
As evidenced by the case studies, the problem of water supply inadequacies in the
disadvantaged communities is significantly linked to the problem of urbanization and
infrastructure development. Thus, a clear policy of systematic urban planning and urban
renewal will be an important step to solve the problem of water inadequacies in the long
run.
Within SSA, reforms in the water supply sector often involve decoupling rural
water supply and urban water supply. The idea is that since urban centers and rural
centers have different characteristics and different water needs, separating them ensures
organizational specialization which then leads to efficiency and effectiveness. In this
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direction, Tanzania, Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso and Uganda have set up different
institutions to specifically cater for the needs of urban dwellers and rural dwellers with
separate policy tools. However, as evident by these case studies, some disadvantaged
communities exhibit rural characteristics which make urban policies difficult to
implements within these communities. Thus, remapping communities based on their
characteristics will ensure that it is placed under the best institution to guarantee greater
effectiveness of policy interventions.
This research cast doubts on the notion that the private sector participation should
be the lead policy tool in addressing urban water supply problems in SSA.

With

prodding from the international donor agencies, many countries in SSA have adopted
private sector participation as the lead policy tool to affect change in the water sector.
Within the literature, scholars have espoused private sector participation in water as an
important policy tool to realize increased investments and technical know-how in the
water sector and thus increased water supply in urban areas. It is believed that such
efficiencies will trickle down to the poor residents in the urban centers. (Rogers, P. et al.
2002; Boardman and Vining, 1989; Tynan, 2000). Nonetheless, this case study has shown
that issues are more complicated in the disadvantaged communities. Improvements
chalked by the private sector citywide may not necessarily trickle down to disadvantaged
communities. In Ghana, three years into the five year management contract with AVRL,
disadvantaged communities like Nima, Ashalley Botwe and Ashaiman are yet to witness
changes in their water supply. Also, in Mali and Burkina Faso, benefits of private sector
participation to disadvantaged communities have been minimal. (Balance & Tremolet,

202

2005) Within the disadvantaged communities, the widespread existence of squatter
communities and the absence of proper legal titles to properties create a big challenge for
private sector involvement in the water sector. (Nickson, 2001) In Sierra Leone for
existence, the disadvantaged urban communities have not been able to take advantage of
subsidized water connections because of the absence of legal titles. The nonexistence of
proper property titles may pose a great challenge to the private operator in identifying and
catering to the needs of these communities. In addition, weak regulatory regimes and low
knowledge of the functions of water institutions within the disadvantaged communities
will limit the level of accountability of the private provider, especially within
disadvantaged neighborhoods. In this case study, in spite of the existence of a private
manager, the communities have created their own informal institutions to cater for their
water needs. Thus, instead of private sector participation as the lead policy tool in
solving urban water supply inadequacies, a multi policy approach is needed to cater to the
different water needs in urban SSA. Equal emphasis should therefore be placed on
community empowerment and mainstreaming informal community institutions for
greater oversight.
This research’s contribution lie with showcasing the importance of the small scale
water providers in ensuring the water needs of the disadvantaged communities.
Throughout SSA, disadvantaged communities in Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire), Nairobi
(Kenya), Dakar (Senegal), Kampala (Uganda), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), Conakry
(Guinea), Nouakchott (Mauritania) Cotonou (Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and
Bamako (Mali) rely heavily on the service of the small scale water provider to meet their
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water supply needs. (Collignon & Vézina, 2000; Manu, 2001; Gulyani et al, 2005;
Kariuki & Schwartz, 2005; Triche et al 2006) In spite of their importance, many have
only in recent times gained acceptability as a possible option for developing and
managing water supply to urban areas. Many governments and donors still consider small
scale water providers as temporary – although some have been in existence for more than
15 years – and operators who take advantage of problems in the urban water sector to
gouge their customers with services that do not meet technical standards. (Kariuki &
Schwartz, 2005) This case study highlights the importance of the small scale water
providers within SSA. Disadvantaged communities like Nima, Ashalley Botwe,
Ashaiman and the many that dot urban centers in SSA would go unserved if not for the
services of the small scale water providers. Thus, working with these providers to create
standards to improve water affordability, quality and efficiency and also look for ways to
expand their services to make up the shortfall in services from the national grid will be
very beneficial to water consumers.
It must be noted however that the operations and ownership regimes of the small
scale water providers is very heterogeneous. Thus, a first step at increasing knowledge
and understanding about the small scale providers is to generate a theoretical construct of
the differences in their operation and ownership regimes. This will help address the scope
and scale of their operations and how best their services can be improved.
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Chapter 9
Summary and Conclusion
Available evidence indicates that urban water supply in Ghana is erratic and in
some places nonexistent. However, it is disadvantaged areas like Ashalley Botwe, Nima
and Ashaiman that feel the full brunt of water supply shortages in urban areas. The
combination of low wages, poor planning and cutthroat small scale water providers
exacerbate their plight. The majority of health problems in the peri-urban neighborhoods
are directly associated with water inadequacies. There is always less water in these
neighborhoods to ensure that good personal hygiene skills are adhered to after visiting the
bathroom, which culminates in a high incidence of diarrhea and other gastrointestinal
diseases. The overcrowded nature of these neighborhoods as well as high household
occupancies helps spread these diseases. Also, the act of storing water in buckets and
other open containers for future use easily becomes breeding grounds for mosquitoes
which in turn infect residents with malaria.
Apart from the fact that residents in disadvantaged communities pay too much for
water supply, they often have to leave their home, and join long queues every day to get
their water supply. In addition to time wasted in getting water supply, residents often find
themselves involved in quarrels in the queues to get water. Children living in
disadvantaged communities often pay dearly for the water inadequacies in the area.
Children who have to fetch water every morning often arrive at school late and tired, thus
hampering their school performance. It is not uncommon for children in these
neighborhoods to be involved in lorry accidents when they have to cross busy streets
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daily to get to their water source. In fact water supply inadequacies affect all aspects of
life in the disadvantaged community. Water supply affects commercial activities
especially the cost of food in these neighborhoods. With the presence of many
middlemen, residents in disadvantaged neighborhoods are constantly at risk of
consuming untreated and bacterial infested water.
Beyond the disadvantaged communities, the effects of inadequacies in water
supply in the disadvantaged communities reverberate throughout entire urban centers and
beyond. Communicable diseases which are endemic in disadvantaged communities is no
respecter of boundaries, thus residents in other parts of urban centers are constantly at
risk of being infected. The healthcare cost can potentially burden local healthcare
facilities and thereby distort local economies. In addition, inadequate urban infrastructure
like reliable water supply facilities is a disincentive for potential investments in such
communities.
With continued population increase and dwindling financial resources, the policy
of choice to solve the urban water supply problems has been private sector participation
in the water supply. In spite of strong opposition from Non Governmental Organizations
as well as civil society groups, the government of Ghana entered into a 5 year
management contract with AVRL in 2005. Although one of the aims espoused in the
management contract was expansion of water services to disadvantaged neighborhoods,
there seem to be very little hope that this objective will be achieved. First, under the
contract, the government has to provide the bulk of the funding for any expansion work.
Since one of the reasons for PSP is that the government does not have enough financial
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resources to invest in the water sector, there is little hope that the government will be able
to provide the needed capital for the expansion project. In addition, more than 3 years
into the contract, a baseline for measuring the performance of the private manager is yet
to be established. In any case, in the event that resources can be provided to expand water
services to disadvantaged communities, the development patterns in some of these
neighborhoods make it impossible for network pipes. Because of the informal nature of
development in disadvantaged communities, almost half of houses and structures would
have to be demolished to make way for laid pipes.
It must be noted that the since the private manager took over the management of
the urban water systems, there has been considerable improvement in the revenue
collection. Net operating surplus increased from GHc 1.9 million in 2005 to GHc 20
million in 2008. However, much more money is needed to ensure that water systems are
managed regularly and unserved areas are duly provided with water.
As a result of rapid population growth and years of little or no attention to
infrastructure developments, substantial investment in the water sector to ensure adequate
water supply in urban centers. According to the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), an estimated US$ 5 billion in investment is needed annually to ensure 85%
water and sanitation coverage by 2015. However, current total budgetary spending in the
water and sanitation sectors in SSA is estimated at US$ 800 million annually. This
amount could possibly see an increase to US$ 2.5 billion through cost recovery measures
adopted by service providers and mobilizing finances locally. It is not likely that donors
will be able to provide enough to make up for the shortfall in finances. In Ghana,

207

WaterAid International estimates annual investment of US$ 85 million to reach 85%
water coverage by 2015 while current expenditure in the water sector is estimated at only
US$ 17 million annually.
There are no quick fixe or even a single solution to ensure adequate water supply
to urban centers. What is needed therefore is a coordinated effort on the part of
stakeholders that creatively combines various policy instruments while paying attention
to the peculiar water needs and local conditions in the area. In this direction, the
following recommendations are to help ensure adequate water supply to disadvantaged
urban neighborhoods.

1. Increased Government Expenditure in the Water Sector
Ultimately, government bears the responsibility to ensure adequate water supply
to all water consumers and the adverse human development problems emanating from
inadequate water supply is clear. There must therefore be increased budgetary to the
water supply sector. In 2002, out of the 21% of budgetary funds allocated to poverty
under the GPRS program, only 1% was directly allocated to water and sanitation
programs. Very few public investments do more to enhance human security and build
prosperity than investments in water and sanitation, yet very few resources comparatively
are devoted to the water sector.
Low government expenditure on water supply is a pervasive problem throughout
SSA. (UNEP, 2006) According to UNEP, most countries in SSA spend around 0.5% of
GDP on water and sanitation. In 2001, Kenya spent only 0.6% of GDP on water and
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sanitation, Uganda spent 0.5% of GPD on water and sanitation in 2002 and on the low
end, Zambia spent only 0.1% of GDP on water and sanitation in the 2003-2004 budget
years.
Recommendation 1: The government must increase the budget allocation of resources
spent in the water sector. To do so will require an increase in revenues to close the gap
between water infrastructure needs and current funding capacity.

2. Increased cost recovery measures
A very important measure is to increase tariffs to accelerate the move to full cost
tariffs for consumers with piped water. Disadvantaged communities are already paying 5
times and in some cases even more on their water service now as compared to consumers
who are within the pipe network of GWCL. The principles of equity demand that at the
very least those who receive service from GWCL pay the full cost of the service provided
by GWCL. Under the current arrangement, residents in disadvantaged neighborhoods
who are often poor are subsidizing the water services of consumers with piped water. The
increasing block rate tariff for water consumption is set such that those who consume
more water will pay a higher rate. Revenue from the high rate is then used to subsidize
lifeline water blocks for low income consumers. However, because of the existence of
compound housing in disadvantaged communities, the aggregate consumption of
residents often end up going beyond the lifeline water block and into the expensive block.
To ensure that poor households are not priced out with the introduction of full
cost recovery tariffs, the lifeline water arrangement should be maintained. However, the
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lifeline water block should be reviewed to ensure that not more than what is needed for
basic needs is allocated. This will ensure that consumers who use more than what is
required for basic needs pay more for the additional water used.
One problem that was apparent in the analysis of the case studies was broken
down pipes, leakages and illegal connections. These problems are present in other
disadvantaged urban communities. These problems account for the high unaccounted-forwater of over 50% for GWCL. With such high unaccounted-for-water, the utility
company will have to extract more water, incur additional water treatment and
conveyance cost while at the same time realizing fewer revenues. Water maintenance
within the urban areas must be prioritized with the high risk areas receiving the most
attention first. In addition inadequate responses to consumer complaints of leakages and
illegal connections give the impression of a lack of credible commitment of water
agencies to deal with the issues. If consumers get the impression that there is no credible
commitment on the part of public agencies to respond to these complaints, they will stop
making complaints altogether. It must be noted however that consumer complaints about
leakages and illegal connections have the potential of saving water agencies from
incurring additional cost to identify these problems. In additions, once no action seems to
be taken against illegal connections, offenders can develop a culture of impunity where
such illegal activities will be tacitly approved. Water agencies must therefore devote
more resources to fight illegal water connections and also seek more community
involvement in identifying illegal connections. Assembly Members within the
communities should be empowered with the requisite tools to partner water utility staff in
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identifying illegal water consumers. Using the law enforcement agencies, culprits of
illegal water connections must be dealt with swiftly and effectively to send the right
message to others who may think of going down that path.
Recommendation 2: PURC must move toward full cost recovery for water delivery
systems. The lifeline water policy should however be kept to ensure that low income
dwellers connected to the pipe network are able to meet their basic needs. For
disadvantaged neighborhoods without service, efforts must be made to provide more
efficient and cost effective delivery systems including standpipes and tanker delivery
services.

3. Immediate technical and financial support for small scale providers
As the case studies indicate, small scale water providers provide very valuable
services to the disadvantaged urban community. Small scale water providers are relied on
as the main source of water for disadvantaged urban areas in Ghana providing more than
two-thirds of all their water supply. Apart from Ghana, disadvantaged communities in
Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania as well as in other African cities rely heavily
on the services of the small scale water provider. (Manu, 2001; WSP, 2003; Kariuki &
Schwartz, 2005; Gulyani et al, 2005) In spite of their importance, several problems exist
in this sector. Chief among them is lack of access to capital to purchase tankers,
containers, water pumps and resources to maintain their equipments. They also face
constant harassment from local officials as well as utility providers. These problems have
been exacerbated by the refusal of government and other practitioners to pay close
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attention to the services of the small scale water provider thereby preventing the effective
policy support for their efficient engagements. The lack of support from government as
well as practitioners has been due to the fact that; i) the services of the small scale water
provider are seen as a short-term fix to water inadequacies in the urban area. (ii) policy
makers have dealt with a few large public enterprises that have historically handled urban
water supply. To them, it is easier to deal with the few large enterprises than to deal with
a heterogeneous group of small scale water providers; iii) International technical
standards sometimes do not recognize the activities of the small scale water providers.
For instance, because of the controversy surrounding water handling, the Joint
Monitoring Program of the World Health Organization does not consider water tankers
and water vendors as sources of safe water supply. (WHO, 2005)
Nonetheless, donor agencies and NGOs like the World Bank, CIDA, DFID and
WaterAid International have increasingly recognized the services of the small scale water
providers and thus provide some assistance. However, such assistance is severely
hampered by the heterogeneous nature of the operations of the small scale water
providers as well as the lack of a coherent organization of their trade.
With rapid population growth, urbanization and scarce financial resources,
governments in SSA cannot effectively provide for all its urban population in the
foreseeable future. Already, civil society groups have charged that the MDG goal of
ensuring 85% water coverage by 2015 is unattainable giving current policies.
(AllAfrica.com, 2008) As a result, the services of small scale water providers have
almost come to stay. (Kariuki & Schwartz, 2005) If government wants to make real
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progress at achieving the MDG goal of ensuring 85% water coverage by 2015, then steps
must be taken immediately to formally recognize and legitimize the activities of the small
scale water provider.
Too little attention has been devoted to regulating small scale water providers.
The lack of attention creates a serious regulatory gap especially from the point of view of
poor households in disadvantaged communities. This regulatory gap can be closed by
adopting policy interventions that regulate the quantity, quality and prices of the small
scale water providers. Formal recognition will make it easy for small scale water
providers to effectively organize into corporative associations through which their
activities can be effectively regulated. Public agencies can then partner with the small
scale providers to ensure that proper equipments are used for the trade and strict hygiene
standards are adhered to. For instance, individual business owners who pass a periodic
hygiene and equipment test can display a sticker to that effect. Public agencies, through
the corporative associations can use negative market incentives like suspensions or
withdrawal of licenses for operators who do not adhere to the strict standards. Consumers
can then use the market information supplied through the hygiene stickers as well as
membership in approved water associations to determine the services they choose.
In addition, public agencies must work to ensure them easy access to capital as
well as ensure financial and technical support for buying equipment and building
containers. For instance, technical support to the two wheeled water provider must ensure
that the proper materials are used to construct their water tanks. There must also be
technical support to facilitate the designing of tanks so that drivers wouldn’t have to stand
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in the tanks to clean them. Education on the frequency of cleaning tanks as well as the
right cleaning materials to use will remedy the scenario where drivers clean their tanks
once a month with laundry detergents. Water resellers should also be assisted as to the
proper place to site containers and build tanks to either prevent or drastically reduce the
build up of spirogyra.
PURC has consistently said that they will not regulate the prices of the small scale
water providers, especially because of the fact that transport cost which makes up the
bulk of production cost for the small scale provider is difficult to control. PURC has
therefore argued that prices should be subjected to the law of demand and supply.
However, in the water business there is a high level of information asymmetry in favor of
the small scale water provider. Not only do consumers find it difficult to ascertain the
source of water, they also have very little information about the quality of water delivered
to them. With no enforced regulations and very little information available, consumers do
not have enough information to make the right choice as to whom to buy from.
Distortions in the market therefore make it easy for the poor to be further exploited. In
any case, consumers who fall sick as a result of the negative externality of the operations
of the small scale providers may burden the health care cost of the government. In
addition, other adverse effect from the health problems may be eventually felt throughout
the economy as loss job man hours increases. This will eventually affect the economic
productivity of some sectors in the economy. If PURC hope to fulfill its mandate of
protecting the interests of consumers, then it is incumbent upon them to regulate the
activities of the small scale provider.
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PURC must work with GWCL to ensure that small scale providers, especially
tanker services do have access to quality water. Existing booster stations (water treatment
centers) must be expanded to ensure that small scale providers can buy water for resale.
In fact, GWCL must proportionally allocate treated water to small scale providers.
Consumers in the disadvantaged communities are also tax paying members of the society
and must therefore benefit from their taxes. If piped networks can not be constructed
quickly to all needed areas, then water treatment centers should be sited strategically
close to disadvantaged areas to ensure that tanker services as well as other small scale
suppliers have access to treated water. GWCL must work to ensure that water sold to
small scale providers is sold at bulk water rate. When water treatment centers become
easily accessible to tanker services, it will reduce their transportation cost and thereby
translate into reduced prices for consumers. In a survey conducted by PURC in 2005,
consumers rated water accessibility as the most important water issue (PURC, 2005)
Recommendation 3: The government should enact appropriate legislation to officially
recognize the services of small scale water providers. The recognition of small scale
water providers should include being subjected to the regulatory supervision of PURC
with licensing or certification programs to assure reliable water service.

4. Collaborate with residents and civil society groups in water decision making
It is important that water supply agencies actively engage consumers in the
decision making process as well as in the implementation of policies. Burby (2003) and
Syme (1994) have argued that lack of public involvement in government plans often lead
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to wrong solutions and an apathetic public. Policies that have low public involvement
tend to be dominated by technical experts and may then raise the fundamental issue of
democratic participation in governance. In addition, as Lindblom and Cohen (1979) have
acknowledged, citizens possess pertinent situational knowledge that can help ensure that
policies take account of local conditions and reflect local values. The relevant situational
knowledge is lost when there is no committed attempt at actively engaging the public and
the policies government seek to implement may seem irrelevant to the citizenry. In
engaging consumers, public agencies must also make the effort to engage the civil society
groups that represent the interests of the consumers. The way forward is to use
information, subtle persuasion and openness to ensure mutual understanding, trust and to
achieve consensus on a course of action. The current process of heavy handedness, name
calling and secrecy only deepens the mistrust between stakeholders. Current civil society
opposition to water privatization has been due to the fact that civil society stakeholders
have fundamentally regarded the planning process as shrouded in secrecy. As Gleick et al
(2002) notes, water is too important to human health that in privatizing water services,
governments must set up clear guidelines that among other things must ensure
transparency and include all stakeholders in the decision making effort.
Through a committed engagement process during planning and implementation,
potential opposition to policies can be identified in the front end and dealt with
appropriately. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) have noted, policy implementation
that is revolutionary and not evolutionary is more likely to fail. In 1992, the city of
Cartagena, Columbia was confronted with a situation very familiar in other developing
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countries – inadequate water supply. The city responded to the crisis with a management
contract, but the effectiveness of the contract was affected by strong public opposition to
the agreement. Acuacar, the private company eventually won the support of the people
when, with the help of the government, they implemented a large public relations
campaign. The private company organized educational campaigns for community leaders
and other stakeholders about the water treatment process, other important operating
issues as well as the vision of the private company for the city. The water managers also
listened to the concerns of the consumers and addressed them in an open and
collaborative manner. In Cartagena, the efforts of the private operator not only
demonstrated their commitment to reform water services, but it also began to alter the
view of most residents that portable water was a free and ever abundant resource. In
Ghana, a committed engagement process has the potential of changing the relationship of
the government and the private company on one hand and civil society groups from one
of distrust to mutual trust and coordination.
Public understanding of the critical issues affecting the sector also helps to sell
‘unpleasant’ policies to consumers with little or no opposition. Opposition still exists
about the rate of water tariffs in the country even though current water tariffs are heavily
subsidized. The current tariff rate of US$ 0.30/m3 is far below the full cost recovery rate
of about US$0.70 m3. Any sustainable maintenance of water systems as well as
expansion works will depend to a large extent on the financial health of the water agency.
Involving water consumers in the planning and implementation of water policies
also creates a sense of ownership in community projects. (Smith, 2004) Communal
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ownership of public projects fosters a culture of maintenance which may mature into an
elaborate community self policing system. (Ostrom, 1990) Telling on residents who
engage in illegal water connections as well as small scale water providers who flout
regulatory rules will reduce agency policing costs. A genuine interest in communal
projects will also ensure that community members give prompt and accurate feedback
about the nature of projects in the areas. To ensure maximum benefit from feedback, they
must be investigated and acted upon in a timely fashion.
GWCL and PURC officials consistently mentioned inadequate resources as one of
the limitations impeding their efforts at discharging their obligations fully. Transparency
on the part of water institutions and public action by citizens can start a process of bottom
up regulation which will compliment official actions. In Bangalore, India, the use of
citizens report cards have given community groups and consumer associations greater say
in reforming utility companies and improving performance by publishing utility
performance assessments. In this direction, PURC and GWCL should grant to consumer
groups and civil society groups access to their operations. In India, the utility company
joined forced with civil society groups to undertake public meetings and also administer
surveys to measure consumer perceptions about utility services. Through this process,
there was evidence of improvement in water services with local consumers reporting
improvement in efficiency and less bribes being paid for water connections.
(Adikeshavalu, 2004; Paul, 2005)
Recommendation 4: PURC and GWCL should encourage the formation of water
committees within the disadvantaged neighborhoods. PURC and GWCL can then use the
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water committees as well as civil society groups operating in the community as a conduit
to get their education and policies across to the communities. The water committees can
also provide important situational information as well as useful feedback to guide PURC
and GWCL policies in the communities.

5. Interagency coordination to limit squatter settlements
There seems to be very little coordination between the different governmental
agencies. Local government officials have very little coordination between GWCL and
PURC. In AMA, a planning official pointed out that there is no formal relationship
between the local government and the key water supply agencies. Local government
agencies are however mandated to initiate development projects as well as implement
other government projects at the local level. Thus, better coordination between local
government officials and the water supply agencies will ensure that all the necessary
information needed at the community level is solicited to ensure a proper management of
water supply systems. In addition, since local government institutions are directly
involved with local communities, local government institutions can become partners in
ensuring small scale water provider compliance with regulations as well as help reduce
the incidence of illegal water connections.
Ultimately, a major problem of water inadequacies in the disadvantaged
neighborhoods is the issue of illegal settlements. The financial costs of breaking down
illegal structures as well as the political costs are sometimes too prohibitive for water
agencies to undertake any progressive water supply planning. In Senegal and Cote
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d’Ivoire for instance, efforts on the part of governments to reduce water supply
inadequacies in disadvantaged communities by providing subsidized water connections
have been hampered by the existence of numerous illegal settlers who do not have the
requisite documentation to participate in the program. (Luria et al, 2005) A concerted
level of coordination between developers, planners and utility providers will be very
instrumental in handling the problems of illegal structures. Often, planning departments
and city councils are ill equipped to handle the avalanche of building permits as well as
handle defaulter developments. The result is the overnight mushroom of unplanned, unserviced and in many cases unrecognized neighborhoods.
Recommendation 5: The Ministry of Water Works must create an interagency task force
involving GWCL, PURC, District Assemblies, town planning department and civil
society groups to coordinate water supply management and most importantly curb the
growth of squatter communities in urban centers.

6. Rain Water Harvesting
Rain water harvesting can also be used to supplement piped water. In fact, rain
harvesting has the potential to provide cheap and available water to disadvantaged
communities. With torrential rainfall occurring during the months of April to June and
September to October in most part of southern Ghana, there can be available rainwater to
enhance the water security of residents.
According to UNEP (2006), a threshold of 200 millimeters of rainfall is
considered the minimum rainfall arrival to embark on a viable rainfall harvesting
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program. In Ghana, rainfall ranges from 800 millimeters to 2000 millimeters and within
the case study areas, rainfall ranges from 1000 millimeters to 1400 millimeters. Thus, the
whole country is conducive for rainfall harvesting. Rainwater stored in storage tanks in
disadvantaged communities has the potential to supplement their water use throughout
the year. Extensive rainfall harvesting is already underway in Kenya, Botswana, Malawi
and Uganda. In Kenya, Maasai women taking part in a pilot rainfall harvesting program
in Kisamese, Kenya have reported gaining four hours in a day due to reduced demands on
their time to travel to their water source. 10
In fact, in Ghana, the culture of rain harvesting has been very strong for a very
long time especially among rural folks and with little modification; rainfall harvesting
can be used throughout entire urban areas. In consultation with estate developers and
builders, modifications can be made to the current building codes to facilitate rainfall
harvesting. Requiring newly constructed houses to have rain caps for harvesting rain
water will ensure readily available water to supplement domestic use such as bathing and
washing. Technical assistance can also be provided to owners of existing houses who will
want to modify their homes to maximize rain harvesting. In addition, urban residents can
use rain water for washing cars and gardening so that the pressure on GWCL to
continually increase their production of treated water will be minimized. Water savings
realized from this program can then be channeled to supplement the needs of
disadvantaged communities’ water needs.
10

Steiner, Achim UN Under-Secretary-General and UNEP Executive Director. (2006) Press release
accompanying the release of a report compiled by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and
the World Agroforestry Center in Nairobi, Kenya. Available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?ArticleID=5420&DocumentID=485&l=en
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Within the disadvantaged urban communities, local government and civil society
groups utilizing communal labor can collaborate to construct rainwater harvesting points
throughout the communities where rainwater will be harvested and stored in tanks. This
will then provide supplemental water service to the residents, especially for the most
vulnerable who do live in any permanent structure that will enable them embark on their
own water harvesting projects.
Recommendation 6: The government should amend the building code to require rain
water harvesting in urban centers with water supply problems. Then, the ministry of
water works through community and civil society groups should offer subsidized
rainwater harvesting equipment to builders to encourage compliance with the building
code.

7. Collaboration between water institutions in SSA
The problem of inadequate water supply is not limited to one SSA country. It is a
pervasive problem that permeates all urban centers in SSA and also throughout the
developing world. The problems are therefore not new and many countries have
embarked different strategies to address these problems. A formal collaborative regime
between different water agencies through the sub region will help propagate best
practices and avoid mistakes.
For instance, Kenya and Tanzania in 2005 embarked on a citizens’ audit approach
to improve water providers’ efficiency. (UNDP, 2006) Water utilities are often
unaccountable, not transparent and unresponsive to consumer concerns. Thus, it is hoped
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that when citizens’ participation is incorporated into the governance structure, utility
providers will be more responsive to the needs of consumers. In Kenya, the cities of
Kisumu, Mombasa and Nairobi have launched a water and sanitation social audit that
brings together residents associations, NGOs and service providers. This audit has been
used successfully in other parts of the world to improve the performance of service
providers in Philippines, Ukraine and Vietnam. (Paul, 2005)
Collaborating with the Greater Horn of Africa Rainwater Partnership (GHARP)
can help water agencies in Ghana to develop a sustainable water harvesting program
while avoiding earlier mistakes. Established in 2001, the GHARP is a regional network
of rainwater associations involving Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. GHARP
seeks to promote effective rainwater harvesting and management by sharing technologies
to, among other things, increase water supply and ensure food security. This is a
partnership that holds prospect for other SSA countries that struggle to ensure adequate
water supply.
In Cote d’Ivoire, apart from lifeline water policies, the Water Society of Cote
d’Ivoire (SODECI) has also licensed water resellers in the informal settlements to ensure
increase in water supply. Available evidence indicates that water coverage has steadily
increased for the last 10 years in Abidjan, the largest city. In addition, with surtax on
water bills, the water agency is able to provide 75% subsidy to low income dwellers for
first time water connection. (Collignon, 2002) In this case, because the requirement to
qualify for the subsidy was proof of legal settlement, many poor households in the
informal sector were not able to take advantage of the subsidy.
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In KwaZulu Natal in South Africa, as part of efforts to increase cost recovery in
the water sector, the utility company introduced prepaid water meters. Each family had to
buy a plastic card with a chip for R60 (about US$9) with additional "water units"
available for purchase to supplement the card. People who were not able to pay for the
cards resorted to unapproved water sources to satisfy their water needs. Subsequent
research found that prepaid water meters negatively impacted hand washing and other
hygienic practices. Eventually, this policy contributed to the worse cholera outbreak in
South Africa’s history with more than 200 deaths recorded. (Public Citizen, 2003)
Amenga (2003) reported that Ghana through a British company was installing prepaid
water meters on a pilot basis in some part of the city of Tema. Collaboration with water
agencies in South Africa will help to avoid a repeat of the problems South Africa
experienced in 2003.
Recommendation 7: The Ministry of Water Works should initiate a collaborative
relationship with sister agencies throughout SSA to share best practices. This initiative
should start with sister agencies in neighboring countries and then proceed to other
regions.
.
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Appendix A
Consumer Survey About Water Delivery and Consumption
1. Where do you live?
A. Ashalley Botwe
B. Ashiaman
C. Nima
2. What type of house do you live in?
A. Self contain house (Single family unit)
B. Compound house (a house with multiple families living in)
3. How many people live in your house including yourself?
A. 1 – 6
B. 7 – 12
C. 13 – 18
D. 19 – 24
E. 25 +
4. How long have you stayed in your house?
A. More than five years
B. One to Five years
C. Less than one years
5. Do you own or rent your residence?
A. Own
B. Rent
D. Other ______
6. Do you have a water meter in your house?
A. Yes
B. No
If “no,” please skip to question 8.
7. If you have a meter, how many family units does your water meter serve?
A. One
B. 2 - 5
C. 6 - 10
D. 11 - 15
E. N/A
8. What is the source of your of water supply?
A. Own house pipe
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B. Pipe in compound house
C. Neighbor’s house pipe
D. Tanker service
E. Bore hole
F. Other ____
9. How would you describe the quality of your water supply?
A. Very Clean
B. Somewhat Clean
C. Somewhat Dirty
D. Very Dirty
10. Which government body determines the price of water?
A. Ghana Water Company
B. PURC
C. I don’t know
11. Where would you complain about a water pricing problem?
A. Ghana Water Company
B. PURC
C. Member of Parliament
D. District Chief Executive
E. Assembly Man
F. Nobody
12. Are you aware that a consumer representative sits on the board of the PURC?
A. Yes
B. No
13. What do you like best about your water service?
Answer _________________________________
14. What do you like least about your water service?
Answer__________________________________
Piped Water (Answer questions 15 and 16 if you answered “own house pipe” as the
source of your water supply in question 8)
15. How often do you get a water bill?
A. Every Month
B. Every other month
C. Other __________
16. How reliable is your piped service?
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A.
B.
C.
D.

Flows everyday
Flows every other day
Flows once a week
Other ____________

Water tanker (Answer questions 17 and 18 if you answered “tanker service” as the
source of your water supply in question 8)
17. How often do you buy water from the tanker services?
A. Once every two weeks
B. Once every month
C. Once every three months
D. Other ____________
18. How much do you pay per trip for tanker service?
A. More than 60 cedis
B. 40 – 60
C. 10 – 39
D. less than 10 cedis
Water well/pipe some where/outside home supply (Answer questions 19 to 21 if you
answered “neighbor’s house pipe,” “public stand pipe,” “bore hole,” or “other” as the
source of your water supply in question 8)
19. How many buckets of water do you use in your household a day?
A. More than 5 buckets
B. Between 2 and 5 bucket
C. Less than two buckets
20. How many minutes does it take you to walk to your source of water?
A. More than 30 minutes
B. Between 20 to 30 minutes
C. Between 10 to 20 minutes
D. Less than 10 minutes
21. How much do you pay to for a bucket of water?
A. More than 10p
B. 5 – 10p
C. 1 – 5p
Closing Questions – All participants
22. Would you be prepared to pay more money for water if it is guaranteed that you will
have water within 10 minutes from your house?
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A. Yes
B. No
23. Which of the following water services would you prefer?
A. Piped water where I live
B. Public standpipe within 10 minutes from your house
C. Weekly tanker service to your house
D. Other _____________
25. What do you think should be done to ensure adequate water supply in your
community? Who should do it?
________________________________________________________________
26. What is your monthly household income?
A. More than 100 cedis
B. 50 – 100 cedis
C. 35 – 50 cedis
D. Less than 35 cedis
27. What proportion of your income do you spend on water?
A. More than two thirds
B. Half
C. One third
D. Less than one third
28. Are you male or Female
A. Male
B. Female
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Appendix B
Focus Group Protocol

Opening Questions
1. Group members make personal introductions. Name and where you live
2. Are you comfortable being part of this discussion?
3. Have you heard about the Public Utility Regulatory Commission?
4. Do you know the functions of the Public Utility Regulatory Commission? What
are the functions?
5. Describe any governmental agencies responsible for water supply and their
responsibilities to you
Introductory Questions
6. Do you have piped water in your house?
7. If not, how many buckets of water do you use a day?
8. What are the main sources of water supply for your household?
9. How do you use your water in your house?
10. How much do you use for each action?
Transition Questions
11. What member of the family is primarily responsible for ensuring that the family
has enough water for domestic use?
Main Questions
12. How would you describe the quality of the water you use? (Clean or Dirty/ Clear
or has particles/ Odorless or smelly)
13. How do you pay for your water (monthly, weekly, daily etc)?
14. What is the proportion of your income spent on water? How expensive is your
water service relative to food and electricity?
15. Would you be prepared to pay more money for water if it is guaranteed that you
will have water within 10 minutes walk from your house?
16. What do you think should be done to ensure adequate water supply in your
community? Who should do it?
17. Who do you go to when you have trouble getting enough water for domestic use?
Ending Questions
18. If you had the chance to give advice to the Minister of Water Works, what would
you say?
19. We want you to help us evaluate water services to your community. Is there
anything we missed? Did you come here to say something that you did not get the
chance to say?
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Appendix C
Statement read to survey participants
Hi, my name is Kweku Ainuson, and I am a graduate student in the Policy Studies
program at Clemson University. I am here because I would like to ask you to participate
in my dissertation research with a quick survey. My research examines the current state
of water provision in peri-urban areas in Ghana and seeks ways to appreciably improve it.
Your input through this survey will provide very useful information about both issues.
If you’re willing to participate, you can decide which questions on the survey
instrument you wish to answer. Please do not write your name on the survey instrument
or give any information that will make it easy for somebody to identify you.
The survey will take twenty minutes and includes twenty seven questions. Your
participation is voluntary and you can decide not to participate in the survey.
All information collected from this research will be kept in a locked cabinet and
kept confidential.
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Appendix D
Tanker Station
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Appendix E
Letter for Focus Group Participants
(On a Clemson University letter head)
My name is Kweku Ainuson, and I am a graduate student in the Policy Studies
program at Clemson University. I am writing to request your participation in my
dissertation research. Please find an abstract of my research attached. My research
examines the current state of water provision in peri-urban neighborhoods of Ghana,
asking whether and how it might be improved in terms of supply consistency and quality.
Your participation in this research will illuminate both of these issues.
I am asking you to take part in a focus group discussion as your contribution to
this research. The focus group discussion will take place at the public meeting place
adjoining the local library. The topics for discussion will be selected to address current
issues in peri-urban water provision in Ghana. I estimate the discussion time to be about
an hour. With your permission I will audiotape the discussion.
The information I will obtain during the discussion session with you will be kept
confidential. The tape recording and any notes I shall take will be stored in a locked
cabinet. Your name or any identifying information will not be used in any research or
report. After the completion of this research, I may save the tape and notes for use in
future research by myself or others. However, the confidentiality guaranteed here will be
the same for any future use of the tape and notes.
I expect you to be involved in only one focus group discussion session. After the
session is over and you have had the chance to initial the audio release form, you will not
be contacted again for this research.
I do not envisage any personal risks or cost in taking part in this research. You
will also not benefit directly from your participation, but I hope your inputs will help to
benefit disadvantaged communities by identifying options to cater to their water needs.
You are not under any obligation to be part of this research. If you take part in this
research, you can refuse to participate in any discussion topic and may opt out at any time
during the discussion.
If you have any questions or concerns about this study please contact Dr. Caitlin
Dyckman at Clemson University at cdyckma@clemson.edu or Kweku Ainuson at
kainuso@clemson.edu. If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a
research participant, please contact the Clemson University Office of Research
Compliance at 864.656.6460.

233

Appendix F
Statement Read out to Focus Group Participants Prior to Their Participation
Hi, my name is Kweku Ainuson, and I am a graduate student in the Policy Studies
program at Clemson University. I have asked you to be a part of my dissertation research
project today because your perspective will provide valuable insight into ways to improve
water supply in peri-urban areas of Ghana.
We are going to discuss issues about peri-urban water supply in Ghana. You are
free to express your views about an issue in any manner you feel comfortable. I will
moderate this discussion. When I feel an issue has been thoroughly discussed, I will
introduce another issue. This exercise should take about an hour. You can decide which
issues you will not want to discuss. Your participation is voluntary and you can decide
not to participate in the discussion at all. If you choose to participate in the discussion,
you will not be identified in person in any further research or publication that will arise
from this research. All notes and information taken from this discussion will be locked in
a cabinet.
With your permission, I will record the entire session or parts thereof. After the
discussion session, you will get the opportunity to tell me how you want the audio record
to be used by filling out an audio permission slip.
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Appendix G
Interview Protocol
Public Utility Regulatory Commission (PURC)
(Statutory Body to Regulate the Operations of Utility Companies)
1. My understanding is that your responsibilities include ensuring consumers have
water readily available when needed and also build a regulatory regime that will
respond to the water stakeholders concerns, and ensure equity in the provision of
water services. Would you agree to this statement or would you like to add more
to it.?
2. Do you responsibilities extend to the activities of small scale water providers?
3. How are consumers interests represented in the decisions of the commission?
a) How do you ensure that you solicit inputs from a representative sample of
consumers?
b) What is the extent of public education to teach consumers about the
responsibilities of the commission?
c) What is the extent of public education to teach consumers water
conservation measures?
4. How do you ensure that utility companies take poor areas into consideration when
planning expansion projects?
a) Do you review expansion projects and assess their effects on all
consumers and potential users?
5. Tariffs have been reviewed annually for the past three year, on what information
do you base your decision to review tariffs?
a) What is the decision making process to review tariffs?
b) Do you consider income levels?
6. What pricing mechanisms do you use?
a) What are the economic justifications for your pricing mechanisms?
b) Are tariffs aimed at full cost recovery?
c) Do you face any problems in ensuring fairness in water tariffs?
7. The 2003 country report on water supply found that poor neighborhoods pay more
for water than non-poor neighborhoods. How do you intend to solve the price
differentials between the poor and non-poor neighborhoods?
8. How do you ensure that subsidies are accurately targeted and reach their intended
beneficiaries?
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a) How do you ensure that multi household settlements with only one water
meter benefit from life line water rates?
b) How do you intend to solve the problem of price differentials in water cost
between the poor and non poor?
9. The government has responded to this year’s increase in electricity tariffs by
increasing the lifeline threshold. Do you get such government intervention in the
water sector? What effects are such interventions likely to cause?

Municipal Assemblies
1. Do you have any collaboration with PURC?
a) Do you share any information pertaining to the residents of your
municipality with the PURC?
b) Are all the residents in your municipality represented in the deliberations
of the PURC? If not, what group is excluded and why?
2. How many water service NGOs operates in your municipality?
a) Do you have any formal collaboration with the NGO (s)?
b) Are the NGOs active in all areas of the municipality or just a single
sector?
c) In your opinion, are the NGOs able to reach the water needs of
communities they serve?
3. Do you know the number of small scale water providers in your municipality?
a) Do you officially recognize their operations?
b) Do you play any supportive role? If so what role do you play?
c) Are they required to pay taxes? If so, how do you establish their tax rates?
4. Has your municipality received any complains about the services provided by the
small scale water providers?
5. In your opinion, how do you assess the services provided by the small scale water
providers?
6. What are the poverty mapping strategies in your municipality
a) Do you have specific information about the extent of water coverage for
poor neighborhoods in your municipality?
7. How does your municipality approach squatters?
a) Do you have a formal policy to deal with squatters? If so, what are they?
b) Are there any plans to integrate squatters in the municipality and provide
them with land titles?
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c) Are there plans to stop squatters from occupying other public lands in the
future
8. Are there any specific measures your municipality is taking to improve water
services to the poor communities? In your opinion, how can we improve water
services to the poor communities?

Selected Water Tanker Providers
1. Is your business registered with the government?
2. Is this business your only source of income?
3. Who are your main customers?
a) What parts of the city do you supply water to?
b) How frequently and for what duration do you supply water to consumers?
c) Is your water supply the only source of water for your clients? If not, how
do they supplement?
4. Do you have competitors? If so, who are your competitors?
5. How many water trips do you make in a week?
a) How much do you charge per trip?
b) How do your prices compare to government rates and your competitors?
6. What is the source of your water
a) Do you get water from public places (piped water, river, stream, etc)?
b) Do you check the quality of the water before you cart to the customer?
c) Do customers inquire about the water source?
d) Do you pay to get the water? If so, how much per gallon?
7. How many times do you wash your tank in a year?
a) Does anyone determine how many times you wash your tank? If so, who?
b) What chemicals/cleaning agents do you use?
c) Does any one inspect the cleaning? If so who?
8. Do you pay any taxes or fees to the government?
9. Do you have any technical/informational from the government?
10. What are some of the challenges you face in your business?
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Ghana Water Company
1. What sector of the population does the government require you to serve?
2. Are you able to meet your requirements to all these sectors? If no, who doesn’t
receive water and how do you make that determination?
3. How are you ensuring that poor neighborhoods receive water when needed?
4. Do you have any sub-contractors working with you to meet your service
requirements? If so, who?
5. What is the percentage of piped water connection in urban areas?
6. What is your billing cycle? (Get a copy of the bill)
7. What information do you include in your bill?
8. How do you collect your bills? Do you have vendors? Do you contract out bill
collection?
9. Do you recognize the operation of small scale water providers?
10. Are you in collaboration with other water providers to improve your services? If
so, how? In what ways?

Ministry of Water Resources, Works and Housing
1. What is the government’s official policy on urban water supply?
2. What percentage of the urban population has access to water supply when they
need it?
3. What are the sources of water for urban consumption?
4. How much surface and ground water are available for urban water supply?
a) Considering population growth and water demands, what are the
projections in the country for water supply?
b) Are there any conservation plans in place to ensure efficient use in the
country’s water resources?
5. What strategies do you propose to ensure that water will be readily available for
urban uses?
6. There is evidence that poor neighborhoods in urban areas pay more for water
services than non poor neighborhoods. How do you propose to bridge the gap?
7. Do you have any strategies in place to upgrade slums in urban areas – if so, how
much progress have you made?
8. What are some of the problems that your ministry faces in the water sector?
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Appendix H
Audio Consent Form
Clemson University letter head
As part of this research I have made an audio recording of you while you participated in
the project. I will like you to indicate below what uses of these records you are willing to
consent to. I will only use the records in ways that you agree to. In any use of these
records, your name will not be identified.
1. The records can be studies by the research team for use in the research project.
Audio __________ (initial)
2. The records can be used for scientific publication.
Audio ___________ (initial)
3. The records can be played at meetings of scientists interested in the study of urban
water supply.
Audio ___________ (initial)
4. The records can be played in public presentations to nonscientific groups.
Audio ___________ (initial)
5. The records can be played on television and radio.
Audio ___________ (initial)
I have read and above description and give my consent for the use of the records as
indicated above
___________________________ Date __________________
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